Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(See Sketches B, 13, 18 & 19 ; Maps 2, 3, 4, 33, 34 & 35)

In order to make clear the narrative of the battle of the Aisne, it seems best, for once, to review the German situation before the British, although of course it was not at the time thus fully known to the Allies. The night of the l2th/l3th September marks the end of the retreat so far as the German First and Second Armies are concerned. During the closing hours of the l2th those of Kluck's troops (the 5th and 3rd Divisions, IV. Corps and half of the IX. Corps) which were still on the south side of the Aisne, entrenched on the line Billy (south of Venizel)-Cuise Lamotte (south-west of Attichy), covering Soissons, were withdrawn over the river. The re-sorting of his divisions into their original corps from the groups in which they had fought the battle of the Ourcq had meanwhile been carried out.

During the same night, Bülow, alarmed by the forcing of the line of the Vesle by the left of the Fifth and right of the British Armies, swung back his right wing east of Reims, as already described, placed his reserve, the 1st Guard and l4th Divisions, behind his right flank and brought back to this flank, from the Vesle, the l3th Division. Thus, the fronts of the German First and Second Armies now formed a wide re-entrant angle, marked by the lines Prosnes (11 miles south-east of Reims)-Reims (exclusive) -Berry au Bac and Ostel (11 miles E.N.E. of Soissons)-Soissons-Compiègne, but with a gap of 25 miles, at least, Brimont (north of Reims) to Ostel, between their inner flanks. Towards the gap, held by the Guard, 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions, were advancing the left of the French Fifth Army (the XVIII. Corps, Valabrègue's Group of Reserve divisions and Conneau's cavalry corps), and the British I. Corps and Allenby's cavalry division.

General Joffre's Instruction No. 23, issued on the l2th September and received at British G.H.Q. at 2 P.M., directed the Sixth Army after the passage of the Aisne, if the Germans continued to give way, to send the bulk of its forces gradually to the right bank of the Oise, so as to make sure of outflanking them, but, whatever happened, to detail a strong detachment to keep in close touch with the British Army. The latter force was to move north between Bourg and Soissons, its right boundary, previously Bazoches-Craonne, being thus, with the whole zone of its operations, shifted westwards. The Fifth Army, equally in close touch with the British, was to commence crossing the Aisne. There was no change in the orders to the other Armies.

G.H.Q. operation orders issued at 7.45 P.M. on the same evening, fixed the starting time at 7 A.M., and directed that the heads of the three British corps should reach a line about five miles beyond the Aisne :-Lierval (7 miles north-east of Vailly)-Chavignon (5 miles north of Vailly)-Terny (4 1/2 miles north of Soissons). The destination of the B.E.F. was thus roughly the top of the plateau, at this point little more than a ridge, which lies between the valleys of the Aisne and the Ailette and is traversed from east to west by the now well-known road, the Chemin des Dames. No specific duties were assigned to the two cavalry divisions, they were merely allotted roads. Major-General Allenby therefore continued to carry out the directions given him on the 9th September, to act in close association with the I. Corps and keep touch with the French Fifth Army, and Br.-General Gough remained with the II. Corps.

The orders allotted the crossings of the Aisne as follows :

In the III. Corps sector a passage was actually effected on the night of the l2th/l3th. About 9 P.M., Br.-General Hunter-Weston, commanding the 11th Brigade of the 4th Division, then at Septmonts, 3 miles from the Aisne, after a conference at divisional headquarters, was instructed by Br.-General H. F. M. Wilson 1 to push forward and seize a crossing at Venizel bridge, with the assurance that he should have the support of the whole divisional artillery at daylight. Sending on two reconnoitring officers, Br.-General Hunter-Weston led the brigade at 11 P.M. through the outposts down into the valley. On his arrival at Venizel at 1 A.M. the engineer reconnoitring officer reported that one of the four large charges placed to destroy the bridge had failed to explode, and that, although the main girders on each side of the principal span were cut, the reinforced concrete of the roadway would probably be sufficiently strong to enable infantry to cross, if great care were taken : there was, however, considerable risk that the bridge might give way without warning. The infantry reconnoitring officer informed the general that there were fresh German trenches close to the bridge on the south bank, but that they did not appear to be occupied, and that a German patrol which had fired on him from the north bank had immediately retired. Br.-General Hunter-Weston, after inspecting the bridge himself, as there were still four hours of darkness, decided to cross and attempt to seize the heights beyond. Owing to the state of the bridge, the men were sent across in single file, and the ammunition carts were unloaded and with their contents passed over by hand.

