Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches A & 4 ; Maps 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 13)

The night of the 23rd/24th August passed without serious disturbance of any kind from the enemy; and at dawn on the 24th the Army occupied a line facing roughly north-east, seventeen miles long, with the centre some three miles south of Mons. The positions from right to left were :

I. CORPS:

II. CORPS :

The bulk of the Army had been subjected to great fatigue. The 1st Division, though scarcely engaged, had been hurried into its place by a forced march during the night of the 22nd/23rd and had been under arms for eighteen hours before it could billet or bivouac. Of the II. Corps, the 8th Brigade had been fighting all day, and the greater part of it obtained no rest until the early morning of the 24th. The 9th Brigade did not get into billets it Frameries until late. The 13th Brigade did not reach its assigned position much before daylight on the 24th, and the 14th Brigade was little earlier. The 15th Brigade fared better, though it did not settle down until midnight. The 19th Brigade had only just left the train at Valenciennes, when it was hurried up to take over a sector of the outpost line. Altogether, the circumstances were very trying for the reservists, who formed 60 per cent. of the infantry, and were for the most part still out of condition.

Shortly after 11 P.M. on the 23rd the senior General Staff officers of the I. and II. Corps and of the Cavalry Division had been summoned, in view of a possible retirement, to GHQ. at Le Cateau. There about 1 AM the Chief of the General Staff explained to them that it was the intention of Sir John French to make a general retreat southwards of about eight miles to an east and west line, previously reconnoitred, from La Longueville (five miles west of Maubeuge) westward through Bavai and four miles beyond it to the hamlet of La Boiserette, (Misspelt La Bois Crette on some maps) a front of about seven miles. He instructed the General Staff officers that the corps were to retire in mutual co-operation, the actual order of retirement to be settled by the two corps commanders in consultation. Br.-General Forestier-Walker left immediately by motor car, as telegraphic communication between G.H.Q. and II. Corps headquarters, thirty-five miles off, was interrupted ; but Br.-General J. E. Gough was able to send off a message, which reached General Haig about 2 AM., with the additional information that the I. Corps was to cover the retirement of the II., the cavalry simultaneously making a demonstration, and that the roads through Maubeuge were not open to the British. G.H.Q. further suggested that the left of the I. Corps should receive particular attention, and that the line from Bonnet (six miles north of Maubeuge) westwards to Blaregnies should be firmly established before the II. Corps was withdrawn. Actually, it was nearly midday on the 24th before the corps commanders found opportunity to meet and arrange how these suggestions should be put into practice. (They met at the cross-roads near Bonnet, Sir John French being there with General Haig at the time.)

To carry out GHQ. orders the I. Corps detailed a special rear guard, composed of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, J Battery, the XXXVI. and XLI. Brigades R.F.A., and the 4th (Guards) Brigade (Br.-General R. Scott-Kerr), under the command of Br.-General H. S. Horne, R.A., of the corps staff. It was to concentrate at Bonnet and make an offensive demonstration at daybreak, so as to delay the enemy's leading troops whilst the 1st and 2nd Divisions fell back.

To save time, General Haig motored to 1st and 2nd Division headquarters and in person issued orders for them to retire by two roads on Feignies and Bavai. The. main body of the 1st Division marched off at 4 AM., unmolested, except by a little ineffective shelling, and by a few small bodies of cavalry, which were roughly handled and dispersed by infantry and artillery fire. The 2nd Division followed at 4.45 A.M. and was equally undisturbed. Even the rear guard was not really troubled : (As will be seen in the account of the German operations on the 24th, no orders were issued for pursuit in this part of the field till 8 AM) the 4th (Guards) Brigade retired by successive echelons from Harveng and Bougnies to a position two miles back between Quévy le Petit and Genly, pursued only by heavy but innocuous bursts of shrapnel. The 5th Cavalry Brigade covered the ground on the left of the Guards from Vellereille le Sec westward, through Harmignies and Nouvelles, to Ciply, under similar ineffective shelling. There was no real pressure from the enemy on the rear guard.

The main bodies of the divisions reached their destinations at Feignies, La Longueville and Bavai between 9 and 10 P.M., with no further mishap than the loss of tools and other articles which had been unloaded by the regimental transport and could not be re-loaded in time. None the less, the men were extremely fatigued; they had had little rest for over sixty hours ; the country was close and cramped, and the day had been exceedingly hot; there had been constant deployments and much labour on entrenching, inseparable from a retreat, so that the men suffered greatly from weariness and want of sleep. Yet one battalion commander records on this date: " We had marched 59 miles in the last 64 hours, beginning the march in the middle of an entirely sleepless night and getting only 8 hours altogether during the other two nights. Many men could hardly put one leg before another, yet they all marched in singing. The other battalions of the brigade did not arrive till long after dark, but they also marched in singing."

