Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches 3, 4 & 5; Maps 5, 6 & 7)

The ground on which the British Army had taken up its Map position was a narrow belt of coalfield which extends roughly for rather more than twenty miles westwards from Maurage (6 miles east of Mons) along the Mons canal, and has an average breadth, from the canal southward, of two miles. South of this belt the country gradually rises to a great tract of rolling chalk downs, cut into by many streams and with numerous outlying spurs. Every inch of this territory has in bygone days seen the passage of British armies; name after name is found upon British colours, or is familiar in British military history.

On the ground occupied by the I. Corps, that is to say, roughly from Givry northward to Spiennes, thence westward almost to Paturages and thence southward again to Quévy le Petit, the chalk comes to the surface; and there is even a little outcrop of it within the salient or loop of the canal around Mons. This small area is cut up by wire fences, market gardens, and the usual artificial features which form the outskirts of a provincial town ; and it is noteworthy that across this tangle of enclosures no fewer than seven different roads diverge from Mons north-east and north-west to as many bridges. At the base of the salient the ground rises gradually from north to south, for fifteen hundred to two thousand yards, till it culminates in three well-marked features. The first of these is Mount Erebus, a round hill immediately to the south of Mons; the second is a great whale-backed hump, about a thousand yards long from north to south, very steep upon every side except the eastern, and crowned by two summits, Mont Panisel on the north and Bois la Haut on the south, the whole called by the latter name. The third is the height known as Hill 93, which lies south-east of Bois la Haut and is divided from it by a shallow valley. This last hill was of considerable tactical importance, since from it and from Bois la Haut observation and cross-fire could be brought to bear upon the ground eastward about St. Symphorien. But Bois la Haut was in parts thickly wooded, and consequently from its northern end, where there were hospital buildings, there was little field of fire.

West of Mons the line of the canal is straight, and the actual borders are clear; the ground on both sides of it is cut up by a network of artificial water-courses, chequered by osier-beds, for a breadth of a mile or more. But the opening up of the coal-measures has turned much of the country immediately south of this watery land into the hideous confusion of a mining district. The space occupied by the II. Corps in particular, within the quadrangle Mons-Frameries-Dour-Boussu, was practically one huge unsightly village, traversed by a vast number of devious cobbled roads which lead from no particular starting-point to no particular destination, and broken by pit-heads and great slag-heaps, often over a hundred feet high. It is, in fact, a close and blind country, such as no army had yet been called upon to fight in against a civilised enemy in a great campaign.

At 5.30 AM. the Commander-in-Chief met the commanders of his two corps and of the cavalry division in the chateau at Sars la Bruyère, when he issued orders for the outpost line to be strengthened, and for the bridges over the Mons canal to be prepared for demolition. (The G.O.C. II. Corps, foreseeing the imminence of an attack, had already, at 2.30 AM., sent an order to his two divisions to prepare the bridges for demolition. At 8.53 AM he issued a further order directing them to be destroyed on divisional order in the event of a retirement being necessary. All the barges in the canal were sunk by small gun-cotton charges. A full description of the work done will be found in " The Royal " Engineers Journal " for March 1932, " Demolitions carried out at Mons " and during the Retreat 1914," by Major-General Sir R. U. H. Buckland.) The conference over, the Field-Marshal, at 9.15 AM. proceeded to Valenciennes. The 19th Brigade had just detrained there and was marching to occupy the left flank of the outpost line on the canal. This would thus extend nearly to Condé, where it was understood from a French staff officer that Territorial troops would take it up. (The 84th Territorial Division subsequently arrived.) The local situation, therefore, seemed satisfactory. For the rest, there was intelligence of fighting between German cavalry and French Territorial infantry about Tournai, though no information as to its results.

In describing the general disposition of the troops it must be remembered that, as the Army had halted whilst in the course of wheeling or forming to face towards Nivelles, the front of the I. Corps was already turned north-eastward, whereas the II., upon the wheeling flank, still mainly faced to the north. The general front, therefore, formed an obtuse angle, the I. Corps being on the right half of the south-eastern arm, and the II. Corps round the apex and along the western arm. The south-eastern arm from Peissant to Mons was about ten miles long, and the arm along the canal from Mons to Condé, seventeen miles.

The I. Corps was extended, roughly speaking, from the Sambre to the Haine ; the 1st Division (Major-General S. H. Lomax) being on the right, with the 3rd Brigade (Br.-General H. J. S. Landon) in front between Peissant and Haulchin (about four miles); the 1st (Guards) Brigade (Br.-General F. I. Maxse) in rear of its right at Grand Reng and Vieux Reng; and the 2nd Brigade (Br.-General E. S. Bulfin) in rear of its left at Villers Sire Nicole and Rouveroy. The 2nd Division (Major-General C. C. Monro) was on its way to take up the line on the left of the 1st Division from Haulchin to Harmignies (another four miles), and meanwhile the vacant place was filled by the 5th Cavalry Brigade. In the II. Corps, the ground in front of the right of the outpost line of the 3rd Division (Major-General H. I. W. Hamilton) was commanded by the great bluff of Bois la Haut. This hill was reconnoitred for occupation by the batteries of the XL. Brigade R.F.A., which were billeted immediately behind it at Mesvin, and had been secured on the night of the 22nd-23rd by sending forward the 2/Royal Irish Regiment, of the 8th Brigade, to connect with the I. Corps at Harmignies, and hold the villages of Villers St. Ghislain and St. Symphorien. The 1/Gordon Highlanders and 2/Royal Scots of the 8th Brigade (Br.-General B. J. C. Doran) were in position near the Harmignies road from Hill 93 to the north-east corner of Bois la Haut. The front from Bois la Haut northwards to the apex of the Mons Salient, two miles, was held as an outpost line by the 4/Middlesex. Rough entrenchments had been thrown up during the afternoon of the 22nd, but were still unfinished when darkness fell. On the left of the 4/Middlesex, the 9th Brigade (Br.-General F. C. Shaw) held the line of the canal from the Nimy bridges on the western face of the Mons Salient, as far as the bridge of Mariette, six miles, with the 4/Royal Fusiliers, 1 /Royal Scots Fusiliers and 1 /Fifth Fusiliers. (Two companies of the 1/Fifth Fusiliers were in the line, the remainder of the battalion was in brigade reserve with the Lincolnshire.) The remaining battalion, the 1/Lincolnshire, was a mile south-west of Mons at Cuesmes. The 7th Brigade (Br.-General F. W. N. McCracken) was in reserve about Ciply, two miles south of Mons. The rest of the artillery of the 3rd Division was held for the present mostly in reserve XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. north of Ciply, and XLII. R.F.A., together with the 48th Heavy Battery, at Nouvelles (1 1/2 miles east of Ciply). The XXX. Howitzer Brigade was still on its way from Valenciennes.