By 3 A.M. on the l3th the passage was completed, and the brigade was then ordered to secure the heights above by a bayonet charge. This operation was entirely successful, and just as day was dawning the German outposts on the crest, completely surprised by the sudden appearance of the British, incontinently abandoned their trenches and fell back on their main line some hundreds of yards away. Then the 11th Brigade, the first British formation to cross the Aisne, although the 4th Division cyclists by seizing Missy bridge at 1 A.M. shared the honour of being the first unit, occupied the edge of the plateau from the spur north of Ste. Marguerite westwards through a farm called La Montagne to within a mile of Crouy, 2 miles north-east of Soissons. It was a most satisfactory end to a trying march of some thirty miles through the pouring rain, in a temperature more appropriate to November than early autumn, and with little or no food for more than twenty-four hours. Had other divisions been equally enterprising, and their marches on the l2th had been shorter than those of the 4th Division, the fighting on the l3th might have had a different result.

The morning was still wet and miserable, when on the extreme right of the British front, the advanced guard of the Cavalry Division rode out from its billets and pushed two reconnoitring patrols forward to the crossings of the Aisne at Villers and Bourg. In every case the road bridges over the river were found to have been destroyed, but not those over the Aisne canal, which lies south of it. (It finally enters the river lower down, near Vailly.) A sharp fire was opened on the British dragoons by Germans (The enemy in this area consisted of parts of the Guard Cavalry Division and 25th Landwehr Brigade, of the Second Army.) sheltered in houses or entrenched along the bank of the branch canal which, starting close to Bourg, runs north-westwards from the Aisne canal to the Oise. The aqueduct which carries this branch canal across the river, however, had been only slightly damaged, and J Battery and the XXXII. Brigade R.F.A. (Temporarily attached to the Cavalry Division from the 4th Division.) came into action to support the attack of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade upon it. But it was not until assistance arrived from the 1st Division that the cavalry was able to effect a crossing.

Sir Douglas Haig's orders for the l3th had directed the I. Corps to continue its advance and, in the first instance, to push forward patrols to the river crossings ; the divisions were to close up, well concealed and ready to act on the information obtained by the cavalry. In the event of the enemy seriously disputing the passage of the Aisne, attack orders would be issued ; in the event of his continuing his retirement, the 1st and 2nd Divisions were to occupy ground beyond the river at Bourg, and at Pont Arcy and Chavonne (3 miles below Pont Arcy), respectively, their advanced guards covering the crossings, and were to push reconnaissances towards the enemy.

The 2nd Brigade, the leading troops of the 1st Division, therefore, followed the Cavalry Division, after assisting its crossing at Bourg, and took up a covering position on the northern bank. The 1st Cavalry Brigade at once struck eastwards upon Pargnan to gain touch with the French, and Br.-General de Lisle took the 2nd Cavalry Brigade northwards along the ridge immediately north of Bourg, from which a German column could be seen moving north from Vendresse. I Battery opened fire upon this with shrapnel, but was answered with such vigour that the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was obliged to fall back to the south side of the ridge.

Further to the left, the divisional cavalry of the 2nd Division reported soon after dawn that the bridge at Chavonne had been destroyed and that the approaches to it were commanded by German snipers. At Pont Arcy itself, however, the demolition of the bridge was only partial, men on foot could use it, and it was feebly defended. The greater part of the 5th Brigade was able to cross there, practically unopposed, and thus enabled the engineers to begin the construction of a pontoon bridge further downstream. At noon the 2/Coldstream was sent to Chavonne to secure, if it could, the passage at that point.

