MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER XX - THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE (Continued)

14 SEPTEMBER

THE FIGHT FOR THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

 

(Sketch 19; Maps 4, & 35)

 

In the description of the actions of the 14th September, although some sort of order may appear in the narrative it must be borne in mind that in consequence of thick weather, of the fighting being at close quarters, sometimes even hand-to-hand, and of the heavy casualties, actually very great confusion prevailed. It was most difficult for divisional and brigade staffs, even for battalion commanders, to follow all the vicissitudes of the combat, and impossible to record them in detail. Even could they have done so, their accounts could scarcely have done justice to the desperate character of the encounters on the Chemin des Dames ridge and on the spurs and in the valleys leading up to it, particularly near the Troyon factory, Soupir and the Chivres spur. The fighting resembled that of Waterloo or Inkerman, except that the combatants, instead of being shoulder to shoulder, controlled by their officers, advanced in open order and in small parties, and fought usually behind cover or lying down ; there was little of a spectacular nature, except when the enemy tried to bear down all opposition by weight of numbers.

 

 

To epitomise the day's work, the British divisions in a literally uphill contest, without much artillery support, came piecemeal on to the battlefield to the assistance of the advanced guards already across the Aisne. They found the enemy not only in position, entrenched and supported by 8-inch howitzers, but in such force that so far from manifesting any intention of continuing his retreat, he made every effort to drive the British back over the river.

Thus the 14th September passed in alternate attack and counter-attack, and ended in no decisive result. It was the first day of that " stabilisation " of the battle line which was to last so many weary months-the beginning, for the British, of trench warfare.

In the I. Corps, reconnaissances during the night had established the fact that parties of the enemy were established in a sugar factory a little north-west of Troyon and at some cross-roads just beyond. To protect the march of the 1st Division, therefore, the 2nd Brigade, with two batteries of the XXV. Brigade R.F.A., all under Br.-General Bulfin, was ordered to seize before daybreak the top of the Chemin des Dames ridge from Cerny to a road junction a mile westward. Under cover of, and through, this force, the advanced guard of the division-the 1st (Guards) Brigade, a battery, and a field company, under Br.-General Maxse, clearing Moulin by 7.30 A.M. was to march northward on Chamouille via Cerny. The main body of the division was then to follow, except two brigades of artillery and the heavy battery, which were to support the advance from Paissy spur.

At 3 A.M., amid heavy rain and dense mist, Br.-General Bulfin's force moved by Vendresse upon Troyon, the 2/K.R.R.C. leading, followed by the 2/R. Sussex. The commanding officer of the former, Lieut.-Colonel Pearce Serocold, had orders from Br.-General Bulfin to seize and secure the high ground above Troyon, whilst Lieut.-Colonel Montrésor of the Sussex was to keep his battalion in support at Vendresse until needed. The leading company of the K.R.R.C., with a party of the 9th Lancers, on reaching the top of the hill, surprised, about 4.45 A.M., a German piquet, but could not progress much further, so that Colonel Serocold sent up two more companies to extend his line. The din of rifle fire now gradually increased, although there was a marked absence of artillery fire, and by 5.30 it had become a roar. It was evident that the Germans were in strength, and Colonel Serocold called upon the Sussex, who meantime had been brought up closer in anticipation that they would be required ; by 6.30 A.M. they were deployed on his left, each battalion covering nearly eight hundred yards of front. At the same time Br.-General Bulfin threw out the Northamptonshire to the spur next to the eastward to protect the right flank. The two leading companies of the Sussex, finding that the fire came from trenches some three hundred yards to the north of them, moved westward so as to take the defenders in flank. For a brief space there was a sharp interchange of rifle fire ; and then large numbers of Germans threw up their hands in token of surrender. Some of the Sussex rose to their feet to bring their prisoners in, upon which other Germans in rear opened fire indiscriminately upon friend and foe ; but, none the less, some three hundred of the enemy were captured and sent to the rear. (Principally men of the l6th Reserve Regiment (VII. Reserve Corps) and 78th Regiment (X. Corps).) Continuing the fight, the left half-company of the Sussex succeeded in overlapping the western flank of the Germans, who, astride the road from Troyon north-west to the sugar factory, were opposing the progress of the K.R.R.C. The British marksmanship was so accurate that here also numbers of Germans threw up their hands. Thereupon, two German batteries, entrenched east of the factory, opened fire upon their unhappy comrades, who, between German shells from the east and British bullets from the south and west, were quickly exterminated. Teams then appeared near the two batteries, but in a very short time every driver, horse and gunner was shot down by British rifles, and the twelve guns remained silent and derelict upon the plateau. (Zwehl, p. 73, says only one battery (1st of the Reserve F.A. Regiment No.14 on the left of the Abteilung).)

 

 

It was now nearly 7 A.M. The head of the 1st (Guards) Brigade had reached Vendresse, where Br.-General Maxse decided to advance and prolong the line of the 2nd Brigade to the left. The 3rd Brigade was in reserve on the right rear of the 2nd at Moulins, less the Queen's, which was on its way further east to the plateau of Paissy (2 miles east of Vendresse) to act as right flank guard and escort to the portion of the divisional artillery in readiness there. The 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades were in observation near Paissy itself and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade in the neighbourhood of Vendresse, to which position it had fallen back after General Bulfin's force had passed through it. The 2nd Division was not ready to move, the 6th Brigade having not yet finished the passage of the Aisne. The two batteries also assigned to Br.-General Bulfin's force had not yet joined him, nor was there the slightest prospect in the fog which prevailed that they could find a target when they did arrive.

After 7 A.M. the fusillade upon the Chemin des Dames ridge increased, and by 8 A.M. Major-General Lomax (1st Division) was satisfied that a strong German attack was developing upon the front of his 2nd Brigade, and despatched a message to the Cavalry Division at Paissy asking that his right flank should be protected. Between 8 and 9 A.M. the combat rapidly became more intense. The 1st (Guards) Brigade, led by the 1/Coldstream, was approaching the left of the 2nd Brigade, but General Lomax sent orders to Br.-General Bulfin not to push on after he had secured the high ground. Meanwhile the Loyal North Lancashire were sent up by Br.-General Bulfin from brigade reserve to support the K.R.R.C. and the Sussex in the attack upon the Troyon factory ; all three battalions then advanced, and successfully occupied the buildings and entrenched on the flat top of the ridge beyond. They had actually passed through the two abandoned batteries ; but, though they clung to the position which they had taken up, and the Northamptonshire worked forward on their right, they were unable to make further headway against the enemy, entrenched with field guns and machine guns north and east of the factory. He, on his side, made repeated counter-attacks, which were steadily repulsed. During the whole day the fight surged to and fro across some three hundred yards of ground, the fresh units which arrived as reinforcements being thrust in where they seemed most required.