Passing westward to the 5th Division (Major-General Sir C. Fergusson), the 13th Brigade (Br.-General G. J. Cuthbert) was posted, with a three-mile front, on the left of the 9th, the 1/Royal West Kent covering the bridges which span the canal immediately east of St. Ghislain, with four guns of the 120th Field Battery in close support on the tow-path. On the left of the West Kent, who had dug themselves excellent trenches by the railway bridge, the 2/King's Own Scottish Borderers, with the machine guns of the 2/King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, occupied the canal up to, but not including, the railway bridge at Les Herbières, with one company entrenched on the road north of that bridge. The two remaining battalions of the 13th Brigade were held in reserve in St. Ghislain, in rear of the centre of the brigade front.

On the left of the 13th Brigade, the 14th (Br.-General S. P. Rolt) occupied the line of the canal from the railway bridge of Les Herbières westward to Pommeroeul road bridge, a front of 2 1/2 miles. The 1/East Surrey were on the right, holding the railway bridge itself, with one company pushed across to the north bank. From the foot-bridge south of La Hamaide, the 1/Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry prolonged the front to Pommeroeul bridge. Here again a platoon, together with the machine-gun section, was sent across the canal to form a bridgehead upon the north bank. The machine guns were posted to sweep the straight length of road towards Ville Pommeroeul ; but a clear view northward was obstructed by rolling stock on the railway, which crosses the road about a mile to north of the canal. As the Haine stream, which was unfordable and had few bridges, passed about a mile behind this part of the line, the Duke of Cornwall's had orders to hold the canal as an advanced position only, and to retire when necessary to a second position, which the 15th Brigade (Br.-General Count Gleichen) was directed to prepare behind the Haine The 2/Suffolk and 2/Manchester, the remaining battalions of the 14th Brigade, were in reserve. The 15th Brigade was divided, part preparing a position on the Haine, with the rest in reserve further to the rear near Dour. From Pommeroeul westward the 4th Cavalry Brigade was responsible for the two remaining crossing-places east of Condé, at Lock 5 and St. Aybert, until the 19th Brigade should come up, and these two points were accordingly occupied by the Carabiniers. All troops were warned to expect an attack early next morning.

The selection of positions along the part of the line held by the 5th Division was a matter of the greatest difficulty, the ground being a wilderness of deep ditches, straggling buildings, casual roads and tracks, and high slag-heaps. These last seemed to offer points of vantage, which were generally found to be non-existent when their summits had been explored, as they were commanded by some other slag-heap ; while certain of them, which seemed to promise all that could be desired, were found to be so hot that men could not stand on them. The artillery was even more embarrassed than the infantry : the officers had great difficulty in finding suitable positions for batteries or even for single guns, and were equally at a loss to discover good observation posts. The general policy followed was to push batteries or sections of batteries up to the infantry line for close defence, and to keep the mass of the artillery, including the heavy battery, on the left, where the guns could cover all open ground in anticipation of a turning movement round that flank. Altogether, the ground was such as to baffle the most skilful and sanguine of British gunners. Fortunately, on the enemy side, the conditions were almost identical ; and, except on the east, where the ground was more open, the Germans could make little use of their overwhelming superiority of numbers; for they were about to match eight divisions against four, and actually in the infantry fight six against two extended along a front of 13 miles. In fact, the line of the II. Corps was so thin that it was little better than an outpost line, a chain of small groups, lying on the canal bank, almost invisible, as is shown in a photograph taken by a machine-gun officer during the battle from his flanking gun. Not without good reason was provision made for a retrenchment across the rear of the Salient and for occupying a position in rear of the canal, roughly Frameries-Wasmes-Dour, should a strong attack develop.

The morning of Sunday the 23rd broke in mist and rain, which, about 10 AM., cleared off and gave place to fair weather. Church bells rang, and the inhabitants of the villages near the canal were seen in their best attire going to worship as if war was utterly distant from them. Trains were running towards Mons crowded with the usual holiday makers. The mounted troops of both armies however were early astir. Those of the British 1st and 2nd Divisions, reconnoitring east of Mons towards the bridges of Binche, Bray, Havre and Obourg, soon encountered small parties of the enemy. Near Obourg they were pressed back, and at 6 AM. the German cavalry exchanged shots with the 4/Middlesex. About the same time, other parties of German horse approached the Royal Fusiliers in the apex of the Salient, and two officers of the German 3rd Hussars, the corps cavalry of the III. Corps, were made prisoners. Another patrol, towards Nimy, came in sight of the Scots Fusiliers, who killed one man, and identified his uniform as that of the cavalry regiment of the IX. Corps. Further west, two German patrols were caught in ambush, near Ville Pommeroeul between 6.30 and 7 AM., and two prisoners were taken, one a dragoon, the other a hussar: an indication of the presence of two more regiments, both of the German 9th Cavalry Division. The mounted troops of the British 5th Division crossed the Canal near the posts of the K.O.S.B. and of the West Kent; and both battalions pushed a reserve company forward to secure their retreat. That of the West Kent, " A " Company, advanced to the road-junction south of the village of Tertre ; that of the Scottish Borderers to a pond about half a mile north of Les Herbières road bridge. Each side was feeling for the other in expectation of the coming shock.

