MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER XV - THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE (continued) - 7TH SEPTEMBER : THE MARCH TO THE GRAND MORIN

 

(Sketches B, 13 & 15 ; Maps 4, 25 & 27)

 

Owing to delay in transit, the instructions from General Joffre to push on, not eastwards as first ordered, but northwards, echeloned left in front so as to be ready to fall on the right flank of the German forces if they offered battle to the Fifth Army, did not reach G.H.Q. at Melun till 11 A.M. on the 7th. But the British cavalry was early on the move ; the Cavalry Division on the right pushed eastward to the Grand Morin, upon Leudon (3 1/2 miles south of La Ferté Gaucher) and Choisy, and the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades on its left, northward upon Chailly and Coulommiers. The advanced parties of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade found that the Germans had left Mauperthuis (3 miles south of the Grand Morin) just as they themselves entered it. The enemy seemed to be withdrawing his covering troops northward. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, advancing further east, came upon cavalry, cyclists and guns south of Dagny (2 miles south-west of Choisy), and forced them back north and east across the front of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. The 9th Lancers, who were at the head of the latter brigade, thereupon pushed on to the hamlet of Moncel, a mile and a half to the south-east of Dagny, which was held by the enemy. A German patrol was driven out of the latter, and it was then occupied by a squadron of the 9th. A troop of the 9th was sent northward to protect the left flank of this squadron ; another troop, with Lieut.-Colonel D. G. M. Campbell and the headquarters of the regiment, halted at the northern outskirts of the village ; and the machine-gun section was posted in an orchard to the west of it. A patrol presently reported the advance of a German squadron, one hundred and twenty strong, which came up at a canter in one rank towards Colonel Campbell's party. Unfortunately the machine gun jammed immediately (The German account in Vogel is that the gun was spotted, and that a sergeant and six men galloped up, drove off the gun crew and damaged the mechanism with a stone ; otherwise the two accounts agree. The attackers were Rittmeister von Gayling's (2nd) squadron, 1st Guard Dragoons.) but Colonel Campbell with about thirty men charged at once at top speed. The Germans did not increase their pace to meet the shock and were completely overwhelmed, as far as the narrow front of the 9th Lancers extended. Colonel Campbell was wounded, but the survivors were rallied and led back into Moncel ; the Germans, fearing a trap, did not follow. Further to the right, a squadron of the l8th Hussars working its way forward on foot was charged just beyond Faujus (2 1/2 miles south of Choisy) by a weak German squadron, (Two-thirds of the 4th Squadron, 1st Guard Dragoons (Poseck, p. 99)) which it practically annihilated by rapid fire at two hundred yards' range. Sixty-three of the 1st Guard Dragoons were killed or wounded in this affair, and only three escaped ; the l8th Hussars had only two of their led horses slightly wounded.

 

 

To the west of the cavalry, the Wiltshire (3rd Division), in their advanced position across the Grand Morin near Le Charnois, were attacked at 6 A.M. by some two hundred dismounted men of the Guard Cavalry Division, whom they beat off without any difficulty. The 2/South Lancashire, making its way forward to cover the right of the Wiltshire, was engaged by the enemy in the woodlands and suffered some loss. Cyclist patrols of the III. Corps, however, ascertained that by 7 A.M. the ground within a radius of 3 miles north and north-west of Crécy on the Grand Morin was clear. Aerial reconnaissances confirmed the general impression that the enemy was withdrawing northward, though there were still considerable bodies both of cavalry and infantry just north of the Grand Morin beyond La Ferté Gaucher.

