Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches B, 13 & 18 ; Maps 4, 31, 32, 33 & 35)

As the line of retreat of the German First Army appeared to be more or less across the British front, there seemed some hope of intercepting it. Acting, therefore, in anticipation of General Joffre's written instructions, Sir John French, at 8.15 P.M. on the 9th September, had ordered his troops to continue the pursuit northwards at 5 A.M. the next morning.

A telegram from French G.Q.G., giving a summary of the instructions for the 10th September, timed 11.59 P.M. on the 9th, reached G.H.Q. at 7.45 A.M. on the 10th. It said : " The Fifth and Sixth Armies and the B.E.F. will take steps to attack the enemy's positions. The British will try to reach the Clignon between Bouresches [4 miles north-west of Chateau Thierry] and Hervilliers [just east of Crouy on the Ourcq]. They will be supported on the left by the 8th Division, and on the right by the XVIII. Corps, which will organise a bridge-head at Chateau Thierry." Joffre's Instruction No. 20 arrived later, brought by an officer ; it gave as information that the Germans were entrenching, and added to the summary of instructions given above : " the Fifth Army will support the movement of the XVIII. Corps by driving back the enemy towards the north, without losing touch with the Ninth Army [a somewhat difficult condition]. It will endeavour to reach the line of the Marne between Chateau Thierry and Dormans and prepare crossings. Conneau's cavalry corps will gain touch with the enemy and try to penetrate in the general direction of Oulchy le Chateau.

The Sixth Army, with its right on the Ourcq, will continue to gain ground towards the north and thus envelop the enemy's right ; Bridoux's cavalry corps will try to reach the flank and rear of the enemy."

Although it did not look as if much support could be expected on the right except from Conneau's cavalry corps, while on the left the French 8th Division had disappeared, it had, indeed, gone to the left of the Sixth Army beyond the Ourcq, Sir John French saw no reason to modify his orders.

Low clouds and heavy mists made aerial reconnaissance almost impossible until late in the afternoon of the 10th September ; the pursuit ordered by Sir John French was begun, and by 7.15 A.M. it was assumed that the Germans were clear of the valleys of the Ourcq and Marne ; nothing was visible from the air, except a small convoy and its escort on an unimportant road 7 miles north-east of Lizy.

At 3 P.M., however, the R.F.C. was able to report-the information was at once sent to G.Q.G.-that near Troësnes (on the Ourcq above La Ferté Milon), German artillery and cavalry were retreating at a rapid pace, and that Villers Cotterêts was blocked with trains and all the sidings were very full. Later at 5 P.M. it added that there were numerous bivouacs around Soissons, where troops coming from the south were being assembled ; that the bridges of Vailly and Vic on the Aisne were intact ; that no movements could be seen north of the Aisne ; and that there were numerous dumps of supplies piled at Anizy (10 miles north of Vailly), south of the Oise canal. Meanwhile, the Cavalry Division, under Major-General Allenby, on the extreme right of the B.E.F., had marched at 5 A.M. to the high ground north-west of Bonnes (7 miles north-west of Chateau Thierry), where it came under heavy artillery fire from Latilly, about two miles to the north, and suffered some loss. The 5th Dragoon Guards pushed on to Latilly, but, finding the village strongly occupied by German cyclists and cavalry, awaited the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and Z Battery R.H.A. ; (Z Battery was formed on 1st September, of two sections of I to replace L Battery destroyed at Néry. On the 3rd, one section of I was replaced by one of D, which on the 16th was exchanged for a section of J Battery. When on 28th September H Battery joined the 1st Cavalry Division, Z Battery was broken up.) when they came up the Germans decamped.

Proceeding to the summit of a hill a little further north-east, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, between 11 A.M. and noon, caught sight of the main body of a German rear guard, five regiments of cavalry, two batteries, a couple of hundred cyclists, and five hundred wagons, moving from La Croix (2 miles north-east of Latilly) northwards upon Oulchy le Chateau. This party was not more than two miles away, but, as the ground had been soaked by heavy rain, Z Battery could not get into action until all but the wagons of the column had passed out of reach ; and when it did open fire, it was silenced by German guns of greater range. The other batteries of the Cavalry Division therefore advanced north-eastwards through La Croix, and at 1.30 P.M. again opened fire on the convoy. Then a French cavalry division of Conneau's corps, supported by infantry in motor lorries, came up from Rocourt (3 miles east of Latilly), fell on the flank of the column of wagons, and captured the greater part of it.