There could be little doubt where the first blow would fall. The Germans were completing a wheel from east to south, and immediately opposite to the eastern, or standing flank of Kluck's Army lay the Mons Salient. Before 9 A.M. German guns were in position on the high ground north of the canal, and very soon shells were bursting thickly along the whole line of the Middlesex and the 2 Royal Fusiliers. One German battery commander boldly unlimbered his guns in the open, and began firing at a range of 1,500 yards ; but he was speedily compelled to shift his ground by the machine guns of the Middlesex. By 9 A.M. German infantry was pressing on to engage the Middlesex about Obourg and, as the hostile movement from north-east to south-west developed itself, troops, all apparently of the IX. Corps, gradually spread around the entire curve of the Salient from Obourg to Nimy. By 10 AM the company in Obourg was heavily engaged and, indeed, hard pressed ; and, shortly afterwards, the machine-gun section of the Royal Irish joined that of the Middlesex. Meanwhile, the Royal Fusiliers were ceaselessly shooting down Germans, who at first came on in heavy masses, but, being caught by the rapid fire of the Fusiliers in front and by the machine guns of the Middlesex and Royal Irish in flank, soon abandoned this costly method of attack. They then began working across the front in small parties, in order to form for a fresh effort under cover of the woods. The British troops in the Salient had orders to make " a stubborn resistance " ; the Middlesex and the Royal Fusiliers, therefore, defended themselves with tenacity, and until past 11 AM were still holding their original positions.

As the southward wheel of Klucks Army progressed, the attack gradually spread westward along the line of the canal. The right of the German IX. Corps did not appear to extend beyond Nimy; (This is now known to he correct (see Sketch 3 in " Mons ")). and it was not until 11 AM that the III. Corps, which was next on the right of it, came into action about the bridge of Jemappes, 2 miles west of Mons. German shells fell in Jemappes itself, in rear of the Scots Fusiliers ; the infantry almost simultaneously advanced in heavy lines. The forward post of the Scots Fusiliers north of the canal was thereupon withdrawn, and, as the Germans came nearer, they were met by a fire of rifles and machine guns which effectually checked their progress. After a pause they came on again, taking shelter behind the northern bank of the canal, and actually closed to within two hundred yards of the bridge at Lock 2, west of Jemappes, when they were compelled by the accuracy of the British fire once more to fall back. (Hauptmann (Professor) Heubner, of the 20th Infantry Regiment, 5th Division, III. Corps, who witnessed the attack at Jemappes, in his book " Unter Emmich vor Lüttich, Unter Kluck vor Paris," pp. 69 and 74 , speaks of the " numerous wounded " of the regiment which attempted to storm the railway and factory ; and at the end of the day says " that they [the English], in any case, fought bravely and obstinately is proved by the heavy losses that our German troops suffered here.")

At Mariette, 3 1/2 miles west of Mons, still in the 9th Brigade area, German shells found the bridge immediately, and a column of infantry in fours came swinging down a country road immediately to the east. It was promptly stopped by the fire of a small party, under a corporal, which occupied a house in the angle between this road and the waterway. The enemy then tried an advance down the main road ; but this had been obstructed by a wire entanglement immediately north and west of the bridge, and by a barricade immediately south of it ; the Fifth Fusiliers too were well and skilfully disposed, under good shelter, on both flanks of the road, both in advance and in rear of the bridge. Under a withering fire from three sides, the Germans pressed on to the wire, only to be brought to a standstill, and then driven back with heavy loss.

They now brought up two field guns within half a mile of the canal, and opened fire with high-explosive shell upon the defenders of the bridge : not without effect, for a shell bursting in the occupied house on the east side of the road killed the whole of the little garrison. But, instead of grey-coated soldiers, a number of little Belgian girls came down the road, and the Fifth Fusiliers naturally ceased their fire. (Evidence of Captain B. T. St. John, commanding the company of the Fifth Fusiliers which held Mariette Bridge. It is not suggested that the enemy drove them deliberately in front of him. In many cases inhabitants were caught between the two hostile lines.) Thereupon, the Germans swarmed forward and, flooding over to the western side of the main road, were able to establish themselves within two hundred yards of the canal, whence they could bring an oblique fire to bear upon the defenders of the barricade. The advanced party of the Fifth on the north side of the bridge was then withdrawn; but the Germans were still far from being masters of the passage of the canal at Mariette ; and the Fifth Fusiliers for the moment held their own with no great difficulty and without serious loss.

Further to the left, in the 13th Brigade area, " A " Company of the West Kent, at the cross roads south of Tertre, which was in support of the 5th Division mounted troops, was warned by the cyclists of the advance of the enemy in force. This company had found a fair field of fire ; but the line of retreat to the canal was difficult, the ground being cut up by many deep ditches and barbed wire fences. As far as time permitted, passages had been cut through the wire, so that during its retirement the company might not mask the fire of the main body on the canal ; but the preparations were scarcely completed before a small party of the cyclists came at top speed down the road from Tertre and reported that the Germans had brought up guns to drive them from the village. The leading German infantry regiment, the Brandenburg Grenadiers of the 5th Division of the III. Corps, had, in fact, moved southward upon Tertre from Baudour, and the battalion which was at its head had encountered considerable resistance from the cyclists. Five minutes after this alarm had reached the West Kent company (that is to say at about 11.10 AM.), this German battalion debouched from Tertre and moved southward, the bulk of the men being in massed formation on the eastern side of the road to St. Ghislain, with parties in extended order upon either flank. They were met by a shattering fire of rifles and machine guns, and were seen to suffer heavily. The commander of the German regiment then made a regular attack with the support of artillery, deploying his two remaining battalions to the right and left of the first. By the German account, the Brandenburgers suffered some loss in the village of Tertre from the British artillery, presumably from the guns of the 120th Battery on the canal. Meanwhile " A " Company commander received a message from the divisional cavalry, a squadron of the 19th Hussars, which had gone out in the direction of Hautrage, north-west of Tertre, asking him to cover its retirement ; and accordingly he clung to his position, while three German battalions, a German battery and a German machine-gun company all came into action against him. The pressure soon became so strong that he began gradually to withdraw by succession of platoons, the men behaving with the greatest steadiness and firing with great effect as the enemy came within closer range. The rearmost platoon, in fact, fought its way out with the Germans within a hundred yards of it in front and upon both flanks. Eventually about half of the company rejoined the battalion on the canal, the remainder having been killed or wounded, and left, inevitably, to fall into the enemy's hands. This was the fate of the company commander, Captain G. D. Lister, and of one of his subalterns ; but his men had made a magnificent fight and inflicted far heavier losses than they received.