Acting upon this information the Field-Marshal issued orders at 8 A.M. for the Army to continue its advance north-eastward across the river in the general direction of Rebais. The corps were to march north-eastwards upon as close a front as the roads would permit, and on reaching the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maisoncelles, the heads of columns were to halt and await further orders. Meanwhile, the Cavalry Division moved northward, making good the course of the Grand Morin as far east as La Ferté Gaucher; it met nothing but a few patrols, but ascertained that a German cavalry brigade and a battery had re-crossed the Grand Morin at 3 A.M. The 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades also pushed northward, the former on Rebais, the latter on Coulommiers. The 3rd met with some little resistance at the bridges over the Grand Morin just east of Coulommiers, and its guns came into action to silence some German artillery on the north bank of the stream, and to shell retiring parties of the enemy. This caused some delay, but the brigade was able to pursue its way 4 miles towards Doue, where it was checked by infantry and machine guns. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, with little hindrance, between 5 and 6 P.M. reached Rebais, whence the German rear parties retired leaving a few prisoners in the hands of the British.

 

 

Behind the cavalry screen, the infantry continued its march without serious incident ; the arrival of the " first " reinforcements " had tended to raise the spirits of the men, and there was cheering evidence of the enemy's demoralisation. The country near the roads was littered with empty bottles ; and the inhabitants reported much drunkenness among the Germans. Indeed, some British artillery drivers while cutting hay discovered German soldiers, helplessly drunk, concealed under the topmost layer of the stack.

Sir John French issued no orders for any advance beyond the line Dagny-Maisoncelles, but General Haig, in order to keep touch with the French, swung his right five miles forward to the Grand Morin. Thus the general forward movement on the 7th, although it brought the infantry up to and across the Grand Morin and met General Joffre's wishes, did not average more than seven or eight miles.

The positions taken up by the Army for the night beyond and along the Grand Morin were as follows :

Cavalry Division

South of the Grand Morin at Choisy, Feraubry.

5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades, and 4th (Guards) Brigade

North of the Grand Morin on the west side of Rebais.

I. Corps(less 3rdand 4th Brigades)

Along south bank of the Grand Morin from Jouy sur Morin to St. Siméon.

3rd Brigade

La Bochetière (9 miles south-east of Coulommiers).

II. Corps

Along north bank of the Grand Morin from Chauffry to Coulommiers.

III. Corps

North of the Grand Morin in front of Maisoncelles, facing north-east, from Giremoutiers to La Haute Maison.

 

Throughout this day the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were reported to be making good progress. By evening General Franchet d'Espérey's XVIII. Corps, the cavalry on its left being in touch with the British, and III. Corps, had reached the Grand Morin, the heads of the 5th and 6th Divisions getting across its upper course. The I. and X. Corps were abreast of them. The position of the Army was reported to be a line from Charleville (7 miles south-east of Montmirail) to La Ferté Gaucher. General Maunoury, having advanced to the line Penchard-Etrepilly-Betz, some five miles west of the Ourcq, was able to report that German artillery was retiring to the eastern bank of that river. There was still a gap of some ten miles between his Army and the British, but there were assembling in this gap, south of the Marne at Meaux, the 8th Division of the IV. Corps and a cavalry brigade. (The IV. Corps had been brought from the Third Army to Paris ; its 7th Division had been badly cut up at Ethe, and its 8th at Virton, on 22nd August. Of the latter, General de Lartigue, its commander, reported : " full (bourrée) of reservists recently arrived at the depôts, and with insufficient officers and N.C.O.'s [most of whom had fallen], it had only a feeble offensive value, and to engage it too soon would be to risk disorganising it.") Aerial reconnaissance indicated that Kluck was withdrawing two of his corps (II. and IV.) ( The Intelligence map shows the II. on the Ourcq and the IV. north of the Marne, between Chateau Thierry and Charly (7 miles south-west of Chateau Thierry). The divisions of the latter corps really crossed the Marne on either side of La Ferté sous Jouarre, and on the 7th were in action in the battle of the Ourcq.) with all haste northward ; and, from identifications by contact during the day and the fact that two German cavalry divisions had been seen between 5.15 and 6.30 P.M. moving into bivouac at Orly (3 1/2 miles north and a little west of Rebais), with yet more cavalry passing northward to the east of them, to Le Trétoire, Bellot and other passages of the Petit Morin, it seemed as if the enemy was trusting to the I. and II. Cavalry Corps (It is again recalled that these cavalry corps included eight infantry (Jäger) battalions besides cyclist companies and machine-gun companies.) to hold the British in check at the Petit Morin during a change of dispositions. The bridges over the Marne from Trilport (just above Meaux) to Trilbardou (below Meaux) and one at La Ferté sous Jouarre were reported destroyed, and the congestion at the remaining bridge at La Ferté was such as to offer good results from a rapid advance towards that point. It was also reported, however, that a considerable force of the enemy lay at Pierre Levée (5 miles south-west of the bridge) to guard against any such attempt. (Four Jäger battalions and a cavalry brigade, according to Kuhl's " Marne," p. 207.) Indeed, the left of the British III. Corps had not been allowed to take up its position between Maisoncelles and La Haute Maison, some two or three miles only from Pierre Levée, without being shelled. The 8th September, therefore, promised to be an important day.