The comparative ease with which the I. Corps was able to withdraw was far from reassuring, for it might indicate that the Germans intended to make a decisive turning effort further west, as, indeed, was their plan. Soon after 6 A.M. an aeroplane, which had been sent out at dawn, brought information not calculated to diminish the anxiety of the Commander-in-Chief: a column, from five to ten miles long, had been seen at 4.30 AM moving south from Leuze towards Peruwelz, having changed direction, at Leuze, off the road that runs westward from Ath to Tournai. This could hardly mean anything less than a German division, (It was the II. Corps (see "Mons," Sketch 2).) and its line of march from Peruwelz to Condé would carry it to the west of the extreme western flank of the British Army. Nothing, however, was known of this at 4 A.M. at the commencement of the British retreat, and the first movements of the II. Corps were naturally made in complete ignorance of it. General Smith-Dorrien, in pursuance of the Commander-in-Chief's original orders, had made his dispositions before dawn to withstand another German attack on the ground on which his corps had spent the night. These dispositions proved of advantage for gaining time when the instructions to retire arrived ; for, before the II. Corps could retreat, it was imperative that the roads should be cleared of all transport and impedimenta, and the orders to that effect did not filter down to the brigades of the 3rd Division before 4.30 AM Meanwhile, before dawn, the Germans had already opened a heavy bombardment against the right of the II. Corps ; within an hour the fire extended westwards along the whole length of the line, and by 5.15 A.M. a general infantry attack was rapidly developing. At 5.30 AM the commander of the 3rd Division became aware that the main body of the I. Corps was retiring, and sent a staff officer to reconnoitre a second position further to the south. Half an hour later he despatched orders to the 8th Brigade, the right of his line, to withdraw from Nouvelles. (The following message from the II. Corps to the 5th Division gives a good idea of the situation about 7 AM :

To 5th Division. From 11. Corps.

G. 313. 24th [August 1914].

First Corps are retiring from the line Peissant-Haulchin-Harmignies to positions at Villers Sire Nicole and Quevy le Petit - Sixth Infantry Brigade moving to position about cross roads one mile west of Harveng - All these positions are to cover retirement of Third Division when that becomes necessary - Fifth Cavalry Brigade to Harveng with detachment and battery at Harmignies - Third Division right flank will probably fall back to Harveng early - When Third Division is forced to retire or ordered to retire it will take up position about Sars la Bruyere - Your retirement will have to be more or less simultaneous and you should at once send to reconnoitre a position if possible about Blaugies and Montignies sur Roe or where you can find it - Your roads of retirement will be those described to Colonel Romer [General Staff of 5th Division] and in addition that through Blaugies and Erquennes to Hergies but not through second I of Pissotiau [that is west of the Blaugies -Erquennes-Hergies road] which belongs to Third Division - If you feel yourself sufficiently strong where you are you might send a brigade or less back to your next position to prepare it - We cannot tell when Third Division will have to retire to Sars la Bruyere but hope that it will at least not be for two or three hours.

G. F. W. [FORESTIER-WALKER], B.G.

7.15 AM. Copy handed to Col. Maurice [G.S. 3rd Division]. One by tel. One by officer.)

Beyond the shelling, which did no damage, the 8th Brigade had been little troubled ; the German infantry did not show itself at all; and at 8 AM. the brigade began its march southward upon Genly. The 7th Brigade about Ciply, and the 9th Brigade at Frameries, when they began to move in their turn, did not escape quite so easily. The Germans were evidently bent upon holding them to their ground for a time, and about 6 AM. launched their infantry in dense waves to the attack. They were thrown back with heavy loss, the 109th Battery finding excellent targets in the masses of the enemy visible behind the front line. Having thus cleared the air, about 9 AM the 9th Brigade fell back, in perfect order, through the town of Frameries, where there was some sharp fighting before the troops got clear of the streets, and marched southward upon Sars la Bruyère. The 7th Brigade held on for a little longer, and the South Lancashire were enfiladed by machine guns from the slag-heaps about Frameries, and lost between two and three hundred men before this brigade also was withdrawn towards Genly. The Germans made no attempt to press them ; indeed, they handled the 3rd Division on this day with singular respect. The division had, in fact, though it was not appreciated at the time, inflicted on them very heavy losses.