Having cleared this advanced party out of their way, the Brandenburg Grenadiers, covered now by the fire of four or five field batteries, swarmed forward over the maze of wire fences and boggy dykes against the main positions of the West Kent and the Scottish Borderers on the canal. The four guns of the British 120th Battery were soon compelled to withdraw, apparently about noon; though, later on, the remaining section found a position upon a slag-heap, further to the south and east, and came into action with considerable effect. But the positions of the British infantry were so well chosen and concealed that the German artillery failed to discover them, and hence the progress of the German infantry was both slow and costly. In any case, the attack upon the bridge of St. Ghislain was stopped while still three hundred yards distant from the canal by the accurate fire of the West Kent, the machine guns of the K.O.Y.L.I., and the half company of the K.O.S.B., on the left of the bridge, who all alike had excellent targets, and took advantage of them to the full, with little loss to themselves. The Germans imagined that they were everywhere opposed by machine guns only, not realising the intensity of British rapid fire. (A full and dramatic account of the attack of the Brandenburg Grenadier Regiment is given in " Vormarsch," by Walter Bloem, the novelist, who, as a reserve officer, was commanding one of the companies. He states that he lost all five of his company officers and half his men. The battalion commander said to him in the evening, " You are my sole and only support . . . you are the only company commander left in the battalion . . . the battalion is a mere wreck, my proud, beautiful battalion ! " And the regiment was "shot down, smashed up-only a handful left." Bloem adds, " Our first battle is a heavy, unheard of heavy, defeat, and against the English, the English we laughed at." The regiment was withdrawn a quarter of a mile as soon as it was dark, and spent an anxious night, for, as the colonel said, " if the English have the slightest suspicion of our condition, and counter-attack, they will simply run over us." Vormarsch " has been translated under the title of " The Advance from Mons 1914 " (Peter Davies).)

In this area, the enemy attack spread westward towards noon to the bridges of Les Herbières, where the 52nd Infantry Regiment contrived, with great skill, to pass men by driblets over the road into the reedy marshes alongside the canal, and even to send one or two machine guns with them. Reinforcements of the 2/Duke of Wellington's and 2/K.O.Y.L.I. were called up about 2 P.M. in closer support of the Scottish Borderers, the former suffering a few casualties from shell fire; but their services were not required, for the German attack had already come to a standstill.

At the railway bridge of Les Herbières the Germans of the 6th Division of the III. Corps began by bringing a machine gun into action in a house about half a mile from the barricade put up by the East Surrey (14th Brigade). This was instantly silenced by one of the East Surrey machine guns; the Germans, thereupon, searched all the houses round the railway bridge with shell, in the hope of locating it. They then tried to push forward in small columns, but were stopped short by rifle and machinegun fire, which also dispersed a group of German staff officers a thousand yards away and further to the east. The enemy then plied the East Surrey defences with shrapnel and machine-gun fire for half an hour, causing no casualties, but disabling one machine gun; after which, about 1.30 P.M., he attacked with two battalions of the 52nd in mass, which advanced across the open at a range of six hundred yards. Such a target was all that the British could wish for: another company of the East Surrey had by this time joined the one astride the embankment, and three platoons of the Suffolk had also come up to cover their left flank. Rapid rifle fire, combined with long bursts at selected objects from the remaining machine gun at the barricade, mowed down large numbers of the enemy and scattered the rest. At this point, therefore, the Germans were decisively repulsed with very heavy loss, at the cost of trifling casualties to the East Surrey.

Thus far, seven miles west of Mons, the German attack had spread during the forenoon and the early afternoon; the line of the infantry of the III. Corps did not extend further westward, while that of the IV. Corps had not had time to complete its wheel to the south, so that the 1/Duke of Cornwall's L.I. at Pommeroeul had not yet come into action.

Throughout the forenoon and the early afternoon, that is to say, until 2 P.M., all had remained quiet opposite the I. Corps, which it will be remembered faced north-east. Between 11 AM and 12.30 P.M. the 2nd Division had reached its destination, and the 6th Brigade took position on the left of the corps between Vellereille le Sec and Harmignies, with the 4th (Guards) Brigade in rear of it about Harveng, and the 5th still further to the rear at Genly and Bougnies. The 3rd and 6th Brigades now therefore held the front of the I. Corps. About 2 P.M. German guns at some point between Binche and Bray, 3 1/2 miles to the north-east, opened fire upon the ridge of Haulchin, against the left of the 3rd Brigade. About half an hour later German cavalry (The 16th Dragoons (see " Mons ").) was seen moving across the British front north-west from Bray towards St. Symphorien. The 22nd and 70th Field Batteries, which were unlimbered about Vellereille le See, were able to shell these parties with good effect, but in return were heavily shelled by batteries which they were unable to locate. The 4th (Guards) Brigade was pushed forward to extend the line of the 6th from Harmignies north-west along the road to Mons, and various battalions, coming under artillery fire in the course of the afternoon, suffered a few casualties. But heavy firing could be heard to the north about Mons. About 3 P.M. a message from Major-General H. I. W. Hamilton reported a serious attack on the 3rd Division, and asked for assistance. Though the situation on the right of the I. Corps was not yet clear, for the Germans were still shelling the 3rd Brigade severely, General Haig directed that two battalions of the 4th (Guards) Brigade should take over the defence of Hill 93 from the 3rd Division, and thus afford it some relief. The news brought in by the 1st and 2nd Division cavalry at 3 P.M. that the French east of the I. Corps had been obliged to fall back a little, might well cause some anxiety; but the more pressing danger lay on the left of the I. Corps in the vicinity of Mons. In every other sector of the line the British were holding their own with case, and were punishing all attempts to force the passage of the canal with severity; but in the Salient, the weakest and most critical point of the line, the situation was not so satisfactory.