Meanwhile the 1/Coldstream was struggling through a large and thick patch of wood in the Vendresse valley and up the very steep hillside which led to the top of the ridge. On reaching it, their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel J. Ponsonby, learnt that the Cameron Highlanders (The 1/Cameron Highlanders had taken the place of the 2/Royal Munster fusiliers in the 1st (Guards) Brigade.) and the Black Watch had discovered an easier road and were already in position. There was, however, still a space left for his battalion between them and the left of the 2nd Brigade. He accordingly deployed it and led it forward as far as the actual roadway of the Chemin des Dames, along which he aligned his men. The road for most of its length ran level with the ground and had neither bank nor ditch, but at this point was about two feet below the general surface, and afforded a little cover ; but the German artillery fire was very heavy and the Coldstream suffered severely. Finally, Colonel Ponsonby collected the equivalent of about a company and led them forward to the village of Cerny (4 mile north of Troyon) on the far side of the ridge, and beyond it, . penetrating far into the German position. So obscure was the whole situation, owing to the fog, that at first he mistook the Germans all round him for British, while they on their part mistook the Coldstream for their own men. The Coldstream, however, were the first to realise the truth, and under their fire the enemy near them speedily disappeared. The rest of the battalion worked its way further to the east and formed on the right of the K.R.R.C., prolonging its line to the east. Still further eastwards, the Queen's, nominally the right flank guard, also crossed the Chemin des Dames, but met with no serious resistance till it reached the northern slope by La Bovelle Farm 1/2 mile north-east of Cerny). Here the battalion took up a position and engaged the German reserves in the valley of the Ailette north of it, turning its machine gun upon the flank of any German troops who chanced to pass across its front, and inflicting considerable damage. Actually, therefore, there were two separate points, a mile apart, at which the German line had been pierced with no great trouble or loss, and five companies in all of British infantry were looking down into the valley of the Ailette.

Owing to the fog, however, the confusion on the ridge was remarkable even for a modern battlefield. The Germans unfortunately enjoyed the advantage of having their guns in position and, indifferent whether they hit friend or foe, maintained a heavy fire, which caused the British considerable loss. The British batteries, on the other hand, took some time to reach their position on the plateau of Paissy, and when they arrived there did not immediately open fire, fearing to do more harm than good. Before 11 A.M., however, the 54th and 114th Batteries did signal service for the 2nd Brigade ; and the 116th, coming boldly into the firing line east of Troyon, fought alongside the infantry. Nevertheless, the general situation was unpleasant, and, for reasons which will be given later, there was no sign of the 2nd Division coming up on the left of the 1st.

Meantime the 3rd Brigade had been despatched by the divisional commander to reinforce the left of the 1st (Guards) Brigade, and it had reached its position when, about 10.30 A.M., a counter-attack of three German battalions (25th Reserve Brigade) south-eastwards towards Vendresse began to make itself felt. Fortunately at this time the fog lifted, so the 46th and 113th Batteries, unlimbering near Moussy, south-west of Vendresse, opened fire on this force with deadly effect. By this and flanking fire from the 5th Brigade the advance of the Germans was checked, whereupon the 2/Welch Regiment and 1/South Wales Borderers delivered an attack upon them towards the north-west. The progress of the Borderers was much impeded by dense woods, but the Welch, having clear ground before, them, pressed their assault with great determination and carrying all before them, established themselves firmly on the south-eastern slopes of the Beaulne spur.

It was now about 1 P.M. The Welch were in the position above described, and the South Wales Borderers in rear of them, between Chivy and Beaulne. They had done their work well ; but they had hardly completed it before the Germans launched a counter-attack (In infantry they amounted to about twelve battalions.) against the entire front of the 2nd and 1st (Guards) Brigades. The first onslaught fell on the British right, and it drove the 2nd Brigade from the sugar factory and back through the two derelict German batteries to the position which it had held earlier in the day. The ground thus regained by the enemy was of no great depth, but it was sufficient to expose the right flank of the Cameron Highlanders (1st Brigade), upon whom the Germans turned a devastating machinegun fire.

This battalion had in the morning formed for attack under cover of the wood by the head of the Chivy valley, which runs down from the Chemin des Dames to Chivy, a little to the west of Troyon. It came under rifle fire before it was clear of the trees, and on emerging into the open was immediately checked by a storm of shells from its front and left, and by enfilade fire of machine guns from the right. The right company, which came up first, was shattered almost immediately, but the remaining companies came on in succession and maintained the attack. A company of the 1/Black Watch was pushed up on the right of the Camerons and part of the 1/Scots Guards (two companies were absent as escort to artillery.) on their left the whole, pressing steadily on, charged the German trenches on the plateau above them, and carried them in an irresistible rush. Then, attacked in flank and riddled through and through, with more than half of the men down and with ammunition failing, the Highlanders gradually dribbled back into the Chivy valley, whence they had started. A last party of fifty Camerons, under Major Hon. A. H. Maitland, clung to the ground which they had won, until their ammunition was almost exhausted ; then they fell back fifty yards behind the crest of the ridge. There they were attacked by masses of the enemy, five and six deep, and, after beating back the first onset, during which their commander was killed, were finally overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

Two companies of the 1/Gloucestershire, the reserve of the 3rd Brigade (the rest of the battalion being divisional reserve), were sent forward to cover the retirement of the Camerons and of such of the Black Watch as were with them, and the Highlanders were delivered from their pursuers. The troops between them and Troyon gradually conformed to the new front, facing north-west. The Queen's were still at La Bovelle, and Colonel Ponsonby's party of the 1/Coldstream was still north of Cerny, these forming, as it were, advanced posts in front of the right and right centre of the British line. The whole of the infantry of the 1st Division except the two companies in divisional reserve had been put into the fight. The situation remained practically unchanged for the next two hours, during which the Germans continued to make counterattacks at various points along the whole length of the line, attacks which grew weaker and weaker after each repulse, until by 3 P.M. they had practically died away.

Leaving the 1st Division we will now turn to the 2nd Division on its immediate left.

The orders issued by Major-General Monro were to continue the pursuit. The 6th Brigade, with the XXXIV. Brigade R.F.A. and 5th Field Company R.E., was to form the new advanced guard under Br.-General Davies and begin the passage of the Aisne by the pontoon bridge at Pont Arcy at 5 A.M. Having crossed the river under protection of the 5th Brigade in position on the line Verneuil-Moussy-Soupir, the 6th was to advance northwards through the 5th, and halt on the Chemin des Dames ridge and wait for further instructions. The 5th Brigade was then to close and follow. The 4th (Guards) Brigade, with the XXXVI. Brigade R.F.A., under Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Hall, crossing by the same bridge at 6.30 A.M. (actually, as will be seen, the bridge was not clear for it until about 8.30 A.M.), was to turn north-westward through Soupir and La Cour de Soupir (a farm about one mile north by west of Soupir) and secure the summit of the Soupir spur (marked by the figure 197, a point known as La Croix sans Tête), about a mile further north. The rest of the division, including two brigades of artillery, was to follow the Guards, except the heavy battery, which was to cross the river at Bourg and join the column north of the river ; actually one of the brigades, the XLIV. (Howitzer), also crossed at Bourg.

The leading battalion of the 6th Brigade began its crossing punctually at the named hour ; but though not molested by the enemy, the march of the troops over the narrow floating bridge was slow ; it was 8 A.M. before the entire brigade, with its attached guns, was assembled on the north bank. The 1/R. Berkshire, with two companies of the l/K.R.R.C. thrown out upon the hills on either hand as flank guards, and preceded by two troops of the l5th Hussars, was then pushed north-north-west towards Braye, up the long valley in which lies the Oise and Aisne canal. This canal valley breaks into the main ridge so deeply that Braye, which stands at the head of its western fork, is hardly half a mile from the Chemin des Dames. On the sides of spurs which jut out on the eastern side of this valley are the villages of Verneuil and Moussy.