General Joffre's Instruction No. 7, issued at 3.45 P.M. on the 7th September, directed the Armies on the left to follow the enemy with the bulk of their forces, but in such a manner as always to retain the possibility of enveloping the German right wing. For this purpose, the French Sixth Army was to gain ground gradually towards the north on the right bank of the Ourcq ; the British forces were to endeavour to get a footing " in succession (sic) across the Petit Morin, the Grand Morin and the Marne " ; the Fifth Army was to accentuate the movement of its left wing, and with its right support the Ninth Army. The road Sablonnières-Nogent l'Artaud-Chateau Thierry, allotted to the British, was made the boundary between them and the Fifth Army.

Accordingly, on the evening of the 7th September, the Field-Marshal issued orders for the advance to be continued against the line of the Marne from Nogent l'Artaud to La Ferté sous Jouarre : the cavalry to push on in pursuit, keeping touch with the French Fifth Army on the right, and with the Sixth Army on the left. The Grand Morin was already behind the British, but before the Marne could be reached, the Petit Morin had to be crossed : a canal-like stream, twenty feet wide, running through a narrow valley, with steep, wooded sides, approachable only through close, intricate country, studded with innumerable copses, villages and hamlets, and with only six bridges in the sector in question. The Marne itself, from seventy to eighty yards wide with many windings, runs through a deeper, but wider and more open valley, so that from either side the heights on the other appear to be commanding ; most of the bridges had been destroyed by the Allies during the retreat, and any repairs which had been done by the Germans would no doubt be demolished. Thus the ground was all in favour of the enemy's rear guards.

 

THE FRENCH ON THE 7TH SEPTEMBER

(Summarised from the French Official Account.)

The summary of the operations of the Sixth Army on the Ourcq is as follows :

" The success of the operations of the Sixth Army on the 7th September depended on the entry into line, on the left of the Army, of the 6lst Division and Sordet's cavalry corps ; for on the right the 5th Group of Reserve Divisions (General Lamaze) was held up by the enemy ; its commander even began to consider the eventuality of a retirement and had organised a position behind his front. The 6lst Division and the cavalry corps came into the line towards midday but could make no progress against an enemy also reinforced ; they even drifted back in the evening on Nanteuil le Haudouin."

The 8th Division, which, with a provisional cavalry brigade under Colonel Brantes, formed from the 5th Cavalry Division, was to fill the gap between the Sixth Army and the British, reached Chessy (6 miles south-west of Meaux) about 5 A.M., the cavalry arriving at 6.40 A.M. On receiving orders from General Maunoury to act offensively in co-operation with the B.E.F., the commander of the 8th Division, General de Lartigue, replied that his division " was in a state of extreme fatigue, as a result of the presence in its ranks of too great a number of reservists without cadres and without training, who had been sent to replace the casualties suffered in Belgium and on the Meuse." (According to Commandant Grasset, in " Virton," pp. 178-9, the losses of the four infantry regiments of the 8th Division, then in the Third Army, in the battle of Virton on the 23rd August, had been :

130th : all the field officers and nearly all the other officers ; the débris formed a weak battalion ;

124th : the 3 battalion commanders and 770 other ranks ; it had hardly any officers left ;

115th : one battalion was reduced to two companies and its commander killed ;

117th : a battalion commander and 725 officers and men lost.