We left the 4/Middlesex of the 8th Brigade, and the 4/Royal Fusiliers of the 9th between 11 A.M. and noon making " a stubborn resistance " on the curve from Obourg to Nimy, north-east of Mons. Br.-General Doran (8th Brigade) had early given orders to the 2/Royal Irish, whose companies had covered the ground in front of Hill 93 and Bois la Haut during the night, to assemble north of the latter hill, and by noon the entire battalion was collected there. Just about that time, the Middlesex at Obourg, finding that Germans were nearly in rear of them, began to fall back westward through the Bois d'Havre, the wood just south of Obourg, and the enemy artillery began to shell the main line of the 8th Brigade, south-east of Mons, with shrapnel, but without much effect ; for it could not see the position of the Royal Scots along the Harmignies-Mons road, and the majority of the Gordon Highlanders were hidden from view. Infantry then advanced by rushes obliquely across the front of these two battalions, heading for Hill 93 and offering excellent targets. The rifles of both battalions were soon effectively employed, whilst the machine guns of the Royal Scots, thrown slightly forward in a quarry about the centre of the line, poured in a deadly enfilade fire. The 49th Battery also contributed to the enemy's discomfiture by firing shrapnel from Bois la Haut. Thus, in this quarter the enemy was brought to a complete standstill three hundred yards from the British trenches.

Within the Salient the conditions were very different. The Germans shortly after noon succeeded in passing the canal west of Obourg, and in reaching the railway ; then, taught by hard experience, they abandoned massed formation and advanced in extended order. At 12.30 P.M. the Royal Irish were ordered to reinforce the Middlesex and moved off in the direction of Hill 62 under heavy fire of artillery and machine guns, which so delayed them that it was nearly 1.30 P.M. before they deployed on the left of the Middlesex. Anything in the nature of a local counter-attack to relieve the situation was out of the question, owing to wire fences and other obstacles. Far from gaining ground, the Royal Irish could only just hold their own. They now shifted their machine guns, which had previously been massed with those of the Middlesex, to the extreme right of their own front. They had not long been there when a body of Uhlans debouched from a wood about six hundred yards east of them : instantly fire was opened from both rifles and machine guns. The German horsemen turned about but, as they retired, were caught in flank by the fire of some of the Middlesex falling back from Obourg. This, however, though satisfactory, was but an incident if the IX. Corps was attacking in earnest, and every minute went to show that this was the case.

The situation of the Royal Irish and the Middlesex was precarious in the extreme; for they were not in a well concealed position which the German artillery could not exactly locate, or with a good field of fire before them. On the contrary, their ground was under good observation from the heights on the north of the canal ; and the German batteries, (Of the 18th Division between St. Denis and Masières, 3 miles north-east of Mons.) having complete ascendancy, kept them under heavy fire. Under the protection of this fire, the enemy infantry slowly gained ground by sheer weight of numbers, although not without loss. Shortly after 2 P.M. the machine-gun section of the Royal Irish tried to come into action on the road about three hundred yards north of Bois la Haut, but one gun was at once disabled and had to be abandoned. Returning to the original position, the remaining gun again came into action, but called down upon itself a concentrated fire of guns and machine guns, which disabled it immediately and killed or wounded every man of the section. The machine guns of the Middlesex were also in trouble; for the Germans had brought up at least six of these weapons against them, and the officer in command of the section had been wounded, though he still remained in charge of his men. By 3.15 P.M. the German infantry, in great force, was within a furlong of the Royal Irish and working round both flanks; so, after consultation with Lieut-Colonel C. P. A. Hull of the Middlesex, Major S. E. St. Leger who was in command decided to withdraw the Royal Irish some fifteen hundred yards southward to the northern slopes of Bois la Haut. The right of their line moved first, meanwhile the remainder were collected into two bodies : one by Colonel Hull on the northern slopes of Hill 62, and the other at its north-eastern corner. The latter helped greatly to cover the retreat, which was conducted methodically and in good order. Finally the battalion rallied on the left of the left company of the Gordons whose line now extended almost to the cross roads north of Bois la Haut, the time being then about 4 P.M. The shelling was still very heavy, and the cross roads themselves were swept by machine guns from the east, though some buildings at that point and the ground west of the cross roads gave some protection from bullets. A section of the 49th Battery unlimbered on the left of the Royal Irish and, though greatly exposed, gave them some support.

The Middlesex fell back about the same time as the Royal Irish, between them and the 9th Brigade in Mons, though, being more widely extended, they were less easily re-formed. One company, on leaving the Bois d'Havre, which lies south of Obourg, entered the deserted rifle pits of the Royal Irish and there for a time stood fast. But the retreat of both battalions was facilitated by the fate of the first German attack upon the hill of Bois la Haut itself. This attack was opened by about a company of German infantry, which, with scouts in front of it, emerged gradually from a wood against the left centre company of the Gordons. The Highlanders allowed the scouts to advance and held their fire until greater numbers appeared ; then they opened rapid fire at five hundred yards' range, and in a few minutes stopped the attack with heavy loss. Thereby a short respite was gained, which enabled the retiring battalions to settle down in their new positions.

Earlier, at 2 P.M., the Royal Fusiliers, in obedience to Br.-General Shaw's (9th Brigade) orders, withdrew southwards from Nimy, the supporting companies covering the retirement of the advanced companies with peace-time precision. Their losses did not greatly exceed one hundred; and after re-forming in Mons the battalion moved southward again to Ciply. (Lieut. M. J. Dease (who died of wounds) and Private S. F. Godley of the 4/Royal Fusiliers were awarded the V.C. for the manner in which they fought the machine guns. All the men of two crews were killed or wounded.) The Lincolnshire had been employed since noon in barricading the three roads which lead from Mons to the south; but the Germans did not follow the Royal Fusiliers very closely, and when at last they tried to debouch by the main road from Mons, they were met by a destructive fire from the Lincolnshire at the barricade and by a few shells from the 109th Battery at close range. Unable to make any progress, they turned westward, leaving the Lincolnshire to retire at their leisure by Mesvin upon Nouvelles, 3 miles south of Mons.