Shortly after 9 A.M., on reaching a line east and west of La Maison Brûlée (about half-way between Moussy and Braye), the Berkshire were checked by heavy shell and rifle fire, from the high ground north of the latter village ; there was some delay whilst the King's were brought forward and extended to the right of the Berkshire, between them and their right flank guard. The batteries which had crossed the Aisne at Bourg were also retarded by a steady rain of German shells upon the road leading northward from Bourg to Courtonne. However, at 10 A.M. the 50th and 70th Batteries of the XXXIV. Brigade R.F.A. came into action on the southern slopes of the Moussy spur ; and at 10.30 A.M. the 6th Brigade opened its attack. Two companies of the 1/K.R.R.C., moving along the summit of the Moussy spur, formed the right. On their left, the King's entered the woods which clothe the western slope of the spur on the eastern side of the Oise canal ; and the Berkshire advanced on the lower ground west of the King's, their left flank being guarded by the two remaining companies of the K.R.R.C. on the subsidiary spur of La Bovette, immediately to the north of Soupir village.

The attack appears to have been launched prematurely, before the troops on Moussy spur had had time to reach their places in the line. In any case, it is certain that, whether from accident or design, the Berkshire outstripped the King's, and that the King's outstripped the two companies of the K.R.R.C. on their right. The Berkshire made their way successfully to the foot of the spur which juts southward from the Chemin des Dames just north-east of Braye village, and by noon had two companies in action on its lower slopes. But they could advance no further, finding their progress barred by fire from tiers of trenches in their front and from both flanks. The King's, though under heavy fire from howitzers, field guns and rifles, likewise advanced nearly to the foot of the main ridge of the Chemin des Dames, where they, too, were brought to a stand by fire from tiers of German trenches on the steep slope before them, from their right flank and from their rear. An effort was made, with the help of the 2/Worcestershire (the head of the 5th Brigade), to clear the trenches on the right from which the enfilade fire proceeded, but without success. Still further to the east, the two companies of the 1/K.R.R.C. pushed on to a wood, where they were counter-attacked by infantry in front, and enfiladed by machine guns from a flank. They fought vigorously and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, but were finally forced back to the top of the spur above Moussy, and the German counter-attack spread further to the west. The Berkshire and King's were pushed back abreast of Beaulne village, only half a mile from Moussy ; but the K.R.R.C., having been reinforced by the 2/Worcestershire and the Highland L.I., were able to stem the German onslaught until, by the aid of the 46th and 113th Batteries and of the 3rd Brigade which had advanced on their right, as already described, they finally repulsed the enemy with very heavy loss.

Although the 2/Grenadiers, the leading battalion of the 4th (Guards) Brigade, which was to prolong the left of the 6th Brigade, commenced to cross the pontoon bridge at 8.30 A.M., the Irish Guards, who were the last battalion, were not all across, according to their diary, until 10 A.M. The Connaught Rangers were on the extreme left of the 5th Brigade covering line, and had taken up a position on the previous night on the outskirts of Soupir, facing north and west. Their commanding officer, Major W. S. Sarsfield, on hearing at 1 A.M. that the 4th (Guards) Brigade was going to advance via Soupir, rightly appreciated that he would greatly assist the Guards by making good the high ground near La Cour de Soupir, instead of remaining down in the valley where he was ; so he decided to move. Reaching the farm with three companies at 5.30 A.M., he pushed out small posts and ascertained that the spur above was clear of the enemy as far as Point 197. On reporting his action to the 5th Brigade headquarters, he was informed by a message which reached him about 9.45 A.M. that it would be some time before the 4th (Guards) Brigade could arrive, and that until the brigade came up and securely occupied the high ground about Point 197, he was not to leave his position. Almost at the same moment a platoon of the 2/Grenadier Guards, the point of the 4th (Guards) Brigade advanced guard formed by that battalion, arrived at La Cour de Soupir, unaware, like the rest of the brigade, that the Connaught Rangers were ahead of it. Rain was now falling, and whilst the officers were discussing the situation in the courtyard of the farm, violent rifle fire was heard a thousand yards away to the left, and immediately afterwards a N.C.O. ran in from one of the Connaught posts and reported the advance of German infantry in force. The three companies of the Connaught Rangers were at once deployed east and west of La Cour de Soupir ; the detachment of the 1/K.R.R.C. was not yet in position on the crest of La Bovette, to their right. The enemy, covered by the fire of his artillery, attacked in large masses over the open, at the same time sending troops into the wood about La Bovette, to turn the flank of the Connaught Rangers. In the centre and on the left the British held their own, the whole of the 2/Grenadier Guards (Major C=. Jeffreys) having been engaged as the companies came up on the left flank of the Connaught Rangers. But in the woods on the right the enemy steadily gained ground, and after an hour's sharp fighting he had advanced to within one hundred yards of La Cour de Soupir. The leading battalion of the main body of the 4th (Guards) Brigade, the 3/Coldstream (Major T. G. Matheson) was now beginning to arrive ; it had suffered from shell fire after leaving Soupir, and in consequence had been ordered to leave the road. Engaging three companies on the right of the 2/Grenadier Guards, it brought the enemy advance to a halt. Arrangements were then made for the 2/Grenadier Guards and 3/Coldstream to resume the advance and secure the high ground near Point 197 : the 1/Irish Guards (Major H. Stepney), which had now arrived on the scene and was clearing the woods on the right, was to join in. About 12 noon the movement was got under way, and the first result was that about two hundred Germans in a root field to the north of the farm immediately stood up with their hands above their heads. In the enthusiasm of the moment a number of Guardsmen, with the limited outlook of the local situation, rushed forward to receive the surrender, and the Irish Guards, hearing the cheering, began to leave the edge of the woods. At this moment other German troops, advancing over the sky-line about half a mile away, opened fire on both friend and foe. Under the German artillery and rifle fire which ensued everyone lay down where he was. Realising that it was impossible to restart the attack with the same companies, Major Matheson, the whereabouts of brigade headquarters being unknown, left Major Jeffreys in charge, and made his way to the Irish Guards. He arranged with Major Stepney to attack from the wood and thus outflank the Germans, when the Grenadiers, Coldstream and Connaught Rangers would cooperate as opportunity offered. About 2 P.M. the movement was initiated by the Irish Guards ; but it was soon checked by heavy rifle fire down the rides and from a field a hundred yards from the edge of the wood. It caused, however, considerable commotion amongst the Germans on the ridge in front of the farm, of which the British took advantage to inflict heavy casualties. The 1/K.R.R.C. was by this time making its presence felt about La Bovette, and the rest of the 4th (Guards) Brigade was rapidly coming up. Thus, by about 2 P.M., the 2nd Division, though unable as yet to advance very far, was in firm possession of a line running, roughly speaking, from Beaulne westward to La Cour de Soupir, and thence south-west along the eastern edge of the top of the spur towards Chavonne. (The opponents of the 2nd Division were the right half of the l3th Reserve Division and part of the 6th Division.)