On the left of General Allenby's cavalry, the 1st Division advanced from Le Thiolet north-north-west upon Courchamps (8 miles north-west of Chateau Thierry), the 2nd Brigade leading. Soon after 8 A.M. the divisional cavalry brought intelligence that the enemy was in position beyond Priez, a couple of miles to the north of Courchamps on the northern side of the Alland, a small stream in a wide shallow valley. The Sussex and Loyal North Lancashire were therefore pushed through Priez, where they deployed and began to ascend the hill beyond it. They were met by heavy artillery and rifle fire at a range of less than a thousand yards, but continued to advance slowly until a British battery in rear, mistaking them for Germans, also shelled them severely and they fell back on Priez. Some of the men in retiring passed by the observing station of the 40th Battery and through the intervals between the howitzers, drawing the German fire upon both, so that Br.-General Findlay, who was reconnoitring a position for his guns, was killed by a shell. There then ensued a lull in the fighting during which the 1st (Guards) Brigade , heading for Latilly, came up on the right of the 2nd Brigade, and the 3rd Brigade, making for Monnes against slight opposition, appeared on its left. In face of this display of force, between 2 and 3 P.M., the Germans began to fall back slowly. The British batteries followed them up, but did not arrive within effective range until the German columns, after crossing the Ourcq, were filing out of Chouy (5 miles north of Priez), when both field guns and howitzers opened fire on them, apparently with good effect.

Further west, the two cavalry brigades under Br.-General Gough, and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions were more successful. The 5th Cavalry Brigade led the way, with the 20th Hussars as advanced guard covering a front of 5 miles from Bussiares (1 mile west of Torcy) south-westwards to Germigny. At 6.30 A.M. a hostile column was sighted moving north-eastward from Brumetz (3 miles north of Germigny) upon Chézy, while another, composed chiefly of wagons, was halted on the slopes between those two villages. The brigade therefore moved westwards to Prémont (a mile north-east of Germigny), whence J Battery opened fire at long range ; as there was no reply to this fire, Brigadier-General Chetwode at 9 A.M. advanced for about another mile northward to the high ground south of Gandelu (immediately south-east of Brumetz), whence he sent two squadrons of the Scots Greys to clear that village, and ordered the 12th Lancers to cross the Clignon a little further to the west at Brumetz, and cut off the enemy's retreat.

Meanwhile, the 6th Brigade and the XXXIV. Brigade R.F.A., which formed the advanced guard of the 2nd Division, were crossing the valley of the Clignon at Bussiares to the right of Gough's cavalry ; and, when Hautevesnes, 2 miles further on, was reached soon after 9 A.M., a German convoy could be seen a mile or more to the west toiling up the road from Vinly in the valley of the Clignon north-westwards towards Chézy. Four guns, which formed part of its escort, unlimbered on the heights above Brumetz, while infantry took up a position in a sunken road, facing eastward, to meet the storm that threatened them from Hautevesnes. The British batteries coming into action soon forced the German guns to retire ; and shortly after 10 A.M. the 6th Brigade was ordered to attack. The 1/K.R.R.C. deployed and advanced over ground which offered not an atom of cover. Nevertheless, the riflemen closed to within seven hundred yards of the Germans, and at that range pinned them to their cover, whilst the 1/R. Berkshire on the right, and the 2/S. Staffordshire on the left worked round both their flanks, when the whole line of Germans surrendered, having lost about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded out of a total of about five hundred present. They were found to be men of the 4th Jäger, the 2nd Cavalry Division, the Guard Cavalry Division and the 27th Regiment of the IV. Corps. (Part of this regiment had defended La Ferté sous Jouarre.)

Meanwhile, in Gough's force the 12th Lancers had caught a party of nearly three hundred more, with thirty wagons and four machine guns, who had been driven from Gandelu by the Greys. Moreover, the 9th Brigade and the 107th Battery, the advanced guard of the 3rd Division, coming up between the 2nd Division and the cavalry, had struck into the woods near Veuilly (3 miles west of Torcy) north-westward upon Vinly whilst the 6th Brigade was attacking westward from Hautevesnes, and had taken another six hundred prisoners, a most variegated assortment, consisting of men of the II., III. and IV. Corps and of five Jäger battalions of Marwitz's cavalry corps. These, with the exception of a party entrenched to north of Vinly, had offered no very serious resistance. The country was, however, so close that many Germans were left undiscovered in the valley of the Clignon, from which they continued to issue for some days to plunder the neighbouring villages and oppress the villagers, until they were gradually rounded up.