It was in the section immediately to the west of Frameries that serious fighting was first experienced. The right of the 5th Division at Paturages, in the midst of the sea of mining cottages, was held by three battalions of the 5th Brigade, and one, the Bedfordshire, of the 15th. The German guns opened a bombardment before dawn, and continued it steadily for some four hours, though to little purpose. The enemy infantry meanwhile fell upon a company of the Bedfordshire near Paturages, and a very lively fight followed without definite result. Meanwhile, further to the west, the Dorsetshire (15th Brigade, but detached with the 13th) were well entrenched along the railway to the north-west of Wasmes, with two guns of the 121st Battery dug in near their extreme left. (The trenches alongside them were never occupied, so that the guns were completely en l'air.) Still further to the left, in the 13th Brigade, the 2/K.O.Y.L.I. was coming into position with the 37th Howitzer Battery level with it. The 2/Duke of Wellington's, which was shortly to relieve the 1/Dorset, and the 1/R. West Kent were in Wasmes; the 2/K.O.S.B. was on the left at Champ des Sarts. The 1/Norfolk and 1/Cheshire of the 15th Infantry Brigade, together with the 119th Battery, were ordered to Dour (two miles south-west) as divisional reserve. The XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. (less the 119th Battery) was about Champ des Sarts ; the VIII. Howitzer Brigade (less the 37th Battery) to the right and in advance of it ; and the XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. was to the left of it, to the north of Dour.

In this sector of the line the enemy began operations at dawn by bombarding the northern edge of St. Ghislain for two hours, after which he pushed his patrols forward and ascertained that the place had been evacuated by the British . (Writing of the advance through St. Ghislain on the 24th, Hauptmann Bloem (p. 153) writes : " Truly, our artillery shot famously this night and this morning " ; and he says that the town looked " as if it bad been visited by a whirlwind.") The infantry (5th Division.) then crossed the canal by some of the foot-bridges still left standing, and a battalion and a half, hastening through the deserted streets, deployed from the southern edge of Hornu, the next village, opposite Champ des Sarts. The two advanced guns of the 121st Battery, which had opened fire, were quickly compelled to retire by the enemy's machine guns ; but the Dorset and the 37th Battery brought the German advance to an abrupt standstill with considerable loss.

At 9 A.M. the three battalions of the 5th Brigade on the right of the 5th Division at Paturages, in accordance with their orders from the I. Corps, began to withdraw by Culot and Eugies southward upon Sars la Bruyère. Roused at 4 A.M. the Worcestershire and the H.L.I. had dug in on the front line, whilst the Oxfordshire L.I. entrenched a position in rear to cover retirement. Though under shell fire no German infantry had attempted to close with them, but their retirement at once brought trouble upon the denuded right flank of the 5th Division, where stood the Bedfordshire. A detachment of the Dorset filled the vacant place for the moment, and the resistance was for the time maintained ; for the Germans were evidently less concerned to drive the British back than to hold them to their ground.

None the less, they were not content to be checked at the exits of Hornu. Again and again they tried to debouch, but without success, the 37th Battery working great havoc among them. It seems that the Germans must have lost heavily, for the Brandenburg Grenadiers, though exhausted and thinned by the engagement of the previous day, were hastily called up to reinforce the firing line. (Of the approach to Hornu, Hauptmann Bloem says (p. 156) that his battalion was fired on by gun and rifles whilst it was in column of march, and the regimental adjutant brought him the order : " The 52nd in front are heavily engaged and require reinforcement at any cost. Haste is imperative." Bloem cannot believe his observer when he reports " Herr Hauptmann, the enemy is retiring." "What-what do you say-the enemy is retiring. You mean he is advancing." . . . " In the thick masses everybody rushes forward, Grenadiers and Fusiliers, men of all companies mixed up . . . we jump into the English trenches. . . . Suddenly something awful happens." They were heavily shelled by their own artillery.) Meanwhile, the German artillery had for some time been shelling Wasmes furiously, causing some loss in the 13th Brigade both to the Duke's and to the West Kent ; but the former, as already related, was withdrawn to relieve the Dorset, and shortly afterwards two companies of the West Kent were also shifted eastwards to fill a gap between the Duke's and the K.O.Y.L.I. The German guns then turned with fury upon the British batteries, and the XXVII Brigade R.F.A. at Champ des Sarts was compelled to shift its ground. But here, once again, the enemy did not seriously press the attack of his infantry.