To sum up the situation on the I. Corps front between s 2 and 3 P.M. :-The corps was successfully holding a line roughly facing north-west from the plateau of the Chemin des Dames opposite La Bovelle, through Troyon, Chivy and Beaulne, to La Cour de Soupir, and thence south-westward to the river ; it had made appreciable headway and repulsed all counter-attacks with heavy loss to the enemy. The 1st Division batteries on the plateau of Paissy on the right had come into action when the fog lifted at noon, and divided their fire between the Germans who were retiring in disorder over the Chemin des Dames and those who were assembling for a fresh attack about Chermizy (about three miles N.N.E. of Paissy) in the valley of the Ailette.

In the centre and on the left of the British front the situation was less satisfactory, and there was a gap of very nearly two miles between the left of the I. Corps and the right of the II. Of the 3rd Division, the 8th and 9th Brigades were, it will be remembered, already on the north bank of the Aisne, their line of outposts extending from a farm called Rouge Maison (1 mile north-east of Vailly) south-west for about a mile and a half to the southern slopes of the Jouy spur, which runs down to the Aisne between the villages of Jouy on the east and Sancy on the west. The 9th Brigade held the right of this line and the 8th the left. All had orders to continue the pursuit on the l4th. At dawn the Royal Scots, of the latter brigade, advancing to take up a position on the crest of Jouy spur, came under fire at close range, the German trenches being just on the other side of the crest of the ridge. The Royal Irish came up on their right, and the 4/Middlesex on their left ; then the three battalions, only some fifteen hundred strong, slowly made their way almost to the crest. The British batteries on the south bank did their best to support them ; but the XL. Brigade R.F.A., which had crossed the river at Vailly soon after daylight, could find no position from which it could come into action.

For some hours the 8th Brigade clung to the ground which it had gained ; meanwhile, about 7.30 A.M., the enemy opened an attack, covered by the fire of artillery and machine guns, on the Lincolnshire and Royal Fusiliers of the 9th Brigade, to the right and left of Rouge Maison. The German trenches, which had been concealed from the Royal Fusiliers by the fog, were in fact less than six hundred yards away, and only two hundred yards beyond the crest of the ridge. The Northumberland Fusiliers were sent up to the left of the Royal Fusiliers, and the three battalions were ordered to meet the German offensive by a counter-attack. A successful advance here was particularly desirable, inasmuch as the Germans had placed batteries on the flanks of the two valleys which run down to the Aisne east and west of Vailly, and were bursting shells very accurately over the pontoon bridge by that village.

Whilst the 9th Brigade was slowly forcing its way through the dripping woods against a driving mist, about 9 A.M., the Germans delivered a heavy counter-attack upon the 8th Brigade on Jouy spur, supporting it by machinegun fire from the west ; after suffering severely, the brigade, about 10 A.M., began to fall back. Urgent messages were despatched to the 7th Brigade from 3rd Division headquarters to come up in support ; but its commander, on nearing the pontoon bridge at Vailly, found the shell fire so heavy that he turned the head of the brigade further upstream to the damaged railway bridge, the breach in which was traversable only by a single plank. Before, however, the brigade could pass it, British soldiers were filing back over the narrow passage towards the southern bank. The 9th Brigade, upon emerging from the woods, had been received with a murderous fire from artillery and machine guns, and after enduring it for a while and attempting to entrench, the right battalion, the Lincolnshire, had given way, and the rest of the brigade had fallen back. The Royal Fusiliers, their flank being uncovered by the retirement of the Lincolnshire, had been compelled to withdraw to a sunken road just south of Rouge Maison. The Fifth Fusiliers, whose leading company had advanced too far into the open whilst the remainder were still entangled in the woods, had been very severely handled, but rallied on the Royal Fusiliers. The Scots Fusiliers, the reserve of the brigade, had already been thrown into the fight, half of them on the right and half on the left, and the former, being enfiladed by machine guns while toiling over heavy beetroot fields waist deep in dripping leaves, had been driven back with heavy losses.

The situation was critical ; for owing to the gap between the I. and II. Corps, the right flank of the 9th Brigade was absolutely exposed ; had the Germans followed up their advantage the consequences might have been serious. The western side of the Soupir spur, the valley of the Ostel west of it, and the spur between that valley and St. Précord, a space fully a mile and a half wide, was open to them. The British gunners to the south of the Aisne were cut off from the battlefield by the mist. If the Germans could have advanced in force they would probably have outflanked and thus overwhelmed the 4th (Guards) Brigade to the east, and the 8th and 9th Brigades to the west of the gap, and cut the British Army in two. There were, it is true, two regiments of the 5th Cavalry Brigade in Vailly ; they had crossed the pontoon bridge in the early morning, but the fog had lifted for a time while the third regiment, the 20th Hussars, was filing over, and it had been ordered to re-cross at once to the south bank. The Scots Greys and l2th Lancers, who remained in Vailly, were under heavy and continuous shell fire. Their five or six hundred rifles might have delayed, but could hardly have averted a catastrophe.

However, whether from dread of the British guns on the heights of Chassemy, which were searching for the concealed German batteries across the river, or from the effects of his own heavy losses, the enemy made no immediate offensive movement. By 1 P.M. the 1/Wiltshire of the 7th Brigade had crossed the Aisne by the railway bridge, deployed with its right on the Vailly-Ostel road, and now, though heavily shelled on the way, hastened to the assistance of the 9th Brigade on the spur to the east of St. Précord. Thus reinforced, the latter brigade stood fast. At 3.30 P.M., the Irish Rifles of the 7th Brigade came up on the left of the Wiltshire, bringing the intelligence that a strong German column was moving south-eastward from Ostel. Warning of this movement was at once sent to the 4th (Guards) Brigade. The remainder of the 7th Brigade continued to pass the river ; whilst the 8th Brigade fell back to the south of Jouy spur, with its right on the road that leads from Vailly to Aizy, and its left west of the chateau of Vauxelles (3/4 mile north-west of Vailly).

The 3rd Division, thus compactly drawn together, held its own without difficulty until dusk, and at 5.30 P.M. General Hamilton declared himself confident of his ability to maintain his position on the north bank of the Aisne. Nevertheless, the casualties had been serious : the 9th Brigade had lost between six and seven hundred men, and the 7th and 8th Brigades about one hundred and fifty each, losses which would not have been felt so much had not the battalions been already below establishment.

As a result of the improvement in the situation, the 5th Cavalry Brigade and the XL. Brigade R.F.A. were ordered back. The former re-crossed the pontoon bridge under heavy shell fire in single file at increased distance, a troop at a time, the passage of the bridge being kept open and controlled with the greatest coolness by Captain T. Wright, V.C., with the assistance of a party of the 57th Field Company R.E. The cavalry escaped with some forty men and half a dozen horses wounded ; but Captain Wright was killed. The three batteries, being unable to re-cross the river at Vailly, drove 5 miles up the valley to Pont Arcy, coming under fire at various points on the way, and especially at the bridge itself. their losses were fortunately slight ; but the orderliness of their retreat, as also of that of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, under such conditions, spoke highly for their discipline.