Still further to the left, the II. Corps, in pursuance of G.H.Q. orders, pushed forward the 3rd Division against the bridges at Vailly (where both canal and river must be crossed), and the 5th Division against the bridge of Missy. These two passages are 4 miles apart. The bridge at Condé, midway between them, was intact ; it also was allotted to the 5th Division, but the approaches to it, over a wide flat stretch of water meadows, could be so easily commanded by machine guns that it had evidently been left open by the enemy as a trap.

The 8th Brigade, which led the advance of the 3rd Division upon Vailly, was checked when it reached Chassemy, on the edge of the plateau, 1 1/2 miles from the river, by the fire of German howitzers on the promontory of Chivres, a large spur flanking the valley; and it could progress no further. The artillery of the division came into action above Brenelle, to the right rear of Chassemy ; but the 49th Battery, unlimbering in the open, was promptly silenced, the detachments being driven from their guns. At 10 A.M. the Royal Scots, working their way down through the woods on the slopes of the valley north of Chassemy, were able to reach the canal not far short of the two bridges ; but the outlook was not promising. The light railway bridge a mile above Vailly had been entirely destroyed, and the road bridge over the river was also broken, though the gap was spanned by a single-plank footway which the Germans, in their haste, had left behind them.

When the 4th Division cyclists had seized Missy bridge at 1 A.M., they had left a party to hold it for the II. Corps. But this party had been driven off by superior numbers of Germans at 4 A.M. and the condition of the bridge was now uncertain. An hour or two later two companies of the Royal West Kent, which was the leading battalion of the l3th Brigade, came down towards this bridge and engaged the hidden machine guns and riflemen on the northern bank and compelled them to retire, though themselves suffering several casualties. It was then possible for a party of the 59th Field Company R.E. to advance and examine the bridge more closely, when it was ascertained that the girders of the two most northern of the three spans had been destroyed, leaving gaps of some twenty feet. Heavy fire then compelled the party to withdraw, but the two companies entrenched to the east of the bridge.

Simultaneously with the movement of the l3th Brigade upon Missy, the 11th Brigade, with the 121st Battery, was sent down a side valley to Moulin des Roches, just upstream from Venizel, which had been selected by the engineers as the most suitable place for bridging, and there the brigade remained until past noon whilst the 17th Field Company was constructing a raft.

Still further to the west, in the III. Corps area, the l2th Brigade, soon after 6 A.M., had begun to defile across the damaged bridge at Venizel, which had by that time been made somewhat safer ; and, west of it again, a brigade of the French Sixth Army was steadily passing the river at Soissons. Both French and British were greeted by fire from German artillery, chiefly 8-inch and 5-9-inch howitzers, in action on the heights to the north. The most troublesome of these, so far as the British were concerned, were three batteries, already mentioned, on the spur of Chivres (just north of Missy), the commanding position in that section of the valley. One of these batteries seemed to be on the eastern branch of the spur, overlooking Condé, and the two others a mile or more further to the north about Les Carrières. The artillery of the 4th and 5th Divisions had by this time taken up position on the plateau, from Le Carrier (1 1/2 miles east of Billy) to Mont de Belleu Farm, on both sides of the valley which cuts into it from Venizel. The 31st and 108th Heavy Batteries succeeded in silencing for a time the German guns which were impeding the advance of the Allies ; but they were soon forced by the fire of the German heavy howitzers either to shift position or to withdraw their detachments. These howitzers, in fact, outraged all the British artillery, except the 60-pdr. batteries, and for the time being had complete mastery of the situation.