Throughout this little action, General Haig had been chafing to act on a message received about 9 A.M. from General Maud'huy of the French XVIII. Corps on his right, giving him intelligence that fifty-four German heavy guns were moving from Lizy sur Ourcq north-eastward upon Oulchy and offering to co-operate in capturing them. As the heads of both the 1st and 2nd Divisions were sharply engaged at the moment, he could give no immediate orders ; and the clouds were so low that later in the forenoon, when he asked for more exact indications from the Flying Corps, such observation as was possible gave no definite result. By 1 P.M. the German column was too far north to be intercepted.

West of the 3rd Division, the 5th Division and the III. Corps met with no opposition. The former advanced to Montreuil early, but Kraewel's brigade had slipped away, and it was too late to cut off any of it except a few wounded. The III. Corps, being occupied for the best part of the day with the completion of the passage of the Marne by a floating bridge at La Ferté sous Jouarre and the railway bridge at Le Saussoy, was obliged to content itself with occasionally shelling distant targets and with the collection of stragglers. The British casualties on this day did not exceed three hundred and fifty, two-thirds of which were incurred by the 2nd Brigade in its check near Priez, and the remainder by the 6th Brigade in its successful action near Hautevesnes. (The total British casualties from the 6th to the 10th September were : I. Corps, 779 ; II. Corps, 654 ; III. Corps (4th Division and l9th Brigade), 133 ; Cavalry, 135 ;total, 1,701.) For these the capture of some eighteen hundred Germans, including wounded, as well as the battery taken by the Lincolnshire, offered some compensation ; and the spirits of the troops rose high at the sight of so much abandoned transport and of so many stragglers, all pointing to the beginning of confusion on the enemy's side. Nevertheless, it was a disappointment that the Germans had not been more severely punished. The general advance during the day had been only about ten miles, and the First Army seemed to be already out of reach ; for an aeroplane reconnaissance between 5 and 6 P.M. revealed columns crossing the Aisne between Vailly and Soissons, and a very large number of bivouacs north of the latter town. The Intelligence situation map, compiled at dusk, showed the heads of the III., IX. (1/ 2 ) and IV. Reserve Corps approaching the Aisne, covered on the Upper Ourcq by three cavalry divisions, with the II. Corps near Villers Cotterêts ; on the right it left a gap from Vailly to south of Fismes, where the VII. Corps was placed. This was remarkably near the mark, but in the west Quast's Group (6th, 17th and 18th Divisions) on Maunoury's front was not shown, as no news of it had reached G.H.Q. from the French.

On the evening of the 10th September the four divisions of the I. and II. Corps were astride the river Alland, with the cavalry in front astride the upper course of the Ourcq, and the III. Corps behind the left flank. In detail, the positions were :

The French pursuit, owing to the troops and horses being tired, and to bad weather which prevented air information being obtained, made the roads and ground muddy, and rendered the nights in bivouac a misery, " was relatively slow, six to seven miles a day " on the average," about half what the British did. It is not necessary here to mention more than the Fifth and Sixth Armies on the right and left of the B.E.F., adding something very brief about the Ninth, as the other French Armies, after a short advance, were held up, and the line except near St. Mihiel settled down where it was to remain for the greater part of the War.

" On the 10th September the [French] Fifth Army advanced to the Marne without having to fight." The whole of the XVIII. Corps, next to the B.E.F., passed across the river, its advanced guard halting five miles north of Chateau Thierry. The other corps had only " their advanced guards solidly established north of the Marne, their main bodies were south of it." Between the right of the Fifth Army and the left of Foch's, which was still around the Marshes of St. Gond, there was a gap of fifteen miles. Conneau's cavalry corps reached the line of the Ourcq, level with the British cavalry, without encountering anything but the tail of the enemy rear guards.

The French Sixth Army took some hours to realise the change in the situation. After its escape from the envelopment of its left on the afternoon of the 9th, " the night had been quiet. On the morning of the 10th, patrols found the country empty, the enemy had gone." Towards 10 A.M., when this event had been fully confirmed, General Maunoury gave orders for a general offensive at noon, left leading (the right actually led). A start was made between 2 and 4 P.M., and a short march was accomplished " without fighting, " without contact even with the enemy." Patrols of Bridoux's cavalry corps (he actually had only one division at his disposal, as Maunoury retained one, and the 5th, absent on a raid, did not return until this day) went 25 miles without seeing an enemy.