It is now time to turn to the 5th and 4th Divisions on the left of the line. Their operations, though nominally in combination with the divisions on the right, were, as it turned out, practically distinct, owing to the barrier interposed by the promontory of Chivres. The 5th Division continued the passage of the river during the night of the l3th/l4th by improvised methods, for Missy bridge was not ready and still required many hours' work before it would be serviceable. The 14th Brigade, it will be remembered, had crossed to Ste. Marguerite on the l3th September. The l5th Brigade was ferried over on rafts during the same night at Moulin des Roches (1 mile east of Venizel) and reached Ste. Marguerite by 6 A.M. on the 14th. The R. West Kent and Scottish Borderers of the l3th Brigade, the other two battalions remaining south of the river, likewise passed the river under cover of darkness, by means of rafts and boats, near the wrecked bridge of Missy, but their further advance was then stopped by fire, and they took such cover as they could find on the north bank. Ferrying was continued under fire all day until 7 P.M. by Captain W. H. Johnston and Lieut. R. B. Flint of the Royal Engineers, carrying wounded one way and ammunition the other. (The former officer received the V.C. and the latter the D.S.O. Both officers were killed in action later in the war.)

The operation orders of the 5th Division for the 14th September, in accordance with higher instructions, directed the continuation of the pursuit : the l5th Brigade, with the VIII. Brigade R.F.A., to march via Celles (near Condé) and thence some fifteen miles northwards to Cessières (6 miles west of Laon) ; the 14th and l3th Brigades, with the rest of the divisional troops, via Missy to Suzy (8 miles west of Laon).

It early became evident that these orders could not be carried out so long as Chivres spur remained in the hands of the enemy. This, the highest ground on the field, with the old fort of Condé on its summit, commands the valley on both sides of it for a considerable distance. It was therefore arranged that the left of the 14th Brigade, with two battalions of the l3th on its right, should attack eastward from the direction of Ste. Marguerite (which village was held by the l2th Brigade), and its right should be thrown forward so as to threaten the spur from the south. The l5th Brigade was to make its way through Missy as soon as the right of the 14th Brigade had cleared the village, and attack the spur from the south-east. The XV. Brigade R.F.A. (reduced by previous losses to two batteries of four guns apiece), together with the 37th and 61st Howitzer Batteries, was brought over the Aisne to the vicinity of Bucy le Long to support the attack.

The 14th Brigade started early, but the Germans began to burst shells in the valley near Missy, as soon as it was light. The progress of the operations was very slow. The Manchester, on the left of the 14th Brigade, were checked by enfilade fire of artillery and machine guns from the village of Chivres and the valley above it. The battalion had, in fact, got within three hundred yards of the German trenches, but once there, could do no more than hold its own. The Cornwall L.I., in the centre, and the East Surrey, on the right, however, worked their way round to Missy, very slowly, for the road from Ste. Marguerite was under artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire ; by noon the East Surrey were established on the northern edge of Missy village. Thence they threw out a company to feel for the West Kent and Scottish Borderers (l3th Brigade) on their right. The l5th Brigade had meanwhile also moved from Ste. Marguerite; leaving the Dorsetshire in a sunken road north of the village. At 2.30 P.M. its head arrived at Missy, and the officer commanding the Bedfordshire at once pushed a company, in co-operation with one of the East Surrey, a considerable way up the wooded spur beyond the village, where they found only a few Germans and established themselves. As Ste. Marguerite was being heavily shelled, the remainder of the brigade was unable to reach Missy until more than an hour later ; it was 4.30 P.M. before the dispositions were completed for a final effort by the 14th and l5th Brigades to secure the crest of the spur.

The left centre of the 14th Brigade, having been absolutely stopped by the frontal fire from the enemy's trenches on the western side of the spur and by the flanking fire from the Chivres valley, the new attack was made up the spur from the south. Ten companies (including the two already on the spur), three from the Norfolk, four from the Bedfordshire, of the l5th Brigade, and three from the East Surrey of the 14th Brigade, with supports from the Cheshire and Cornwall L.I.-were detailed for it. As they advanced northwards up the hill, the woods were found to be held by the enemy with an organised system of trenches protected by wire netting and fencing. (According to Bloem, his regiment reached Chivres spur on the l2th September ; so there had been plenty of time to entrench.) The companies of Bedfordshire and East Surrey, on the left, were the first to enter the woods ; they pressed on steadily, shooting down a good many Germans and making headway by sheer superiority of marksmanship. In fact, on the left of the attack all seemed to be going well.

But on the right it was otherwise. Whether, in view of the failing light, insufficient time had been allowed for the various units to reach their several starting points, or because the wire netting in the woods caused them to converge, it is difficult to say, it is only certain that, in spite of all precautions, some companies lost direction, and that the right tended to close in on the centre, where the overcrowding and confusion became so great that few could tell in which direction they should fire, whilst both British and German guns shelled the woods. The inevitable result soon followed. Confused advance gave place to confused retirement. Br.-General Count Gleichen, the senior officer on the spot, therefore decided to abandon the attack, called back his battalions and broke off the fight.

Three companies of the East Surrey and a company of the Bedfordshire, however, still stuck to the ground which they had gained within seventy yards of the German trenches. They were still striving to push forward when, between 6 and 7 P.M., they received orders to fall back. The l5th Brigade was then re-formed south of Missy, and a line was taken up by the 14th Brigade and entrenched, starting from the left, from the eastern end of Ste. Marguerite, across the mouth of the Chivres valley to Missy village ; thence the West Kent and Scottish Borderers of the l3th Brigade prolonged it to Missy bridge. The casualties had not been heavy, but the loss of a total of one hundred men was a serious thing to these already depleted battalions.

West of the 5th Division, the 4th had received orders to push on northward over the plateau between Vregny and Crouy, with the double object of dislodging the German heavy guns, which from Clamecy (2 miles north of Crouy) were stopping the advance of General Maunoury's right, and of helping forward the advance of the 5th Division. By 1 A.M. on the 14th, the 10th Brigade had completed its passage of the river, and an hour later it was sent up to reinforce the 11th Brigade which, secure by its own boldness, was still occupying the line of heights from Ste. Marguerite to Crouy, a front of 3 miles. The 12th Brigade held a line on the right of the 11th. Its right was thrown back into the Chivres valley, the right flank resting on the stream about five hundred yards south of Chivres village, which was the point of junction of the 5th and 4th Divisions. From here the line ran west-north-west over the valley to the northern edge of Ste. Marguerite spur, at a point immediately south of Vregny, and thence to the crest of the hill between Le Moncel and Ste. Marguerite. The 39th and 68th Batteries, with a section of the 88th, were in the open a little to north-east of Venizel, a position exposed to the fire of the German guns on Chivres spur, but the best which could be found. The 31st and 55th Howitzer Batteries also crossed the river about dawn and, in order to facilitate the advance of the French, moved to a position a hundred yards north-west of La Montagne Farm (north-east of Bucy le Long), and opened fire on German guns which were on the ridge about thirteen hundred yards north-west of Crouy.