However, by 11 A.M., covered by the 11th Brigade on the edge of the heights, all the l2th Brigade (except the 2/Inniskilling, which had been left behind to bring the guns over the bridge) was across the Aisne at Venizel. In widely extended order, the three battalions made their way across the two miles of water-meadows to Bucy le Long at the foot of the heights, under a hail of shrapnel bullets, which did little damage. (A translation of what Hauptmann Bloem saw of this advance from Chivres ridge is, apart from its vividness, of interest as showing the superior observation enjoyed by the Germans : " Across the wide belt of meadow extending between our chain of heights and the course of the river, stretched what seemed to be a dotted line formed of longish and widely separated strokes. With field-glasses, we could see that these strokes were advancing infantry, and unmistakably English. From the bushes bordering the river sprang up and advanced a second line of skirmishers, with at least ten paces interval from man to man. Our artillery flashed and hit-naturally, at most, a single man. And he second line held on and pushed always nearer and nearer. Two hundred yards behind it came a third wave, a fourth wave. Our artillery fired like mad : all in vain, a fifth, a sixth line came on, all with good distance, and with clear intervals between the men. Splendid, we are all filled with admiration. The whole wide plain was now dotted with these funny khaki figures, always coming nearer. The attack was directed on our neighbour corps on the right [the II.]. And now infantry fire met the attackers, but wave after wave flooded forward, and disappeared from our view behind the hanging woods which framed the entrance to the Chivres valley.") The 68th Battery followed them, moving by sections, and escaped without casualties. The 10th Brigade meanwhile took up a position behind the railway embankment westwards from Venizel for 2 miles to Villeneuve St. Germain, to cover a retirement if it should be necessary. The 11th Brigade, holding the southern edge of the heights above Bucy le Long since early morning, was absolutely unmolested, though German troops were entrenched within eight hundred to fifteen hundred yards north of it, and in the valleys of Chivres and Vregny to its right and front. On the right of this brigade, indeed, the l/Rifle Brigade had stolen through the woods on the western side of the Chivres valley and was effectively enfilading the German trenches on the eastern side.

Such, then, was the situation about noon. The passage of the Aisne had been forced at both extremities of the British line ; and it remained to be seen how far this success would assist the passage of the centre. From all the information furnished to General Haig the gap had not been closed which had existed between the German First and Second Armies ever since the battle of the Marne, and there was nothing in front of him but a strong force of cavalry, either a weak corps or a division at full strength, and five batteries entrenched on the Chemin des Dames. Against such a force, he naturally hoped to gain ground without making a formal attack. (This estimate of the German force was correct at the time : the Guard and 2nd Cavalry Divisions had opposed the I. Corps, but reinforcements were approaching, as will be narrated later.) There was news, too, that the 35th Division of the French XVIII. Corps had at 10.30 A.M. crossed the Aisne at Pontavert, 7 miles to his right, with the Germans only one hour ahead of it, and that this division and Conneau's cavalry corps were pressing on to the eastern end of the Chemin des Dames ridge and beyond. The prospects of a break-through never were brighter.

The ground facing the British I. Corps presented a series of high spurs projecting generally southwards from the Chemin des Dames ridge towards the Aisne. First, commencing from the east, are the Paissy-Pargnan and Bourg spurs, both extending nearly to the river, with the village of Moulins at the top of the valley between them. Next is the short Troyon spur, with Vendresse in the valley east of it, and Beaulne and Chivy west of it. Westwards of these again are the three spurs at the foot of which lie Moussy and Soupir and Chavonne, respectively ; only the last of these comes close down to the river.

By 1 P.M. the 2nd Brigade, the advanced guard of the 1st Division, had reached the top of the spur north of Bourg, enabling the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to advance again some two miles, as far as Moulins, where it was checked by German forces on the ridge north of Troyon. Other German troops were seen moving towards Bourg from Chivy, about a mile west of Troyon, and the Flying Corps reported the concentration of yet more, a mile or two further to the north of Courtecon. (Part of the VII. Reserve Corps.) The 1st (Guards) and 3rd Brigades were therefore sent across the river in all haste, and by divisional orders were directed north-eastwards towards Paissy to the right of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. About 4 P.M. the 2nd Brigade took up a position from Moulins south-west towards Bourg, and released the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to withdraw to its billets east of Bourg. By 6 P.M. the last infantryman of the 1st Division was on the north bank of the Aisne. The artillery, as it came up to Bourg, was pushed on to the next spur to the east, north of Pargnan, whence, towards evening, the XXV. Brigade R.F.A. and 30th Battery engaged the Germans about Troyon at long range. At dusk, the action, in which the artillery of the French Fifth Army had shared, died down ; and the 1st Division and 2nd Cavalry Brigade settled down for the night at Paissy, Moulins, Oeuilly and Bourg, the 1st Cavalry Brigade re-crossing to the southern bank of the river at Pont Arcy. The casualties of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been slight ; fifty German prisoners had been taken and all seemed to be going well. Had the enemy intended to drive the I. Corps back across the Aisne, his chance was gone.