By General Joffre's Instruction No. 21, dated 10th September, the British force had definite boundaries assigned to it between which it was to advance : the road Fère en Tardenois-Bazoches (3 miles west of Fismes) on the right and La Ferté Milon-Longpont-Soissons (but exclusive of this town) on the left ; these involved the B.E.F. inclining half right. (In this Instruction General Joffre further said : " To confirm and exploit this success, the advance must be pursued energetically, leaving the enemy no respite : victory is now in the legs of the infantry." He gave the general direction as N.N.E., in the hope of dislodging the Germans who had not yet fallen back in front of the Fourth and Third Armies ; but Bridoux's cavalry corps was to gain ground on the outer wing in order to attack the German lines of communication and hinder the retreat.) Accordingly operation orders for the Army on the 11th directed it to continue the pursuit north-eastward at 5 A.M., crossing the Ourcq and making for a line from Bruyères (3 miles west of Fère en Tardenois), north-westward through Cugny to St. Rémy and thence 2 1/2 miles westward to La Loge Farm. The march proved a troublesome one, for the front allotted was so narrow that it was impossible to assign a separate road to each division. The advance was covered by the cavalry, General Allenby's division making good the ground from Fère en Tardenois westward to within about a mile of the road from Chateau Thierry to Soissons, and General Gough's two brigades the space from that line for some three miles further west. The advance of the cavalry brought it to a line : Cuiry Housse (6 1/2 miles north of Fère en Tardenois) through Buzancy to Vierzy (9 miles west of Cuiry Housse). No large parties of the enemy were seen except a brigade of cavalry at Braisne on the Vesle (3 1/2 miles north-east of Cuiry Housse) and a party of infantry throwing up entrenchments at Noyant (9 miles west of Braisne). There were clear indications that hostile cavalry had retired in two bodies upon Braisne and Soissons, the former in good order, the latter in some confusion ; but although wounded and stragglers were picked up there was no encounter of any kind with the Germans.

The march of the infantry, therefore, was wholly undisturbed, except for the congestion of the roads, the III. Corps, in particular, was long delayed by a French column, and by rain which came down heavily in the afternoon and drenched the men to the skin. Owing to the bad weather, no air reconnaissance was possible, but a wireless message of Marwitz s cavalry corps was intercepted at 8.45 A.M. both by G.H.Q. and G.Q.G., which said that the 4th and 9thCavalry Divisions were south-east and south-west of Soissons " in a terrible state of fatigue, without food for several days, and not able to move owing to the roads being blocked."

The general advance on the 11th was again about ten miles. At nightfall the three centre divisions were across the Ourcq with the cavalry in front 5 miles from the Vesle, and the 1st and 4th Divisions echeloned back on either flank. In detail :

Owing to the wheel of the B.E.F., its right was now slightly behind the left of the French Fifth Army, but on the other flank it was abreast of the Sixth.

In the Fifth Army, General Franchet d'Espèrey had already issued orders for an advance due north on the 11th, when at 11P.M. on the 10th he received G.Q.G. Instruction No. 21 to go practically north-east. There was, in consequence, some delay and confusion next morning ; otherwise the marches " were executed without difficulty, the enemy having retired " ; there was no contact except by Conneau's cavalry corps, which, towards 8 P.M., found the passages of the Vesle blocked, but the part of Fismes south of the river was occupied after a skirmish. In front of Foch's Army the enemy retired " without seeking to utilise the defensive positions which offered themselves. . . . Its advanced guards reached the Marne . . . but they did not, except on the left at Damery and Epernay, occupy the bridges." The total advance was ten to fifteen miles.

The Sixth Army had " a day of marching, of very prudent pursuit, without any contact with the enemy, except some skirmishes " ; it advanced, in fact, 7 1/2 to 9 miles. Bridoux's cavalry corps which was trying to pass to the west side of the Oise, was held up by the bridge at Verberie being damaged and a crossing could not be made until 6 A.M. on the l2th ; but the French Official Account mentions that the bridge Croix St. Ouen, 2 miles north of Verberie, was " intact."