Owing to the close proximity of the enemy only the bridge over the canal to the north-west of Mons was blown up in this sector, although charges were laid. An officer of the 57th Field Company R.E. was taken prisoner at the Nimy bridge and all the work was done under sniping. One charge which had been placed in position was removed by a shell.

West of the Salient, about 3 P.M. the Scots Fusiliers (9th Brigade) likewise fell back, by order, through Jemappes upon Frameries, 3 miles from the canal. Here, since two of the three bridges had not been destroyed, from lack of an " exploder " to fire the charges, the Germans followed hard after, and there was sharp fighting among the slag-heaps. Some of the Fusiliers, firing from the houses, used their weapons with special effect ; but two companies seeking a route between the slag-heaps suffered much from machine guns which the Germans had instantly brought forward, and for a time were in serious difficulties, the ground being most unfavourable either for defence or for the co-operation of artillery. About 4 P.M. however, the two reserve companies of the Fifth Fusiliers, the left of the 9th Brigade, whose orders to retire from Mariette had reached them rather late, struck in from the west upon the flank of the Germans, and, after some fighting, enabled the Scots Fusiliers to extricate themselves and to re-form in Frameries. The German guns were sufficiently far advanced to shell the position of the South Lancashire (7th Brigade), a mile north of the village, but only one or two small parties of enemy infantry approached it. The forward companies of the Fifth Fusiliers meanwhile stuck to their position on the canal, in spite of the command to retire, in order to cover the engineers who were preparing the bridge of Mariette for destruction. Despite the remarkable coolness and gallantry of Captain T. Wright, R.E., (Captain Wright, who was killed on the Aisne, 14th September, received the V.C. for this service. Lance-Corporal C. A. Jarvis, 57th Field Company, R.E. also received it for working 1 1/2 hours under heavy fire and successfully firing the charges at Jemappes station bridge.) who swung himself forward, hand over hand, under the bridge to connect the charges, the work could not be completed, though he made a second attempt after being wounded in the head. It was not until 5 P.M. when the sappers had withdrawn, after collecting all their gear, that these two companies of the Fifth retired towards Frameries. The Germans made no effort to press them and, in fact, did not immediately cross the bridge.

Further to the left, the 13th Brigade still held its position on the canal, though the fire of the German artillery steadily increased in the course of the afternoon. The enemy, indeed, pushed forward three batteries to within twelve hundred yards of the canal about St. Ghislain, and smothered the 13th Brigade with shells, but did remarkably little damage. Indeed, it was not until about 6 P.M., when guns were brought up within close range and destroyed the barricade over Les Herbières road bridge that the Scottish Borderers withdrew to the southern bank. The East Surreys (14th Brigade) withdrew their advanced parties from north of the canal about the same time. The battalion then retired by alternate companies to the position ordered near Thulin, south of the Haine. Nevertheless in this quarter the Germans were unable to make the slightest progress, and, indeed, at dusk the West Kent were still holding their position north of the canal. Parties of the 17th Field Company R.E. remained near the bridges in this sector until 1.30 AM on the 24th, when, after all the infantry had withdrawn, they blew up the railway and road bridges at St. Ghislain, and the three bridges to the west.

On the left of the East Surreys the Duke of Cornwall's L.I. were left wholly undisturbed until 4.45 P.M. when a mass of German cavalry coming down the road from Ville Pommeroeul was driven back headlong by machine-gun and rapid rifle fire. Immediately afterwards, the advanced parties were recalled to the southern bank of the canal ; the bridge was blown up by the 59th Field Company R.E., and the adjacent bridges near Pommeroeul by the 1st Field Squadron R.E.; and then all fell back across the Haine to the second position.

On the extreme left, the 19th Brigade relieved the Cavalry Division between 2 and 3 P.M., the 1/Middlesex and the Cameronians taking the line up to Condé. Soon after 5 P.M. an attack was made upon Lock 5, when the enemy contrived to mount a machine gun in a house commanding the buildings. The lock bridge was therefore blown up by the 1st Field Squadron R.E., but the 1/Middlesex, though it abandoned the buildings, continued to hold its own without difficulty and with trifling loss. The two bridges at St. Aybert, further west, were destroyed at 3 A.M. on the 24th, after all the cavalry parties had come in.

Such, therefore, was the condition of affairs west of the Salient whilst the 2/Royal Irish and 4/Middlesex were defending their second position north of Bois la Haut ; the facts most important to them were, that the Germans, in consequence of the retirement, by order, of the 9th Brigade, were defiling through Mons, and, though checked for a time at its southern border, had nearly reached Frameries, 3 miles south-west of the town. About 5 P.M. the main body of the Royal Irish was again forced to retire. By that time the men of the Middlesex who had occupied the rifle pits of the Royal Irish, many of their rifles being so clogged with sand as to be useless, were overwhelmed by the attacking swarms of Germans. Then came the turn of their machine-gun section which, with the water boiling furiously in the jackets of the guns, fired away its last rounds of ammunition into the masses of the enemy, and was then overpowered. Having no other position in rear which offered any field of fire, the main body of the Royal Irish re-formed west of the northern end of Bois la Haut, their withdrawal being assisted by the left company of the Gordons. Here the 4/Middlesex passed through them and, taking the first road to the westward, marched towards Hyon (1/4 mile west of Bois la Haut) on their way to Nouvelles, their place in the second position. The Royal Irish started back along the same road, but had not proceeded far before they found the enemy ahead of them little more than a hundred yards away. Cramped between the steep slope of Bois la Haut and a tangle of buildings on the other side of the road, they could not deploy; the battalion was obliged to turn northward and to work round the hill to its south-eastern angle. Here the guns of the 6th Battery, expecting an attack every minute, were disposed in a semi-circle, and the Royal Irish, together with a platoon of the Gordons which was acting as escort to the battery, entrenched themselves about the guns, facing north, west, and south. The enemy followed them up, but, being in no great strength, did not venture to attack.