The difficulty of giving any artillery support to a direct attack by the 4th Division was so great that Br.-General Wilson, the divisional commander, hesitated to commit himself to such an operation unless the 5th Division on his right or the French on his left should make a decided forward movement. The right of the French Sixth Army could neither force its way beyond Crouy nor establish itself on the plateau north of Pommiers (2 miles west of Soissons). The French had no heavy artillery comparable with that of the Germans, and immediately east and west of Soissons the heights on the north bank of the Aisne are, at the nearest point, over five thousand yards distant from those on the south bank. The 5th Division, for reasons already explained, was progressing very slowly. So far as infantry was concerned the numbers facing the British 4th and 5th Divisions did not appear to be very great, though as a matter of fact the whole of the German II. Corps and parts of the III. and IX. were opposite to them ; (II. Corps held Vregny-Crouy, with the 5th Division of the III. Corps east of it, on Chivres spur. Then came Kraewel's Composite Brigade of the IX. Corps, and next the 6th Division, extending to Vailly, inclusive.) but all approaches to the enemy's position, which was entrenched and of considerable natural strength, were swept by artillery, in great force, and by machine guns.

At daylight intermittent fire was opened on the line of the 4th Division and on its batteries ; work upon the trenches of the 10th Brigade could only be carried on at intervals, so that the shelter obtained by the battalions was, in many cases, inadequate, and among the killed was Lt.-Col. Sir E. Bradford commanding the 2/Seaforth Highlanders. At noon the fire increased so greatly that a German attack on the spur of La Montagne (west of Le Moncel) was apprehended, and a company of the Dublins was sent forward to make a counter-attack. This company advanced for half a mile, engaged hostile infantry in a beetroot field at four hundred yards' range, and by sheer marksmanship silenced its fire. This practically ended the active work of the 4th Division for the day. The casualties were slight for the most part ; but the 10th Brigade lost one hundred officers and men, chiefly owing to the fact that they had not had time to dig themselves really good trenches.

The close of the I. Corps operations on the l4th September can now be told shortly. News of the repulse of the 3rd Division reached General Haig about 2 P.M. ; the serious menace which it meant to the left flank of the 2nd Division was instantly realised. Not a single battalion was available in corps or divisional reserve, every one having been thrown into the fight ; but the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades were at once despatched to the left, near Soupir. After an interview with Br.-General Perceval, R.A., who had taken over command of the 4th (Guards) Brigade column and was at Soupir, Br.-General Briggs pushed the 1st Cavalry Brigade on to Chavonne, where it arrived about 3.30 P.M. Finding two companies of the 2/Coldstream (Lieut.-Colonel C. Pereira), the last battalion of the 4th (Guards) Brigade, which had been sent up from Soupir in view of the emergency-holding the village, he forthwith sent one cavalry regiment to occupy a commanding bluff west of Chavonne and the small wood beyond, with a troop to connect it with the 3rd Division. About the same time, various reports were received tending to show that the enemy was retreating, and Major-General Monro (2nd Division) ordered the general advance on the main ridge to be resumed in the direction of Courtecon, the original objective. The commander of the 4th (Guards) Brigade thereupon ordered the 2/Grenadiers and the troops south-west of La Cour de Soupir to advance and swing round, pivoting on that farm, so as to face northward. The southern edges of the foothills were so steep and the space between the river and the hills was so narrow that very few guns could be put into position north of the river. Thus the only artillery support which could be provided was a section of 18-pdrs. near Soupir, and this had speedily to be withdrawn. The right of the Irish Guards and the left of the 1/K.R.R.C., reinforced by some of the remaining platoons of the 2/Coldstream, made a little progress ; but a German counter-attack now began to develop south-eastwards from Ostel towards La Cour de Soupir, and the 2/Grenadiers and 3/Coldstream lined the road to the north of the farm, fronting north-north-west, supported by a machine gun in the farm enclosure. This position they held until dusk ; but they were unable to advance further owing to the enemy on their left flank. Ultimately the bulk of the 4th (Guards) Brigade entrenched, after the battalions had been sorted out, the right and the K.R.R.C. being drawn back into the general line, and the brigade then bivouacked where it stood. Its casualties were 21 officers and 566 other ranks killed and wounded.

The 6th Brigade on the right of the Guards fared little better ; owing to heavy shelling, it could only just hold its own, without any thought of forward movement. On its right again, Br.-General Haking (5th Brigade) with the 2/Highland Light Infantry and the 2/Worcestershire, and half the 1/K.R.R.C. of the 6th Brigade managed to advance up the eastern slopes of the Beaulne spur, and there held on. Of the two remaining battalions of the 5th Brigade, which for a time had been nominally in corps reserve, the Connaught Rangers were still with the 4th (Guards) Brigade at La Cour de Soupir, and the Oxfordshire near Soupir, where they had been sent by Sir Douglas Haig to assist in securing the left of his corps.

On the extreme right, the situation towards evening had sensibly improved. The French XVIII. Corps had begun the day badly, for by 10 A.M. it had been severely handled, and had been driven from Craonne and Craonnelle. The French Colonial Division, immediately on the right of the British, had likewise at the outset suffered a repulse ; but now the XVIII. Corps was once more in possession of Craonne, and the ridge immediately to the west of it ; and the Colonial Division was again advancing over the plateau of Paissy upon Les Creutes (2 1/2 miles south-east of Cerny). The enemy was showing signs of hesitation, and Sir Douglas Haig felt that the time was come for a general forward movement of the I. Corps, and issued orders for it. The commander of the 2nd Division had, as we have seen, anticipated this ; in the 1st Division there had been no change in the general disposition since last described, except that Lieut.-Colonel D. Warren of the Queen's, after sharp fighting at La Bovelle, had skilfully extricated his battalion from its dangerously advanced position, and brought it back at 4.30 P.M. to the foremost of the British guns on the Chemin des Dames. The light was failing fast before the 1st Division was under way, and the Troyon factory had, after heavy bombardment, just been reoccupied by the Germans, who, under cover of a counter-attack, had carried off their abandoned guns. The 3rd Brigade pushed forward between the 2nd and 5th Brigades, and carried the line to within three hundred yards of the Chemin des Dames, the Welch capturing a hundred prisoners and a machine gun. Mistaking the Germans in the factory for British, the 3rd Brigade missed its chance of recapturing that building. Br.-General Haking, when it became dusk, continued his advance over heaps of German bodies to the top of the main ridge opposite Courtecon. The 3rd and 5th Brigades, however, were never really in touch, and, in fact, Br.-General Haking, after sending out patrols, found only the enemy on either side. Judging it imprudent to remain in his forward position he withdrew his two and a half battalions after dark to Verneuil and Moussy. The 3rd Brigade was left on the ground which it had so honourably won ; but, on the whole, though a final effort was fully justified, no solid advantage had been gained by it. With a few fresh battalions to put life into the fight, the results might have been widely different. Colonel Ponsonby's small party remained out in its advanced position at Cerny, with Germans all round it, until nearly midnight.

Then, in pitch darkness and heavy rain, carrying the colonel, who was wounded, the forty odd survivors, guided by an officer with a compass, made their way back into the British lines.