On the left of the 1st Division, the pontoon bridge at Pont Arcy was not completed until 1.30 P.M. ; meanwhile the 2/Coldstream (4th (Guards) Brigade), with the help of artillery, had driven the German sharpshooters from Chavonne, crossed the river by the bridge there (the enemy having left a temporary trestle construction over a broken span) and advanced to the top of the ridge beyond it. Here, however, the battalion came under heavy artillery fire, against which the British guns were powerless to help, for they were out-ranged. When, however, Colonel G. P. T. Feilding reported to the 2nd Division that the 2/Coldstream was across and he proposed to send another battalion over, Major-General Monro, after personally examining the situation at the bridge, ordered him to withdraw the Coldstream leaving only one company to guard the bridgehead ; there were no engineers available to make the bridge serviceable, as both divisional field companies R.E. were employed in throwing a pontoon bridge at Arcy, and until the passage was improved it seemed inadvisable to leave many men on the far side. Neither the 4th (Guards) nor the 6th Brigade, therefore, crossed the Aisne. The 5th Brigade, the only infantry of the 2nd Division on the northern bank, after enduring some hours' bombardment, moved under cover of darkness towards the left of the 1st Division, between Moussy and Verneuil and placed a line of outposts half a mile further north, astride the Beaulne spur and the two valleys which flank it to the east and west.

Further to the left, in the II. Corps, Major-General Hubert Hamilton, commanding the 3rd Division, after personal inspection of the bridges at Vailly, at 1 P.M. ordered the 8th Brigade to advance upon them. As already stated, the railway bridge had been completely destroyed, and the road bridge had been broken ; but by the single plank spanning the breach in the latter, the Royal Scots and the Royal Irish began at 3 P.M. to cross the Aisne. They were steadily shelled as they did so, and a few men were wounded ; but by 4 P.M. the Royal Scots were established in Vauxelles Chateau (1 mile north-west of Vailly) and on the high ground north-west of it ; and before nightfall the rest of the 8th Brigade was in support at St. Pierre (just west of Vailly). The 9th Brigade followed by the same tedious way during the night ; while the engineers, under continued shell fire, began the construction of a pontoon bridge. For the best part of the night, however, the only communication in the 3rd Division between the 8th and 9th Brigades on the north bank of the river and the 7th Brigade at Braisne, was a single-plank footway.

Owing to a misunderstanding a demonstration which was to have been made at Condé bridge by General Gough's cavalry did not take place.

At Missy bridge, where the river was 70 feet wide and 12 feet deep, the R. West Kent (l3th Brigade) were unable to move from their trenches until nightfall, when under cover of darkness they began to dribble men across the Aisne : first in a boat which had been found under the north bank by a sapper who swam across, then on five small rafts, each capable of carrying five men, constructed by the 59th Field Company R.E. of planks, straw and wagon covers. The annihilation of a German patrol, which came down to the bank after about forty men had crossed the river, saved them from interruption by the enemy ; and though it was past midnight before the whole battalion , had been transferred to the north bank the process was practically unhindered by the Germans. The 2/Scottish Borderers followed and were all across shortly after daylight. The two remaining battalions of the l3th Brigade were left for the moment at Ciry and Sermoise, a mile or more south of Missy bridge.