On the front of the 14th Brigade, on the left of the 13th, all was quiet. Still further to the west, the 19th Brigade had received orders from GHQ. at midnight to fall back to Elouges, six miles south-east, and at 2 AM it began its march upon that village by Hensies and Quiévrain. At the same hour, the French 84th Territorial Division evacuated Condé and commenced its retirement towards Cambrai. At dawn the Cavalry Division, which was in rear of the left, began to move : General Allenby, finding that the Germans were in great strength on his left, decided to withdraw some distance, and sent a message to Sir Charles Fergusson to that effect ; but, on hearing from him that the 5th Division was to hold its ground, agreed to cover its left flank. A squadron of the 9th Lancers, feeling its way forward to Thulin, the left of the II. Corps, found the enemy at the northern edge of the town and engaged him. Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General H. de B. de Lisle) had taken up a position south of the main highway to Valenciennes and astride the road from Thulin to Elouges ; the 1st Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General C. J. Briggs) was on the railway to its left; the 3rd (Br.-General H. de la P. Gough) to the left rear of the 1st near a sugar factory about a thousand yards south-east of Quiévrain, and the 4th (Br.-General Hon. C. Bingham) at Sebourg, about five miles further south. There they remained until the 19th Brigade had been withdrawn, when it came under General Allenby's command and was halted at Baisieux, two miles south-west of Elouges, to the vicinity of which the 1st Cavalry Brigade also retired. Meanwhile, the advanced squadron of the 9th Lancers was delaying the march of the Germans from Thulin, and inflicting some loss upon them, though all the time falling back upon its main body. About 6 A.M. German guns opened fire upon that main body from the neighbourhood of Thulin, and about 7 A.M. German infantry and artillery, of the 7th Division of the IV. Corps, were seen moving westward along the highway to Valenciennes. One party turning southward, came down the road towards Elouges in column of route, and, after suffering severely from the rifles of the 18th Hussars and 9th Lancers upon either side of it, deployed and advanced upon a wide front.

Thereupon, General Allenby, ordering the road Elouges-Audregnies-Angre-Roisin (five miles south of Elouges) to be left open for the retreat of the 5th Division, about 9 A.M. began to withdraw his troops slowly southward. Though he had sent three officers, one of them in a motor car, to ascertain whether the 5th Division had begun its retirement, not one of these messengers had yet returned. Accordingly, he made his dispositions for retreat with due precautions for the safety of the left flank of the Army. The 19th Brigade was directed to fall back and take up a position at Rombies (three miles south-west of Baisieux and about seven south of Condé), and then the Cavalry Division began to withdraw, by successive brigades, in the same direction. In order to delay the enemy's advance to the utmost, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which formed the rear guard, utilised the sunken roads, mineral railways and slag-heaps which crossed and dotted the ground between the Mons-Valenciennes road on the north and the villages of Elouges and Audregnies on the south. It was supported by L Battery R.H.A., which was in position in the middle of the area behind the railway between Elouges and Quiévrain. The brigade was very heavily shelled as it retired, but fortunately little harm was done, and here also there was no real pressure from the enemy. By 11.30 A.M. the very last parties had come in, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was moving through Audregnies upon Angre, the 18th Hussars bringing up the rear.

So much for the first moves of the great retreat. The succeeding hours of the 24th August likewise passed without serious trouble on the right of the Army. General Horne's rear guard had, as related, taken up a position on a front of three miles facing north-east, with its right on the road from Mons to Maubeuge, about a mile north of Bonnet, its left near Genly. About 10.30 AM. the 8th Brigade came in on its western flank. The 7th Brigade, assembling at Genly from Ciply and Nouvelles, passed through the 8th on its way to Blaregnies, where it-or, at any rate, some part of it-halted and faced about. About 11 AM. the 5th Brigade (That is to say, the three battalions which had been at Paturages. The remaining battalion (2/Connaught Rangers) was with the 4th (Guards) Brigade.) likewise joined the 8th on the western side, forming up in depth from Eugies to Sars la Bruyère. The 9th Brigade made its way, as indeed from the direction of the roads was inevitable, to the same point; there the 3rd Division, together with General Horne's rear guard, waited until far into the afternoon. There was no pressure whatever upon them. Indeed, at 11 A.M. General Horne reported that the special responsibility of his rear guard was at an end, and that he proposed to return his troops to their divisions. But, soon after 1 P.M., a message came in to I. Corps headquarters from the II. Corps that the retreat of the 5th Division on the left was delayed, and that meanwhile the 3rd Division would stand fast. Sir Douglas Haig directed his rear guard to conform with the movements of the 3rd Division; it accordingly remained in its position, little troubled or threatened, but stationary.