Meanwhile, the 23rd Battery had received orders to retire from the summit of Bois la Haut, and selected as its route a sunken lane leading due south into the main road to Hyon. Proceeding that way, the head of the battery had reached a point within a hundred yards of the main Hyon road, when the leading teams and drivers were all shot down by German infantrymen, who had come through Mons and were hidden behind a barricade at right angles to the end of the lane. The gunners went forward to engage the enemy with rifles, and, being joined by the battery escort of the Gordon Highlanders, drove the Germans back into Hyon with some loss. The enemy's barricade was then occupied, and a second barricade thrown up a little east of it; some adjoining buildings were placed in a state of defence ; and, while all ranks gave themselves to the task of clearing the lane, the major in command A of the battery went off to find Br.-General Doran (8th Brigade). Although the light had now begun to fail, the 23rd Battery was still in an unenviable situation. Moreover, the Germans seemed bent upon pinning the 8th Brigade to its ground; for between 7 and 8 P.M. they launched a general attack, without any preliminary bombardment, against the whole front of the Gordons and Royal Scots along the Harmignies-Mons road. The attenuated line of the Royal Scots had since 4 P.M. been reinforced by two companies of the Irish Rifles (The 2/R. Irish Rifles had been attached about 2.30 P.M. to the 8th Brigade and had relieved the Royal Scots on Hill 93.) from the 7th Brigade, and the entire front blazed into a burst of rapid fire, which cut the Germans down by scores and brought them instantly to a complete standstill. (The 75th Regiment lost 5 officers and 376 men in this attack. See Mons," pp. 33, 34.) They then drew off, and some of them assembling about the cross-roads north-cast of Bois la Haut, they were dispersed anew by the fire of the little party of the Royal Irish installed there. Still, the general situation of the 8th Brigade was insecure ; on its front the enemy, as he had just demonstrated, was in force, and in its rear parties had penetrated through Mons as far as Hyon.

To review the British line from the Salient westward, as it stood at nightfall : of the 3rd Division, the position of the 8th Brigade has just been described; it was the apex of the new front. The 7th and 9th Brigades were entrenched on its left between Nouvelles and Frameries three miles from the canal ; the guns had been withdrawn from Erebus to the vicinity of Frameries for the night. Of the 5th Division, on the left of the 3rd, in the 13th Brigade the West Kent were still in their position on the canal, with orders to retire three miles south-east to Wasmes at midnight. They had lost little more than a hundred men ; from five to six hundred yards to their front the Brandenburg Grenadiers, who had suffered heavy loss, were entrenched in the marshy meadows on the north bank. On the left of the West Kent, the K.O.S.B. had just withdrawn their advanced companies from the north of the canal, and had repulsed, with great slaughter, an attempt of the Germans to debouch in mass from a wood opposite the left of their main line. The bridges over the canal on their front were ready for demolition, and the K.O.S.B. were also preparing to march to Wasmes, some of the K.O.Y.L.I. coming forward to cover the movement. There was no sign of pursuit by the Germans, though even demolished bridges are not impassable for an enterprising infantry. Opposite Les Herbières the East Surreys and the remainder of the 14th Brigade had joined, or were in the act of joining, the Duke of Cornwall's L.I. in the second position south of the Haine. Here the enemy, after suffering severely while passing the canal from the machine guns of the D.C.L.I. and the Manchester, was firing away an immense amount of ammunition with very little result. On the extreme left, the 19th Brigade was in position on the bank of the canal.

Thus it will be observed that there was no uniformity of movement from the outpost line on the canal to the main position in rear : the characteristic obstinacy of the British infantry, which has always fought on without much regard to what was happening in other parts of the field, was thus early made manifest, in spite of the efforts of the Staff to co-ordinate the withdrawal. The 13th Brigade did not attempt to retire until night, though the brigades to the right and left of it had fallen back in the afternoon. The 19th Brigade also stood fast. As a result of the retirement of the two divisions from the outpost line on the canal to the position south of Mons, the left of the 3rd Division remained as heretofore on the road between Frameries and Cuesmes, but the right of the 5th Division extended no further than to the road from Quaregnon to Paturages ; between the inner flanks of the divisions there was a gap, almost entirely covered by houses, of some two miles. This gap had been foreseen by II. Corps headquarters, and more than one message passed early in the afternoon between General Smith-Dorrien and GHQ. and the Staff of the I. Corps with reference to using the 5th Brigade (Br.-General R. C. B. Haking) to fill it, as this brigade was close at hand in reserve near Genly, in rear of Frameries. As a first measure, General Smith-Dorrien ordered the 1/Bedford from the 15th Brigade to Paturages, and, later on, three battalions of the 5th Brigade arrived from the I. Corps, in compliance with his request. Two battalions of the 4th (Guards) Brigade had moved up late in the evening to Hill 93, and were in touch with the Royal Scots, thus completing the junction between the I. and II. Corps.

The only thing which still remained in doubt was the fate of part of the 8th Brigade and the artillery with it. At 9 P.M. orders were issued by Br.-General Doran to fall back to the new position at Nouvelles. The party of the Royal Irish at the cross-roads, having clung to their little stronghold till 10 P.M., joined the Gordons, bringing with them one of the battalion machine guns, which had been repaired from the wreck of the other. The 6th Battery guns were man-handled to the foot of Bois la Haut, where the teams were hooked in. These guns and the Royal Irish were the first to move off, about 11 P.M. Meanwhile the 23rd Battery had been working hard to clear the lane and extricate its guns. Interference by a strong German patrol soon after dark was stopped without serious difficulty, and by 10 P.M. the road was free and the battery ready to march. Shortly afterwards the battery commander returned, having walked through some German troops, and by his orders, shortly before midnight, the battery drove off as noiselessly as possible, the Germans being within three hundred yards of it-eastward to the Beaumont road and thence, by Spiennes, to Nouvelles. Then the Gordon Highlanders marched off, the Royal Scots opening fire to drown the tramp of men and the clatter of vehicles. Finally the Royal Scots withdrew, company by company, and before 3 AM on the 24th the whole of the 8th Brigade, together with the three batteries attached to it, was safe in Nouvelles. The two Guards battalions and the Royal Irish Rifles left Hill 93 shortly after 2 AM.