To the west again, at Moulin des Roches, above Venizel, a raft to carry 60 men had been completed by noon on the l3th, and the leading battalion of the 14th Brigade (the 2/Manchester) began to cross the river, the men concealing themselves as they landed behind a convenient wood on the northern bank. The East Surrey followed them, and by 3 P.M. both battalions, together with their pack animals, were on the German side of the Aisne, and beginning their advance without waiting for the rest of the brigade. As they left the cover of the trees, they came under heavy shrapnel fire from the promontory of Chivres, but pursued their way in extended order towards the eastern end of Ste. Marguerite (half a mile west of Missy) to support the 12th Brigade, which held the village. As they were approaching, they received a message from Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Anley, then commanding that brigade, (Vice Br.-General H. F. M. Wilson, now commanding the 4th Division.) that he was attacking the Chivres spur from Ste. Marguerite, and begged the 14th Brigade to help him by striking in from the south. It was too late, however, to fall in with this suggestion, but the direction was changed so that the East Surrey should come in on the right of the 12th Brigade with the Manchester in echelon to its right rear. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the Essex of the 12th Brigade were in fact advancing, the former on the right, the latter on the left of the road which leads from Ste. Marguerite to Chivres, against a position of which they knew remarkably little. The ground was swampy and the undergrowth of the woods on the way was very thick, so that progress was slow ; but about 5 P.M. the Lancashire Fusiliers came under heavy fire on their front from trenches south of Chivres village, and on their right flank from the western slopes of the Chivres spur. Two companies engaged the enemy in front while a third drove back or silenced the enemy on the flank, the Essex giving such support as they could from the hill above Ste. Marguerite. But the I.ancashire Fusiliers could advance no further ; and it so happened that just at this moment two guns of the 68th Battery opened fire from an exposed position near the head of the ravine of Le Moncel (half a mile north-west of Ste. Marguerite), drawing heavy retaliation on that area. The guns were compelled to retire, and some parties of the 1/Rifle Brigade (11th Brigade)which were pushing on were also driven back with considerable loss.

These incidents put a stop to the advance on Chivres. The two battalions of 14th Infantry Brigade had not been able to assist much, as having to change direction under shrapnel fire they did not come up until the moment for co-operation had passed, and then behind rather than on the right of the 12th Brigade. The Lancashire Fusiliers clung to their ground until nightfall, when the Manchester came forward to relieve them. They had lost 6 officers and over 170 men, and were obliged to leave many of their wounded on the ground, as they were too near the German trenches to permit of removal. It was long before any troops of the Allies approached nearer than the Lancashire men had to the commanding promontory of Chivres. However, a passage at Moulin des Roches had been effected; and at 9 P.M. the 15h Brigade marched down to the raft which the 14th had used and began crossing the river, leaving behind their horses and vehicles to follow at daybreak. Thus before dawn of the 14th September a footing, albeit a precarious one, had been gained on the north bank of the Aisne at several points. The situation of the British Army was as follows :

North Bank of Aisne

South Bank of Aisne.

Both flanks of the British Army were in close touch with the French. On the right the French Fifth Army, it was known, had met with varying fortune. On the left of the British the French Sixth Army had made little progress, General Maunoury's difficulties in this section of the line being exactly the same as our own. The German guns could shell his troops in the valley at comparatively short range, but could not be reached by the French guns except at long range. The 45th Division, next to the British, crossed at Soissons, but, though supported by the 55th Division of Lamaze's Group, had been unable to get beyond Cuffies.

The Chemin des Dames ridge, which lay athwart the advance of the British and of the French immediately on their flanks, rises out of the plain of Champagne near Craonne and extends thence, between the valleys of the Aisne and the Ailette, in a continuous unbroken line westward for some five and twenty miles until abreast of Soissons, where it bifurcates near the village of Juvigny, its south-western fork ending a mile or two beyond Nouvron. The XVIII. French Corps seemed to have good prospect of getting on to the eastern edge of the ridge at Craonne ; if, in conjunction with the British I. Corps, it could secure the eastern section of the Chemin des Dames from Craonne to Courtecon and then strike west-ward, it would ease the task of the II. and III. Corps and of General Maunoury's right. If the latter's VII. Corps could simultaneously gain Nouvron and thence strike eastward, it is obvious that there was very good prospect of completely sweeping the Germans from the ridge.