The retirement of the 5th Division had been delayed by the fact that it had to be carried out in the close presence of the enemy. The Dorsetshire and Bedfordshire had been left at Paturages covering the right of the 13th Brigade, which was engaging the enemy issuing from the southern exits of Hornu. After the withdrawal of the 5th Brigade on their right, it was evident that these two battalions could not maintain themselves in such a position for long, and at 10.30 A.M. Br.-General Count Gleichen began the somewhat awkward operation of withdrawing them westward through Paturages. It was none too soon. The first line transport of the Dorsetshire, retiring by La Bouverie on its way to Blaugies, six miles north of Bavai, was caught in an ambush by the Germans, (Part of the 20th Regiment of the 6th Division, it appears, had pressed on (see " Mons "), between Frameries and Paturages.) but managed to extricate itself with little loss; then at 11 A.M. the Bedfordshire on the right (south of the railway line from Wasmes to Frameries), and the Dorsetshire on the left began their movement south-west across the rear of the 13th Brigade, towards Petit Wasmes and Warquignies. They had some sharp fighting, in which British marksmanship seems to have told its usual tale, before they could clear themselves from the streets. Part of the Bedfordshire, acting as escort to the divisional artillery, struck due south from Warquignies, and made its way to St. Waast lès Bavay ; (On some maps St. Waast la Vallée, two miles west of Bavai.) the remainder marched to Athis, west of Blaugies, and the bulk of the Dorsetshire to Blaugies itself, where both halted, the time being about 2 P.M.

About 11 A.M., Sir Charles Fergusson had received a message from the II. Corps, giving him discretion to fall back as soon as the troops on his right had retired ; finding that they had already gone and that the enemy was working round his right flank, he proceeded to follow their example. The 13th Brigade was holding its own with no great difficulty, though the enemy was shelling the 2/Duke of Wellington's on the right and inflicting considerable loss ; he was however doing little mischief to the 2/K.O.Y.L.I., and still refrained from any serious infantry attack. The 14th Brigade, on the left of the 13th, remained in comparative quiet, the 2/Manchester, part of which had been moved up to the left of the K.O.Y.L.I., alone being under heavy artillery fire. This brigade began the withdrawal by successive battalions, and formed up at Blaugies to cover the retreat of the 13th Brigade. The latter then fell back. The VIII. Howitzer Brigade withdrew at once; the XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. left a section of each battery behind to support the infantry rear guards. The operations seem to have proceeded with little or no interference from the German infantry. One enemy battery did, indeed, come into action in the open at three thousand yards' range, but was quickly silenced. Only in one quarter does the German infantry appear to have advanced in earnest. By some mishap, the order to retreat did not reach the 2/Duke's, which accordingly remained in position, with a battery of the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. close to it. About 11.30 AM exactly the time when the order should have affected the Duke's, the Germans suddenly concentrated very heavy fire upon this battery from guns which they had brought up to close range. A sharp fight followed during the next hour and a half, and it was only the rifles of the infantry that saved the British battery. About 1 P.M. the Germans debouched in thick skirmishing formation followed by dense masses from the Boussu-Quiévrain road on the left front of the British battalion, but were greeted by such a rain of bullets from rifles and machine guns at 800 yards, and such a salute from the battery, that they stopped dead. Under cover of this final stroke, the guns limbered up and the battalion withdrew south-west into Dour. The Duke's had suffered heavily, their casualties reaching nearly four hundred of all ranks, but they had driven back six battalions. (66th and 26th Regiments of the 7th Division (see " Mons,'' Sketch 5). A German infantry regiment contained three battalions.) By 2 P.M. the 13th and 14th Brigades were assembled at Warquignies and Blaugies, respectively, ready to continue their retreat to their places in the new position : St. Waast (2 miles west of Bavai) and Eth (4 miles west and little north of St. Waast).