Low clouds and rain made aerial reconnaissance so difficult that the Flying Corps could furnish no reports of value on the 12th. News, however, came that Maubeuge had fallen on the 7th, an event which was most opportune for the enemy, since it released the VII. Reserve Corps and other German troops for work further south.

The German Armies were falling back, mostly in a north-easterly direction, along the whole front as far as the Argonne, with exhausted horses, deficient supplies, and signs of failing ammunition. It remained to be seen how much further the Allies could push their success. There was no sign yet of any movement of enemy reinforcements from the north, but there were some indications that the enemy might hold the line of the Aisne : it was impossible, however, to forecast in what strength, and whether as a mere rear-guard or as a battle position.

The situation with which the Allies were now confronted was by no means clear. If the retreat of the German Armies from the Marne had been followed by disorganisation and loss of morale, as appeared probable from the numerous stragglers and the mix-up of units evident from the prisoners captured, the operation of converting confusion into disaster must be of the nature of a pursuit. If, on the other hand, their power of resistance, though diminished by heavy loss, was unbroken, as had been the case of the Allies in the retreat to the Seine, the problem of completing their discomfiture would involve bringing them to action again, and winning a fresh battle before pursuit, properly so called, could be resumed. Orders quite appropriate to the pursuit of a broken and disorganised enemy can be wholly unsuited to the very different problem of beating an unbroken foe. They may well lead to defeat, for the latter situation clearly demands that an organised battle should be delivered with all forces united and co-operating.

The enemy certainly appeared to be disorganised, and there were undoubtedly very weak spots in his front. In any case, it was of vital importance that no time should be lost, and no opportunity given to the Germans to reorganise and reinforce these vulnerable places. Unfortunately for the Allies, there was heavy rain on the 12th September, and only very few reconnaissance flights were made.

General Joffre's Instruction No. 22, received on the evening of the 11th, gave the intelligence that " on the front of the Sixth Army and B.E.F., the enemy was retiring behind the Aisne ; the German VII. Corps, originally on the right of the Second Army, had been identified on the Vesle between Fismes and Braisne, in front of the left of the Fifth Army ; before the Ninth and Fourth Armies the enemy is retiring north of the Marne and the Saulx." It directed the Sixth Army (reinforced by the XIII. Corps from the First Army), the British Army, and a portion of the Fifth Army specially detailed to support the British, to deal with the right wing of the German forces, endeavouring always to outflank it by the west. To the B.E.F. the boundaries Bazoches-Craonne on the east, and Soissons-Laon on the west were assigned. (Instruction No. 22 continued : " the Ninth and Fourth Armies will concentrate their efforts against the German centre group and left wing. the Fifth Army, maintaining one detachment on the right of the British Army and another on the left of the Ninth Army, will dispose the main part of its forces so as to be able to act either against the north-western enemy group or the north-eastern one, according to the situation.")

The French XVIII. Corps reported that the German retreat in front of it was nearly a rout ; otherwise there was no definite information.

G.H.Q. orders for the 12th were that the pursuit should be continued, and that the crossing-places of the Aisne should be seized and the high ground on the southern side of the river secured. (It will be seen that there is no mention in the orders of the gap in the German front.) The day was dark, with torrents of rain which turned the roads into seas of mud, so that observation and movement were both equally difficult. The cavalry was pushed forward early, and at Braisne came to the first obstacle that lay between it and its objective, the river Vesle, running from south-east to north-west down a broad valley to join the Aisne at Condé. On the right of the British, General Conneau's cavalry had already seized the bridge over this stream at Bazoches : and reconnaissance revealed that of the bridges on the British front, that of Courcelles, next below Bazoches, had been destroyed, also one of the two at Braisne (This appears to have been a mistake, as both bridges were subsequently used.) and that of La Grange Farm, a mile further down-stream. The second bridge at Braisne was, however, intact and defended by German cavalry and infantry. After clearing away parties of the enemy from La Fohe (the ruins of a chateau, 1 mile south-west of Braisne) and Augy (1 mile west of Braisne), the 1st Cavalry Brigade about 11 A.M. attacked Braisne with all three of its regiments dismounted, the battery being unlimbered half a mile north-west of Augy to check the arrival of German reinforcements from the north.