Reviewing the general position, Sir John French decided that he was justified in making a great effort to carry out General Joffre's instructions for an energetic pursuit by attacking along the whole front on the 14th. For all he knew, the Germans might still be in retreat, and there might be nothing before him except obstinate and skilfully posted rear guards. Captured documents proved that the retreat of the enemy was not a mere strategic movement, but had been forced on him as the result of an unsuccessful battle. The weather had been very unsettled on the l3th, though it improved in the afternoon, but aerial reconnaissance had revealed only one German cavalry division and about two infantry divisions between Cerny (8 miles S.S.W. of Laon) and Aizy (2 miles north of Vailly), and another division near Laon. (This report, as is now known, was correct. The two infantry divisions in the line were the l3th Reserve Division (just arrived) and the 6th Division. But on the east of the space reported on, Cerny-Aizy, the l4th Reserve Division was coming up, and on the west, opposite the British, were the other division of the III. Corps and the whole of the II. Corps. The Guard Cavalry Division was still in line, but the 2nd and 9th were pulled out as the infantry came up. Thus, there were six infantry divisions and a cavalry division in front of the British, with a corps, the XV., behind. This corps went in next day against the French on the east of the VII. Reserve Corps.) Appearances seemed to indicate that, except for local counter-attacks, the whole German line was retiring in a north-easterly direction. By dawn on the 14th, the engineers would have laid a pontoon bridge and a trestle bridge near Vailly. At Missy the bridge had been so much damaged that it could not be repaired in a single night. But even without additional bridges much might be done.

General Joffre also, in his Instruction No. 24 of the 13th, was of opinion that " the enemy was retreating on the whole front without serious resistance on the Aisne and the Marne." He ordered that the pursuit should be continued energetically in a general northerly direction, by the British between Athies (just east of Laon) and the Oise, and by the Sixth Army west of the Oise.

G.H.Q. operation orders for the 14th, therefore, directed the Army to continue the pursuit and act vigorously against the retreating enemy, advancing northward to the line Laon-Fresnes (12 miles west of Laon), the Cavalry Division covering the right and Gough's cavalry brigades the left of the force.

Sir Douglas Haig decided to make the Chemin des Dames ridge the first objective of the I. Corps and ordered the 1st Division to advance to the section from Cerny westward to Courtecon, and the 2nd Division from Courtecon, exclusive, westward to the tunnel through which the Oise canal pierces the hill from Pargny to Braye. Whether further progress could be made would depend on the movements of the II Corps. The Cavalry Division was directed to be prepared to push on to Laon. The orders entailed the 4th and 6th Brigades of the 2nd Division crossing the Aisne at daybreak.

In the II. Corps, both divisions were ordered to continue the pursuit northwards, Gough's cavalry following as soon as the bridges were clear.

In the III. Corps, similarly, the 4th Division was ordered to resume the offensive and gain first the northern edge of the high ground between Vregny-Braye, some two and a half miles from the southern edge of the plateau where the division was established. The divisional artillery and the l9th Brigade were still to remain on the south bank of the Aisne.