But the 5th Division was not destined to march so far to the south-west as Eth. Hardly had the 13th and 14th Brigades begun their retreat, when Sir Charles Fergusson became aware that the withdrawal of the cavalry and 19th Brigade had been premature, and that his left flank was seriously threatened by German forces of considerable strength advancing due south between Thulin and Condé. (The whole IV. Corps.) At 11.45 A.M. he sent an urgent message to the Cavalry Division to come to his assistance, and at the same time placed the 1/Norfolk and 1/Cheshire, together with the 119th Battery, all of which were still in reserve near divisional headquarters at Dour, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Ballard of the Norfolk Regiment. The first orders given to this officer were to advance north and counter-attack. Accordingly, he moved his troops northward for half a mile till a staff officer came up and directed them to be moved westward into position along the Elouges-Audregnies-Angre road, down which, as we have seen, the rear guard of the Cavalry Division had already retired. Thither, accordingly, they marched. General Allenby had received General Fergusson's message about noon, and responded instantly by sending back the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades to the vicinity of Audregnies, which brought them within a couple of miles of Colonel Ballard. The 18th Hussars, who had just quitted their position of the forenoon, returned ; L Battery came up next at a rapid trot, and halted just to the west of Elouges; whilst the 9th Lancers formed up by the road immediately to north of that village, with the 4th Dragoon Guards in rear. Simultaneously, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which was nearing Rombies, faced about and, hastening back, occupied a position on the ridge immediately west of Audregnies.

The scene of action was an irregular parallelogram, bounded on the north by the great highway from Mons to Valenciennes, on the east by the Elouges rivulet, on the south by the road from Elouges to Audregnies, and on the west by the valley of the Honnelle : a space, roughly speaking, about three thousand yards from north to south, by five thousand from east to west. From south to north the ground forms a perfect natural glacis, at this time covered with corn-stooks. Across the parallelogram runs the railway from Elouges to Quiévrain, for the most part sunk in cutting and bordered upon each side by a quickset hedge. About a thousand yards to the south, a mineral railway runs parallel with it for about half its length, and then comes to an abrupt end in a group of cottages. More or less parallel to the Honnelle, the old Roman road, famous under the name of the Chaussée Brunehaut, runs straight as an arrow north-west from Audregnies, cutting the great highway about a thousand yards east of Quiévrain. Upon this road, about a mile and a quarter north of Andregnies, stood a sugar-factory, and, immediately to the east of it, a cluster of high slag-heaps.

It was now about 12.30 P.M. Colonel Ballard's force was just taking up its ground, facing nearly west, the Norfolk with their right resting on the railway from Elouges to Quiévrain, and the Cheshire on their left, carrying the line to the northern outskirts of Audregnies, and securing touch with the cavalry. All had, so far, been comparatively quiet, when a sudden burst of fire, both of guns and rifles, from the north-west, gave warning that the Germans were opening their attack. It developed in two distinct parts, one from Quiévrain, the other from the Bois de Déduit and Baisieux south-east upon Audregnies. Br.-General de Lisle (2nd Cavalry Brigade), galloping to the 9th Lancers, instructed the commanding officer to deliver, if necessary, a mounted attack northwards in order to take the German advance in flank ; whilst L Battery, finding no suitable forward position near, wheeled about and galloped south, coming into action behind the railway just to the east of Audregnies.

Lieut.-Colonel D. G. M. Campbell ordered the 9th Lancers to advance, which they did at the gallop in column of squadrons, with two troops of the 4th Dragoon Guards echeloned to their left rear. Crossing the sunken road from Baisieux to Elouges at a point where it ran level with the ground, they galloped on, speared a couple of German scouts near the road, and caught sight of a few more taking cover among the corn-stooks ; then, their advance checked by the fire of nine batteries, they hesitated. Some dismounted by the sugar-factory, others swept round to the right and back towards Audregnies, and a great number, retiring along the mineral railway towards Elouges, rallied there upon the 18th Hussars. Simultaneously, a squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards galloped down a narrow lane towards Baisieux, in order to seize a house at the end of it, and thus cover a further advance upon Quiévrain. On its way the squadron was shattered by heavy fire of rifles and shrapnel and, though the cottage was eventually reached and held, the effort led to no result.