On the 30th-3lst August, the division was engaged in the " combats vers Mont devant Sassy " and " Villers devant Dun," in defence of the passages of the Meuse ; but its losses there have not been published. It was then drawn into reserve and was thus available to be transferred by rail to the Sixth Army.) He gave his men a long rest until 1 P.M., after which they made a short advance. As this division took no part in the fighting, was in fact incapable of fighting, and was withdrawn at 2.30 P.M. on the 9th to join Maunoury's Army on the Ourcq, no further mention of it will be made, or of the provisional cavalry brigade, which did not obtain touch of the enemy.

In the Fifth Army, General Franchet d'Espèrey, between 7 and 9 A.M., heard from his aviators that on his front numerous German columns were retreating northwards, leaving only weak detachments, behind. " Between 10 and 11 A.M. the British Air Force reported the message being telephoned from G.H.Q. to the Sixth and Fifth Armies, that all the German Army facing the Fifth Army was in retreat northward." This was the case.

At 8 A.M. General Joffre by telephone told General Franchet d'Espèrey that " it would be of utility if he made the left of the Fifth Army get up level with the British right." The latter duly informed the XVIII. Corps of the Commander-in-Chief's wishes, and all his corps of the reported retreat of the Germans. Nevertheless, their progress was very slow, being " hampered at least by rear guards. . . Towards the end of the morning these rear guards slipped off . . . the march was resumed," again with great precaution ; for General d'Espèrey in instructions issued at 10 A.M. had " insisted on the necessity of acting methodically and, in particular, of co-ordinating efforts." In view of German counter-attacks, which, he said, he considered possible at the end of the afternoon, he ordered " every position taken to be solidly organised immediately ; this operation performed, the movement ahead will not be resumed, until aid has been given, by every means, to facilitate the progress of neighbouring corps." (He had forgotten the maxim : " Il faut qu'il attaque, pousse et poursuive sans cesse. Toutes les manoeuvres sont bonnes alors, il n'y a que les sages qui ne valent rien." (Maurice Comte de Saxe.)) The commander of the Fifth Army thereupon called on General Foch to cover his right during the attack on Montmirail. On this flank the X. Corps had only had an artillery fight to stop an attack on Foch's 42nd Division, which was retiring ; d'Espèrey had previously told the X. Corps that it was more important to support the left of the Ninth Army than to cut off the retreat of the Germans in front of the I. Corps from Montmirail. To the B.E.F., which had informed him that all the Germans in front of him were retiring, he telephoned at 10.15 A.M., " it is extremely urgent that the British Army should act on the flank of the retreating German columns."

In the afternoon Conneau's cavalry, then well behind the British, being ordered to pursue, advanced without gaining contact with the enemy and halted on the Grand Morin at 6.30 P.M. The XVIII. and III. Corps got up to the Grand Morin, 5 miles from the great highway, Sézanne-Sancy ; the 2nd Division of the I. and the X. Corps were abreast of them, the 1st Division alone pushing on somewhat further to within a couple of miles of Montmirail. The marches of the Fifth Army were accomplished without incident, except that between 5.30 and 6.30 P.M. one battery, on ahead with a cavalry regiment, fired on a German column marching on Montmirail, and was shelled in reply. " At 6.30 P.M. the detachment, judging its " mission terminated, went to its billets."

The Ninth Army, except the 42nd Division, which was driven in a little, had practically a quiet day, for the Germans opposite were side, slipping eastward so as to get clear of the Marshes of St. Gond before attacking. The result was that Foch informed Franchet d'Espèrey that the situation on his left, " without being compromised, was serious. . . Whereas the right was making progress against the enemy, who was drawing back." Nevertheless he reinforced his right with his last and only reserve, the l8th Division. In his 3.45 P.M. order General Joffre only required of the Ninth Army that it should " hold on, on the front it occupied, until the arrival of the reserves of the Fourth Army on its right would enable it to participate in the forward movement."

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