On the whole, the results of the 14th September were disappointing. The I. Corps had certainly. made some progress, but at heavy cost ; for its casualties amounted to three thousand five hundred. In the 1st (Guards), 2nd and 4th (Guards) Brigades, the 1/Cameron Highlanders lost six hundred officers and men, the 1/Coldstream, 1/Loyal North Lancashire and 2/Sussex, 2/Grenadiers and 3/Coldstream, each of them, over three hundred and fifty, and the 1/ and 2/K.R.R.C. over three hundred apiece. Amongst the killed was Lieut.-Colonel Adrian Grant-Duff commanding the 1/Black Watch, who fell whilst superintending the filling of a gap in the line. (As Assistant Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence 1910-1913, he had designed and edited the " War Book and worked out the detailed co-ordination of the action to be taken by the various Government Departments on the outbreak of war.) On the rest of the line the British force was stationary ; though the casualties of the 4th and 5th Divisions were slight, those of the 3rd Division fell little short of a thousand. Moreover, the general situation of the British was very far from secure. Apart from the one and a half mile gap between the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, covered by battle outposts of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 5th and 4th Divisions, separated from the rest of the Army by the promontory of Chivres, held their position on the north bank of the Aisne on a most precarious tenure. The only link between the two sections of the force was Gough's cavalry division (3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades), which, from a position about Chassemy, on the south bank, watched the undestroyed bridge of Condé, to guard against a German counter-attack. It was still by no means certain, after the day's experience, whether the Aisne was being defended by a strong rear guard or by an enemy in position. It may be said now that, but for the determined spirit of the British attack, Bülow, who, as already mentioned, was commanding all the German Armies defending the Aisne, the Second, Seventh and First, might have succeeded, as he expected, in sweeping the French and British across the river and securing the ground on the south bank. It would seem that here, as on other occasions in 1914, the sheer audacity of the British in attacking with small numbers imposed on the enemy, and made him believe that large reserves were behind them. Examination of prisoners and of the dead proved that the greater part of the German VII. Reserve Corps and at least one division of the III. Corps (Part of the 6th Division.) had been pitted against Haig's I. Corps. It was plain that the British were distributed on a front far too extensive for their strength, except in defence. Practically every battalion was in the firing line, and there was no general reserve whatsoever. Two of the corps in the field required at least another division apiece, and the third, two divisions (for the III. Corps was still a corps in name only), besides heavy guns, if they were to do the work assigned to them.

Again, there was no permanent bridge over the deep and rain-swollen waters of the Aisne : although the engineers had displayed conspicuous energy and self-sacrifice in the laying of temporary bridges, still these were, most of them, exposed to fire, and always in danger, owing to the nearly incessant rain which now fell, of being suddenly carried away by a flood. In any case, the greater part of the valley was open to the shells of the German artillery. On the left of the line it was impossible to establish any depots of supplies and stores on the north bank ; everything required had to be brought down to the river and across it by night. At Missy, the most dangerous point of all, on the night of the 14th September, the supply wagons were brought safely to within two hundred yards of the German trenches and as safely withdrawn ; but frequently rations could only be brought over by hand. The wounded could not be brought in except at night ; the stretcher bearers, who toiled with equal courage and devotion through the hours of darkness, had to carry disabled men for one or two miles over heavy soaked ground before they could deliver them to a horse ambulance. Even on the south bank trains of transport were occasionally caught by the enemy's high-explosive shells of greater calibre than any gun which the French or British had available, and fired from a range which forbade any effective reply. All ranks, however, whether of combatant or non-combatant branches, were confident of a further and immediate advance. On the enemy's side there was corresponding depression, for on the evening of the 14th September, as will be seen below, the Supreme Command issued an order for a general retirement if the First Army could not hold the Aisne line.

The situation of the British troops on the night of the 14th/15th September was as follows :

I. Corps : right on the Chemin des Dames, 4 miles from the Aisne ; left almost on the Aisne near Chavonne.

1st Division : From a point on the Chemin des Dames about 1,000 yards east of Troyon factory, south-west behind the factory, over the ridge to Mont Faucon and into the valley south of Chivy, with two advanced detachments at the head of the Chivy valley.

4th Cavalry Brigade : Paissy and Geny (south of Paissy), behind the junction of French and British armies.

2nd Division : From the southern end of Beaulne spur, across the Braye valley to the vicinity of La Bovette, and thence, by La Cour de Soupir, to Point 166 just north of Chavonne.

1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades : Connecting the I. and II. Corps ; from Point 166 to the mill midway between Chavonne and Vailly.

II. Corps : in two portions, barely across the river, with a gap of 3 1/2 miles between them.

3rd Division : From the mill aforesaid, north-west to Rouge Maison, thence parallel with the Aisne south-west to Vauxelles Chateau and the confluence of the stream which runs southward from Aizy.

5th Division : From Missy westward to Ste. Marguerite. Two battalions of the 13th Brigade south of the Aisne about Sermoise (south-east of Missy).

III. Corps : on the edge of the main ridge.

4th Division : From Ste. Marguerite north-west to La Montagne Farm, thence westward to Point 151 (east of Crouy).

19th Brigade : South of the Aisne about Venizel.

3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades : on the south bank of the Aisne, Chassemy southward to Augy.

 

THE FRENCH ON THE 14TH SEPTEMBER

 

The l4th September marked the definite end of the advance of the Fifth Army after the battle of the Marne. The X., I. and III. Corps and the right of Valabrègue's Group of Reserve divisions remained where they were, unable to gain any ground in front of the position of Bülow's Army. Conneau's cavalry corps and the portion of Valabrègue's group which had penetrated into the wide gap in the enemy front north of the Aisne, at the threat of convergent attacks from the east and north-east, " hurriedly " re-crossed to the southern bank of the river.

The XVIII. Corps, next to the British, the troops actually nearest to them being the 76th Mixed Brigade of four battalions of Zouaves and four of native African Tirailleurs, made a little progress on the left, but the right of the corps after heavy fighting was driven back, evacuating Corbeny.

" In all the area of the Fifth Army, the front now remained unchanged for a long period."

Foch's Army, on the right of the Fifth, " after hard fighting, " made only some insignificant local progress " as the Germans settled into their line.

The Sixth Army, being in close contact with the enemy, was unable to carry out the duty assigned to it of outflanking Kluck's right. Part of the 45th Division and the Moroccan Brigade managed to cross the Aisne at Soissons, but were not able to reach the edge of the heights beyond. Lamaze's group, still south of the Aisne, the VII. Corps and Ebener's group remained in their positions of the previous day, unable to advance. The IV. Corps, by attacking north-eastwards, endeavoured, without success, to help its neighbours : only one of its brigades (l6th) crossed the Oise, and joined the 37th Division, which was advancing slowly with its right on the river, the 3rd Cavalry Division being on its outer flank. The XIII. Corps nearly completed its detraining in the Creil area. Bridoux's cavalry corps (1st and 5th Cavalry Divisions) finding nothing but stragglers in front of it, pushed on nearly to the Somme near Bray, but did not turn behind the German front. General Maunoury still hoped to envelop the German right with the 37th Division, XIII. Corps and the cavalry corps, but he was too late.

 

15TH SEPTEMBER : THE DEADLOCK

 

 

Operation orders for the l5th September issued from G.H.Q. only contained information as to the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief, at a personal interview at his headquarters at Fère en Tardenois with the commanders of the II. and III. Corps, and the Br.-General General Staff of the I. Corps, at 11 P.M., on the 14th, ordered all troops to entrench on the positions which they then occupied. He dwelt on the importance of concentrating the 60-pdrs. of the five divisions in turn on the heavy batteries of the enemy, and instructed the I. Corps, without committing itself in any way, to render what assistance it could to the 3rd Division (which was barely across the river) by gun fire or infantry demonstration. Sir John French was confirmed in his view of the situation by the receipt at 1.15 A.M. of the following telegram addressed by General Joffre to his Army commanders :

" It seems as if the enemy is once more going to accept battle, in prepared positions north of the Aisne. In consequence, it is no longer a question of pursuit, but of a methodical attack, using every means at our disposal and consolidating each position in turn as it is gained."