The advance of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade seems to have produced some moral effect in delaying the progress of the German attack, and so gained time for Colonel Ballard's flank guard to settle down, not, indeed, in entrenchments for there was not a moment to spare for digging but in fair natural cover. Probably it made matters easier also for the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which was now in position further south about Angre, supported by the 1st Cavalry Brigade and covered by the guns of D and E Batteries in rear, with its machine guns firing down the valley on Baisieux. About 12.45 P.M. the action became serious, with obvious signs of an enveloping movement. The Germans had at least seven batteries in action about a mile north of the Valenciennes road towards the hamlet of La Croix, and, under the protection of their shells, the main body of their infantry, apparently a division of the IV. Corps (All four regiments, twelve battalions, of the 8th Division were engaged (" Mons ").) closed up on the advanced guards and strove to carry them further. Solid masses emerged from Quiévrain and from a small wood at its north-eastern corner, and dense columns came streaming down the three broad rides which led from the Bois de Déduit, midway between Quiévrain and Baisieux, into the open. L Battery now had the chance for which every gunner prays ; no sooner did the Germans show themselves than it opened upon them with shrapnel, bursting its shells low, with an accuracy which literally mowed down the advancing masses. In vain they ran back to cover, rallied and endeavoured to press forward. In vain four German batteries, three firing shrapnel and one high explosive, strove to silence the exasperating guns which had arrested the progress of the infantry. Their shrapnel burst high and scattered harmless bullets, while their high-explosive, with the exception of one shell which caused ten casualties, fell wide. L Battery was not to be silenced, and forbade, under heavy penalty, any hostile advance from Quiévrain.

Colonel Ballard's infantry, likewise, with a perfect natural glacis before it, seemed secure ; the 119th Battery, which was in position south of Elouges, not less so. The fire of the German artillery was heavy, but its shell, for the most part, went over. The 119th Battery answered the German guns with considerable effect, the Norfolks found excellent targets in the German infantry, who strove to swarm out of Quiévrain, while the Cheshire brought both rifles and machine guns to bear with great execution upon the masses which were endeavouring to debouch from the Bois de Déduit. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which was spared all artillery fire, likewise held its own successfully south of the infantry, before Baisieux, and, with the help of D and E Batteries, effectually barred the way against the Germans at that point. The baffled enemy then tried a movement still further to the south by Marchipont, but was stopped by the 5th Dragoon Guards, who had come up, from the 1st Cavalry Brigade, on the left of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. Everywhere the Germans were checked. The first of Kluck's enveloping movements had been, in fact, completely and victoriously foiled.

There were, however, disquieting signs of a still wider turning movement further to the west about Quarouble (three miles south-west of Quiévrain), where a mass of German infantry, thought to be the flank guard of an army corps, (Actually the three battalions of the 36th Regiment of the IV. Corps.) could be seen moving steadily to the south. Accordingly, shortly after (about 2.30 P.M.) Colonel Ballard gave the order to retire.

About the same hour the troops to the eastward were also set in motion to resume the retreat. The 3rd Division marched from Genly-Sars la Bruyère for Bavai en route for the villages to the south-west of that town ; General Horne's rear guard, on its right, moved last of all, not until about 4.30 P.M. The main body of the 5th Division struck south from Blaugies through Athis upon Bavai and St. Waast, its place in the selected position ; the Cavalry Division also prepared to withdraw, the 1st Cavalry Brigade moving up to Onnézies to cover the first rearward bound of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Angre. Meanwhile, the effect of the advance of the Germans (The 7th Division of the IV. Corps.) to the east of Colonel Ballard's flank guard was beginning to be felt, and the 119th Battery, between the fire of the three German batteries, and of a machine gun at much closer range, was suffering considerably. One section, the first that had come into action, fired at the hostile infantry until it was within eight hundred yards, and then withdrew. The four remaining guns were brought off by the battery commander, Major E. W. Alexander, one at a time, with the help of a party of the 9th Lancers. (Major Alexander received the V.C. for " handling his battery against overwhelming odds with such conspicuous success that all his guns were saved, notwithstanding that they had to be withdrawn by hand by himself and three other men." Captain Francis Grenfell, 9th Lancers, also received the V.C. on this day for gallantry in action and for assisting to save the guns of the 119th Battery.) The Norfolk then fell back in two parties under a continuous hail of shrapnel bullets, leaving a hundred of their wounded behind them at Elouges. Most unfortunately, both the second in command and the adjutant were wounded at this critical moment, and thus one platoon in an advanced position received no orders to retire.

Colonel Ballard sent to the Cheshire three separate messages to fall back, not one of which reached them. The major of L Battery also did not receive orders, but seeing no sign of the Norfolk and having fired away nearly the whole of his ammunition, was meditating withdrawal when the brigade-major of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade arrived and directed him to bring his battery out of action. The guns were thereupon run down close under the screen of the railway hedge; the limbers were brought up one by one at a gallop from Audregnies ; and the battery limbered up and got away without further mishap. The party of the 4th Dragoon Guards in the house by the lane then retired also ; and they, together with L Battery and the main body of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, moved off south-westward upon Ruesnes. The Cavalry Division had meanwhile fallen back towards St. Waast and Wargnies, the 4th Cavalry Brigade being further to the west between Saultain and Jenlain.