Altogether, the British commanders were not ill-satisfied with the day's work. The unsatisfactory position on the canal had been imposed upon them fortuitously; but it had been held for a sufficient time, and had been evacuated, without great difficulty or disaster, in favour of a second position only a mile or two in rear. The men, too, were in high spirits, for they had met superior numbers of the most highly renowned army in the world and had given a good account of themselves. (It may be of interest to note that the strength of the 3rd and 5th Divisions, those principally engaged at Mons, was just under 36,000 ; the strength of the British Army at the battle of Waterloo was 31,585 (Wellington Despatches, xii. pp. 485-7).) The total casualties amounted to just over sixteen hundred of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. The whole of these, except forty, were sustained by the II. Corps, and practically half of them by two battalions of the 8th Brigade in the Salient.(The 4/Middlesex had lost over 400 and the 2/Royal Irish over 300.).

The only loss of artillery was that of two guns of the 120th Battery, which could not be removed from their exposed position on the canal at St. Ghislain.

The general result of the action was that the German advance was delayed a whole day. Muck's orders for the 23rd August had directed the III. and IV. Corps to " occupy the rising ground on the southern side of the canal," whilst the IX. Corps was to advance via Mons to the north and north-western front of Maubeuge. The positions prescribed for the 23rd were actually the limits of advance on the 24th. Judged by the units whose casualties are now known, the enemy losses must have been very heavy. And this is confirmed by the behaviour of the Germans as it grew dusk. The success in the Salient against the 8th Brigade was not exploited. Nor did any enemy appear elsewhere to take advantage of the gaps in the British line or to embarrass the retirement. As at the close of a manoeuvre day, German bugles, to the astonishment of the British troops near the canal, were heard to sound the " Cease fire," repeating it along the line unit by unit, and then, after some little singing at one place, all was quiet. But the enemy showed his nervousness and fear of a night attack by the constant discharge of illuminating flares, which the British soldier then saw for the first time.

4There was no real anxiety at GHQ., therefore, except as regards events in the French Fifth Army further east. During the day the Flying Corps had reported fighting about Charleroi, two powerful German columns moving south-westward from Charleroi and from Luttre, and a heavy engagement at Thuin, the left of the French Fifth Army. (The following message was dictated by Sir John French to Colonel G. M. W. Macdonogh and telephoned by the latter at 3.10 P.M. to Lieutenant Spears (liaison officer) at Philippeville for communication to General Lanrezac, in reply to the latter's enquiry for information as to the British action :

" I am waiting for the dispositions arranged for to be carried out, especially the posting of French cavalry corps on my left.

I am prepared to fulfil the rôle allotted to me when the Fifth Army advances to the attack. In the meantime I hold an advanced defensive position extending from Condé on the left through Mons to Erquelines, where I connect with the two Reserve divisions south of the Sambre.

I am now much in advance of the line held by the Fifth Army, and feel my position to be as forward as circumstances will allow, particularly in view of the fact that I am not properly prepared to take offensive action till to-morrow morning, as I have previously informed you.

I do not understand from your wire that the XVIII. Corps has as yet been engaged and they stand on my inner flank.") A report which came to hand soon after 5 P.M. stated that Tournai appeared to be in the enemy's hands, and that a long column of all arms was moving southward through Ladeuze (13 miles west of Soignies), Grosage and Neufmaison towards Ville Pommeroeul. (The German IV. Corps.) The conclusion to which this intelligence tended was, that the enemy would probably continue to develop his attack during the night and upon the following day. At 8.40 P.M. this conclusion was embodied in a message from Sir John French to the II. Corps : " I will stand the attack on the ground now " occupied by the troops. You will therefore strengthen your position by every possible means during the night."

Further information, however, which arrived from French Fifth Army Headquarters during the evening and just before midnight-when Lieutenant Spears brought the news that General Lanrezac had decided to order a retreat to begin at 3 A.M. next morning, led the British Commander-in-Chief to decide that his position in advance of the general line was strategically untenable, and that an immediate retirement was necessary. He thereby escaped, to use the enemy's words, a " veritable wasps' nest "(Lieut.-General von Zwehl.) and his action fell in with the wishes of General Joffre, official notification of which reached him next day shortly after 1 P.M. in two messages.

The first message was to the effect that the French commander had decided that his Fifth Army should manoeuvre in retreat and rest its left on the fortress of Maubeuge, and its right on the wooded massif of the Ardennes, remaining in liaison with the British Expeditionary Force by means of cavalry. The second pointed out the desirability of delaying the advance of the enemy between Maubeuge-Valenciennes, and gave Cambrai as the general direction of retirement for the British if the enemy should appear in superior force, with their right on Le Cateau, and their left on the water line Denain-Bouchain-Arleux. GHQ. informed General Joffre that the British Force was falling back slowly to the position Maubeuge-Valenciennes, and that, if driven from this, it would act in accordance with his wishes.

The reason for these messages was sufficiently cogent. As a result of his operations on the 23rd, General de Langle de Cary had ordered a general retirement of the French Fourth Army on the 24th to the line Montmédy-Sedan-Mezières, that is, the line of the Chiers and Meuse. In consequence of the failure of the Fourth Army to get forward, General Lanrezac's right flank on the Meuse was not only exposed to attack, but his right rear was actually attacked by the German Third Army from the east, whilst the German Second Army advanced against his main force near Charleroi from the north. On the night of the 23rd/24th, therefore, General Lanrezac ordered the French Fifth Army to commence retiring before daybreak south of the general line Givet-Philippeville-Beaumont-Maubeuge, with its left, the XVIII. Corps, about Solre le Château, 22 miles south-east of Mons. General Valabrègue, hearing of the attack on the XVIII. Corps near Thuin on the 23rd, had assembled his Reserve divisions that night near Cousolre, 10 miles due east of Maubeuge. There was therefore not only a considerable gap between the Allied forces, but the French were preparing a retirement which might increase it.