There was, however, little opportunity of carrying these intentions into effect : the 15th was a day not of Allied but of German attacks ; the British could do no more than repel them, maintaining their position and inflicting severe loss on the enemy. The Royal Flying Corps rendered great assistance, for, though there were showers during the day, there was no heavy rain until night. Photographs were for the first time taken of the enemy's positions, most of his batteries were located, and considerable success was achieved in assisting the ranging of the artillery. From the few movements of troops behind the German lines little could be gathered for certain, though the reports of large empty bivouacs, of movements of trains northwards, and of troops moving into massed formation north of Pancy (north of Courtecon) (Probably the 2nd Cavalry Division moving eastwards.) still seemed to indicate retirement.

The 15th, however, was by no means a day without any offensive action on the part of the British. In the 3rd Division, the 7th Brigade, discovering soon after daylight that Germans were entrenching themselves between La Fosse Marguet (1 mile north-east of Vailly) and La Rouge Maison (1 1/4 miles N.N.E. of Vailly), attempted with two companies of the Irish Rifles to clear them out of their trenches, which lay 200 yards north of a wood. The attack was repulsed with severe loss ; still, German attacks or demonstrations on the line of the 3rd Division were all beaten back by rifle and machine-gun fire alone, and the situation remained unchanged. Vailly bridge was in spite of considerable shelling made passable for all traffic except heavy artillery. The 3rd Division, it may be noted, was on this day strengthened by the arrival of the 1/Devonshire, which replaced the remnant of the l/Gordon Highlanders in the 8th Brigade.

Further west a final endeavour was made by the 5th Division to gain the Chivres spur. The 14th and 15th Brigades were ordered to renew their attacks from the south-west and south over the same ground as on the previous day, whilst the 13th Brigade, including the two battalions still on the south bank, struck in simultaneously from the south-east. The 2/Duke of Wellington's was therefore brought over the river at Missy on pontoon rafts, losing some men by German high-explosive shell fire while approaching and crossing the river. The Yorkshire L.I. also suffered in the same way, but did not pass the river, as rafts were not ready in time. About 8 A.M. the Norfolk of the l5th Brigade led the advance, with the Bedfordshire in support and the remainder of the brigade in reserve, over the same ground as on the 14th September but on a narrower front. It was soon discovered that the Germans had thrown up new defences in the woods, and there was half an hour's pause during which the British batteries searched them. The ground before the l5th Brigade was at best very unfavourable, for the open country ran up into a wooded re-entrant. On advancing once more, the Norfolk were stopped by a wire-netting fence six feet high, through which there was but one entrance. Wirecutters were to hand, but the task of making a gap was long and tedious, and the density of the undergrowth made a flanking attack extremely difficult. A few outlying Germans were shot down by flanking parties ; but the attack made no progress and gradually came to a standstill. In the 14th Brigade, the Cornwall L.I. had orders to advance up the valley in touch with the 15th Brigade, with its left on the Missy-Vregny road ; the 2/Manchester on the western side of the Cornwall L.I. was to advance as soon as the latter's progress enabled it to do so. But the Germans on the end of the Chivres spur offered a stout resistance ; the advance was therefore stopped, and artillery support called for. At 11 A.M. Br.-General Rolt of the 14th Brigade was placed in command of all troops of the 5th Division on the northern bank of the Aisne. Meanwhile, the 13th Brigade found it impossible to move along the road towards Condé, which was swept by the German artillery, and could not therefore reach its assigned position to assail the Chivres spur from the south-east. Thus, the whole movement was checked. The rear battalions of the 15th Brigade and the Cornwall L.I. of the 14th became crowded together in Missy. A German aeroplane, passing over the village, took note of this congestion, and at 10 A.M. the German artillery poured such a storm of shells upon the houses that the battalions were compelled for a time to evacuate the village. Gradually they returned to their original places in front of it, always under harassing fire from German snipers at the edge of the wood ; but there they remained until dark. It was then found that there were far too many men crowded together in the small space, and the l5th Brigade was ordered to re-cross to the south bank of the river, where a temporary bridge was now available. Between 11 P.M. and midnight the Germans bombarded Missy heavily and for a short period caused some confusion ; then after a trying time the troops settled down in the positions ordered under the new arrangement. The l5th Brigade successfully completed its re-passage of the river just before the first streak of dawn on the l6th.

The casualties were not serious, though the Yorkshire L.I. paid for its unprofitable march down to the bank of the Aisne with fifty killed and wounded. It now seemed established beyond doubt that the capture of the promontory of Chivres was beyond the strength of the British force.

In the I. Corps the infantry had a comparatively quiet day. There were repeated outbursts of enemy shelling from field and heavy guns, which caused some losses among the artillery horses and disabled one field gun, and some small attacks by the enemy's infantry, which were beaten off without difficulty. Advantage was taken of the cessation of the advance to begin the construction of a very complete system of bridges and communications across the river and canal, as the enemy had spent a great deal of ammunition the previous day in trying to damage the canal bridges at Pont Arcy and Bourg.

In the 4th Division there was no change in the situation, and the day was spent in improving the trenches and collecting wire from the fences of the country round, which was converted at night into entanglements ; for except what the Field Companies carried, no barbed wire or other engineer stores were yet available.

 

THE FRENCH ON THE 15TH SEPTEMBER

 

Right and left of the British, the French had also been unable to advance. Eastward the French XVIII. Corps in the afternoon lost Craonne and Craonnelle, as a result of the arrival of German reinforcements, (On the l5th the German XVIII. Corps from the Fourth Army arrived, in addition to the VII. Reserve, XV. and XII. Corps already mentioned.) after most gallant and strenuous fighting. The gap which had existed between the German First and Second Armies was now completely closed and all chance of turning the western flank of the Second Army had disappeared. Westward the French Sixth Army could make no progress along the line of the Aisne. Though there had been great hopes that the French IV. Corps might turn the right of the First Army at Nampcel (about thirteen miles north-east of Compiègne), the enemy offered stubborn resistance in that quarter, and in addition he had been reinforced (The 7th Cavalry Division from Alsace and IX. Reserve Corps from Antwerp had arrived on the 15th. The place of the latter was taken by Landwehr)

The French General Staff was now satisfied that the Germans intended to stand on the Aisne. North of the river there was now no doubt that the troops who had been shaken by their defeat at the Battle of the Marne, reinforced by fresh divisions, were resting and refitting. It was becoming clear that, if any immediate progress were to be made by either side, it must be by turning movements rather than by frontal attack. Everything pointed to the probability, if not the certainty, of a deadlock on the line of the Aisne, which could only be resolved by a decisive action on the one open flank towards the west. For the moment the French General Staff hoped that it might be beforehand with the enemy in this ; for the district west of the Oise, from Compiègne to Montdidier, was now reported fairly clear of Germans, who, to all appearances, were steadily retiring. But meanwhile it was essential to hold the enemy to his ground on the existing front.

There was actually better reason for the optimistic views of the French than was afforded by the information then available.

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