The Cheshire, together with a small party of the Norfolk, were thus left alone. Lieut.-Colonel D. C. Boger, commanding the former, was unaware of the general retreat of the force, so that he was at a loss to know what was expected of him. The Germans were now pressing forward rapidly upon both flanks, and about 4 P.M., while making dispositions to meet the movement, he was disabled by three wounds. Shortly before this, part of the reserve company of the Cheshire at Audregnies had been ordered by a staff officer to fall back, and, after vainly striving to rejoin the fighting line, which was rightly forbidden, made its way to Athis. As the Germans came closer, the main body of the Cheshire fell back to the Audregnies road, where they were fired on by two machine guns placed in a dip in the ground, a couple of hundred yards away. These were promptly silenced by the machine guns of the Cheshire, and a little party of men charged forward with the bayonet to dislodge the enemy from this point of vantage. The Germans turned at the sight of them, and during this short respite the opportunity was taken to draw off a small part of the battalion across country to Audregnies wood, which they reached under heavy fire, thence making their way to Athis. But the Germans, seeing how few were their assailants, returned to the attack, and there was nothing left for the remainder of the Cheshire, mere handful though they were, but to fight to the last. They still had ammunition and could keep up rapid fire, and, by this time separated into at least three groups, they continued to defend themselves desperately until nearly 7 P.M. Then at last, surrounded and overwhelmed on all sides, they laid down their arms. Of the main body on the Audregnies road, only forty remained unwounded. Their captors were the 72nd Regiment, belonging to the German IV. Corps.

The troubles of the small parties which had escaped were not ended on the battlefield. The enemy broke in from Dour during their retreat, and cut off a few men, and at Athis only one hundred could be assembled. The indefatigable gunners of the 5th Division artillery came into action along the line Blaugies-Athis-Montignies, and again further to the south at Houdain, and this enabled the survivors of the flank guard to reach their bivouac at St. Waast at 9 P.M. utterly worn by hunger, fatigue and hard fighting, but still unvanquished. They had held off from the main body of the 5th Division the pursuit of a whole German corps, but at heavy cost. The 119th Battery had lost thirty officers and men ; the Norfolk over two hundred and fifty officers and men; whilst of the Cheshire, who in the morning had mustered nearly a thousand, only two officers and two hundred men answered their names at St. Waast.

The total losses on the 24th August were greater than on the 23rd, and amounted to roughly 250 in the Cavalry Division, 100 in the I. Corps, 550 in the 3rd Division, 1650 in the 5th Division and 40 in the 19th Infantry Brigade.

Thus ended the first day of the retreat. All circumstances considered, although the casualties were considerable, the operations had not been unsuccessful. The 5th Division had, indeed, been called upon not only to defend six miles of front, but also, with the help of the cavalry and of the 19th Brigade, to parry Kluck's enveloping attack, and it had triumphantly accomplished its task. The flanking battalions to the east and west had, it is true, suffered much, but only one had been actually overwhelmed ; not a single gun had been lost ; and the enemy had been very severely punished. Our troops were still confident that, when on anything like equal terms, they were more than a match for their opponents ; the one trouble which really oppressed them was want of sleep. Long after nightfall the battalions of the 3rd Division were passing the cross roads in Bavai, the men stumbling along more like robots than living soldiers, unconscious of everything about them, but still moving under the magic impulse of discipline and regimental pride. Marching, they were hardly awake ; halted, whether sitting or standing, they were instantly asleep. Yet these men on the eastern flank of the corps had done little fighting and endured little pressure during the day. Worse was it on the western flank, where cavalry and infantry had had hard fighting front dawn till dusk, and many a man had been for over twenty-four hours without sleep or food. And this, it must be borne in mind, was only the beginning of the retreat.

The general disposition of the Army on the night of the 24th/25th, on a line east to west through Bavai, was, :

It will be observed that in the course of the day's march, the 3rd and 5th Divisions had changed places, the latter being now on the right and the former on the left of the II. Corps. This manoeuvre was intentional and carried out in accordance with orders issued for the purpose. The whole Army was inclining westward, in order to clear Maubeuge, and since the 3rd Division was able to begin its retirement considerably before the 5th, it could without difficulty proceed to the westward of Bavai, and thus shorten the retreat of the 5th Division by permitting it to fall back due south instead of south-west, and so to drop into its place on the right of the II. Corps. This movement not only eased the immediate task of the 5th Division, but relieved it from its difficult position upon the threatened western flank ; it was carried out without any collision, in fact without the divisions seeing each other.