By General Joffre's Instruction No. 23, the left of the Fifth Army was to cross the Aisne, that is move N.N.W. into the gap in the German line. As on a previous occasion, General Franchet d'Espèrey had already issued his orders, sending his troops north-east, and drawing the Group of Reserve Divisions into reserve, when he received the G.Q.G. Instruction. It increased his front eastward, as we have seen, but he got over this difficulty by issuing a correction to his orders at 9 P.M., which brought Valabrègue's Group again into the line, between the III. and XVIII. Corps, only the latter corps moving N.N.W. His Army, divided as on the 9th September, fought two distinct actions during the day : whilst his centre was not in contact with the enemy, his right the X., I. and III. Corps, facing a little north of east, encountered Bülow's Army, and was definitely held up on the line marked by the course of the Vesle above Reims, the eastern and northern suburbs of that town, and the Berry au Bac canal. On the left, the XVIII. Corps fought its way " painfully " north-westwards, alongside the B.E.F., towards the Chemin des Dames. The Group of Reserve Divisions and Conneau's cavalry corps in the centre, were opposite the 10-mile gap in the German line, into which they penetrated without difficulty. But they did no more than this. The 10th Cavalry Division, crossing the Aisne at Pontavert at 8.30 A.M., reached Amifontaine, 7 miles to the north-east, at 2.30 P.M., and, after sending out patrols, pushed on six miles northward to Sissonne, where it passed the night, without any contact with the enemy. The 4th Cavalry Division, finding that it was unable to move by the western route assigned to it, via Corbeny, which was occupied by the enemy, followed the 10th towards Sissonne, but was brought back to bivouac at Amifontaine. The 8th Cavalry Division, being in reserve, did not do more than reach the Aisne at Berry au Bac, where it billeted at 6 P.M. Without being aware of it, at Sissonne Conneau's cavalry corps was some forty miles behind the general line of the German Third Army, and fifteen miles north of the thrown-back flank of the Second Army. It had only to move eastwards across the enemy lines of communication to cause at least alarm and confusion.

Of Valabrègue's Group, the left division, the 53rd, crossed the Aisne at Berry au Bac at 11.30 A.M., intending to go northwards to Amifontaine ; but, receiving some shell fire from the direction of Corbeny, it wandered eastward and settled down for the night with its main body north of the Aisne at Guignicourt (3 miles above Berry au Bac), and detachments to the north and south-west at Juvincourt and Berry au Bac. Valabrègue's right division, the 69th, directed on Guignicourt, was called on for assistance by the III. Corps and sent a brigade with guns south-eastwards for this purpose. The detachment, after being in action, was at night halted near Cormicy on the left of the III. Corps. The rest of the division, continuing northwards, reached Guignicourt in the afternoon and billeted there and in Prouvais, two miles to the northward.

Foch's Army, on the right of the Fifth, facing now nearly due north, was delayed by enemy rear guards and " by evening had advanced only some six miles."

General Joffre's instructions to the Sixth Army were to the effect that it should gradually transfer its forces west of the Oise, so as to outflank the German right, leaving only a strong detachment west of the Forest of St. Gobain area to ensure liaison with the British. To carry out this plan, General Maunoury ordered the 8th Division (IV. Corps) on the left to be shifted westwards to act in co-operation with the 37th Division (brought from the Fifth Army), which was moving up to Compiègne, and the XIII. Corps (from the Fourth Army) assembling behind it. the IV. Corps was, however, in the process of crossing the Aisne and pushing on, as Kluck had withdrawn his right flank, before the Army order arrived ; and, in spite of reiterated orders, (General Boëlle, his corps being engaged, could do no more than detail one brigade to proceed westwards with orders to reconnoitre the passages of the Oise.

Next on the right, Ebener's Group of Reserve divisions having made floating bridges during the night, crossed the Aisne without resistance : but the passage took time and the leading division was unable to reach Nampcel, and push on to the Oise, as directed by the Army.

The VII. Corps, the greater part of which was already across the Aisne, prepared to march northwards in pursuit in much the same fashion as the B.E.F. ; but it soon encountered organised resistance, well supported by artillery, on the edge of the heights bordering the Aisne valley, and was unable to obtain a footing on them. Lamaze's Group of Reserve divisions, next on the right, owing to enemy fire, could not throw bridges, and did not cross the Aisne, except for a small party on the left next to the VII. Corps In the 45th Division, next to the British, all the 90th Brigade, except three companies, crossed the Aisne at Soissons during the night of the l2th/l3th, mainly man by man, over the débris of a permanent bridge, but from 4.30 A.M. onwards by means of rafts. Towards 6 A.M. enemy gun fire stopped further movement. A battalion of the 89th Brigade managed to cross by a footbridge on the débris of another permanent bridge, but in the course of the day both bridges were destroyed and owing to the fierceness of the fire the engineers were unable to repair them or to construct others. The 90th Brigade, however, was not entirely cut off, as it established contact with the British 4th Division on its right.

There seemed little chance of the Sixth Army carrying out the rôle assigned to it by Joffre.