For more than two hours there was sharp fighting, during which, on the right of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 1st Division marched down to the bridge at Bazoches, and the 2nd Division towards that of Courcelles, where the 5th Brigade, its advanced guard, by various expedients, contrived to effect a crossing, but the main body subsequently crossed by the easternmost of the two bridges at Braisne. The Worcestershire and some of the Oxfordshire L.I. at once pushed on to the Monthussart Farm (1 mile to the north-east of Braisne), reaching it about 1.30 P.M. Just at that time, the 9th Brigade at the head of the 3rd Division having previously cleared the outskirts of that village, the 1st Cavalry Brigade succeeded in driving the enemy out of the buildings of Braisne on to the hill beyond it, and then advanced on the road to Brenelle. The retreating Germans were thus caught first by the fire of the 5th Dragoon Guards from the west, and then by that of the Oxfordshire L.I. from the east. Such of them as survived, about one hundred and thirty in number, laid down their arms. A few of them were Guard Uhlans, but the majority were of the 13th Landwehr Regiment of the 25th Landwehr Brigade, which, though Line of Communication troops attached to the Second Army, (This brigade is now known to have been on the extreme right (west) of the German Second Army.) had been hurried to the front.

Meanwhile, further to the left, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades had proceeded to Serches (4 miles west of Braisne) and pushed out advanced parties northward to Ciry, and thence north-eastward to the bridge over the Vesle leading to the village of Chassemy. The bridge was not destroyed, and so lightly held that the 4th Hussars soon cleared it and pushed on towards Chassemy. Being shelled, however, when in column of route, they sought shelter in the woods to the eastward, and advanced, dismounted, against the chateau on the heights north of the village. The rest of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade then moved to the high ground north-east of Chassemy ; and on reaching it the 4th Hussars, together with two guns, were sent down into the valley of the Aisne to seize the bridge of Vailly. It was now between 3 and 4 P.M. The British horse batteries were just picking up the range of the German guns which had been shelling the 4th Hussars, when two companies of German infantry were reported moving south from Brenelle. The 5th and l6th Lancers at once opened fire on both flanks of this column while the batteries and machine guns engaged it in front. About seventy Germans fell, and at 4.30 P.M. the remainder, about one hundred in all, surrendered. These also belonged to the 13th Landwehr Regiment, and apparently had been sent westwards to reinforce Braisne, but were driven by the advance of the 5th Brigade into the jaws of the British cavalry. Meanwhile, the 4th Hussars sent to surprise the bridge of Vailly reported it destroyed ; and the bridge of Condé, a mile and a half below Vailly, though intact, was found to be strongly held. When darkness fell, therefore, the results had fallen far short of the object set forth in operation orders : not a single bridge over the Aisne was in British hands, and no information of value as regards the enemy's strength and capacity for resistance had been obtained.

The nature of the country, high open ground cut by a succession of streams flowing through deep valleys, was chiefly responsible for this, since it greatly favoured the delaying tactics of the enemy. Heavy rain, with its inevitable result of deep muddy roads, did not help matters for the Allies, and the I. and II. Corps were still 2 miles distant from the Aisne when they halted for the night. On the left the III. Corps had made a great stride forward ; hearing that the French 45th Division on its left had become engaged with the enemy holding a position covering Soissons, the corps advanced in a preparatory formation towards the river ; but it was 3 P.M. before the leading infantry brigade reached the heights of Septmonts (3 miles south-east of Soissons) overlooking the valley of the Aisne. The news then sent in by the divisional cavalry was interesting : the bridge over the Aisne at Venizel, some three miles north-east of Septmonts, had been damaged, but was still passable both by infantry and cavalry ; the ground to the north of it had been entrenched for defence, and a large column of Germans (III. Corps of the First Army.) was moving north-east from Soissons over the plateau, on the north side of the river. With great difficulty the 31st Heavy Battery was hauled to the top of the ridge of Septmonts to open fire on this column, and the XXIX. Brigade R.F.A. also unlimbered to support an advance of the infantry upon Venizel. But all this took time ; the light failed early, shut out by a canopy of rain clouds, and darkness had intervened before these preparations could lead to any result. Major C. A. Wilding (commanding the 2/Inniskilling Fusiliers), who, with two companies, was on outpost duty on the edge of the high ground overlooking Venizel, on his own initiative had earlier sent down a party to the bridge. Its appearance was the signal for the Germans to attempt the demolition of the roadway. But of the charges laid all had not exploded and the fuses of these were found and removed by Captain S. G. Roe by the light of an electric torch, within close range of the Germans entrenched on the northern bank. (Captain Roe, Inniskilling Fusiliers, was killed in action 20th October 1914.)

The situation at nightfall of the l2th September found the B.E.F. across the Vesle and close up to the Aisne.

There were many indications that the enemy intended to make some kind of stand on the line of the Aisne, which indeed offered great facilities for defence, so that there was good reason for attempting an enveloping operation round the German right flank, if only with Bridoux's cavalry corps. The river, winding and sluggish except when in flood, and some two hundred feet wide, is unfordable ; it runs through a valley which has steep sides covered with patches of wood, but with a gently sloping or level bottom from a mile to two miles in breadth and over three hundred feet below the level of the plateau through which the course of the stream has been cut. As in the case of many other valleys in the north of France, the sides form a series of spurs and ravines, wooded on the toes of the spurs and sides of the ravines, and in its winding course the stream passes first close to one side and then to the other. There is little cover on the low ground in the valley itself for infantry seeking to force a passage from the south, and no position for artillery to support it, except on the southern heights. The German artillery could harass British troops in the valley at a range of three thousand yards, and yet have no British battery within closer range than five to six thousand yards.

In the section opposite the British from Bourg to Venizel (both inclusive) there were seven road bridges, an aqueduct carrying the Oise-Aisne canal over the river at Bourg, and a railway bridge east of Vailly, where a narrow-gauge railway which runs along the southern bank from the direction of Reims crosses the river to the northern bank on its way to Soissons. All these bridges, except that at Condé, were eventually found to be more or less unserviceable.

Whether the enemy was in a position to avail himself of the advantages afforded by the line of the Aisne remained to be seen. Though the weather had prevented air reconnaissance, reports from inhabitants and escaped prisoners seemed to show that large bodies of German troops had been moving eastward from Soissons on Neufchatel (15 miles north of Reims) during the previous three days, which indicated that the enemy feared his centre might be broken and was making efforts to concentrate more troops in front of the French Fifth Army and the British.

On this day the French Armies on either side of the British were in close touch with them. General Franchet d'Espèrey informed the Fifth Army that its mission was to act, marching north-eastwards, left leading, against the eastern mass (Second and Third Armies) of the German host, whose columns were retreating before Foch's Army, whilst the B.E.F. and the Sixth Army would deal with the western mass (First Army) ; the corps of the left wing were, however, to be ready, in case of need, to act in the direction of Soissons and the B.E.F. General Franchet d'Espèrey most unfortunately considered the enemy in front of Foch was the more important, and moved north-east against him. At night, the Fifth Army was strung out along the course of the Vesle. Only on the left wing was resistance encountered : the right, the X. Corps (returned in the morning to the Fifth Army by Foch), the I. Corps and the right of the III. Corps, marching in the rain until a late hour, reached the Vesle west of Reims without any fighting ; the left of the III. Corps and the leading division of the Group of Reserve Divisions reached and crossed the Vesle about 4.30 P.M. without any resistance ; the XVIII. Corps, sent to support the cavalry, drove the Germans away from Fismes and began crossing the Vesle at 4 P.M. ; Conneau's cavalry corps was unable to carry out even the reconnaissances ordered, and at night returned to the billets of the previous day.

Foch's Army at last crossed the Marne, " the enemy did not defend the river line and had retired northwards." It closed up within six miles of the Fifth Army, facing north-east : only its extreme right reached the Vesle, the average march having been less than ten miles.

Although General Joffre had on the 11th urged the Sixth Army, " always keeping something on the left of the B.E.F., to send forces to the right [west] bank of the Oise, in order to outflank the enemy," General Maunoury, being still uncertain of the whereabouts of the enemy, decided to send his whole Army against the Germans in his immediate neighbourhood, who were retiring across the Aisne, and ordered only the Cavalry Corps to go west of the Oise. General Bridoux crossed the Oise at Verberie towards 1 P.M., but was unable to obtain contact with any enemy. The rest of the Sixth Army closed up to the Aisne under some artillery fire from the northern bank. In the centre, the leading division (14th) of the VII. Corps, following up the retreating Germans closely, crossed the river at Vic from 5.30 P.M. onwards, while towards midnight its other division, the 63rd, got a small party across at Fontenoy over a damaged bridge, man by man, and then, having made a floating bridge, passed over a brigade. On the left, a battalion of the IV. Corps managed to cross at Attichy : but on the right next to the British, as the bridges in Soissons were down, the French were unable to pass the river.