Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches B, 13 & 16 ; Maps 4, 25 & 28)

The cavalry moved off at 4 A.M., covering the front of the I. and II. Corps. In the Cavalry Division, the 1st and 2nd Brigades made for the line of the Petit Morin from Bellot (due north of La Ferté Gaucher) westward to La Trétoire, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade in support. Gough's 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades on its left headed for the river from La Trétoire to St. Cyr. The 5th Dragoon Guards, at the head of the Cavalry Division, moved by La Ferté Gaucher on Sablonnières, and the 4th Dragoon Guards on the wooden bridge at La Forge, 2,000 yards lower down. Driving scattered parties of German horsemen before them, they plunged down into the wooded valley of the Petit Morin. The two bridges at Sablonnières were reported to be lightly held, but a direct advance upon them was found to be impossible owing to the enemy's rifle fire ; an attempt to turn the position from the east by way of Bellot was also checked. At the La Forge bridge, to which the approach lay over a railway bridge, a troop of the 4th Dragoon Guards tried to carry both by a rush, and secured the first, but were foiled at the river bridge which was barricaded. On their left, 3 miles further westward, a reconnoitring party of the Greys discovered just south of the river, near Gibraltar (14 miles S.S.W. of Orly), half a battalion of Jäger and a cavalry brigade comfortably eating their breakfasts. Stealing back unperceived they were able to indicate this target to a section of J Battery at Boisbaudry, which broke up the picnic abruptly with shrapnel, and sent the enemy fleeing across the valley with considerable loss. German artillery, however, forbade any further advance of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and the 5th was likewise brought to a standstill. On their left, the 5th Lancers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade penetrated into St, Cyr, and D Battery did some execution among the Germans retreating before them. But very soon the enemy counter-attacked, drove the 5th Lancers out of St. Cyr, and stopped further progress by a heavy cross-fire of artillery from the high ground above Orly (opposite Gibraltar). D and E Batteries, being in an exposed position, were for the time out of action, for their teams could not come up to shift them and the detachments were obliged to leave their guns and take cover. By about 8.30 A.M. the whole of the British cavalry was at a standstill, the hostile rear guards being too strong and too well posted to be dislodged from the line of the Petit Morin until further forces arrived.

On the extreme left, infantry of the 4th Division ascertained between 3 and 4 A.M. that the enemy had evacuated Pierre Levée, which defended the approaches to La Ferté sous Jouarre ; so at 6 A.M. the l2th and l9th Brigades advanced, the former against Jouarre, the latter on its left against Signy Signets. Aerial reconnaissances about this hour reported a great number of the enemy massed about La Ferté sous Jouarre, waiting their turn to cross the river, whilst the passage of infantry over the bridge was unceasing. (The whole of the 5th Division passed through La Ferté sous Jouarre on the 8th.) But the movement of the British was necessarily slow, for there were many copses and coverts to be cleared in front, and a large belt of wood the Bois de Jouarre on the right flank. No serious opposition however was encountered until about 11 A.M., when the leading battalion of the l9th Brigade had passed beyond Signy Signets and reached the ridge overlooking the Marne, where it was caught by artillery fire from the heights just north-west of La Ferté sous Jouarre. No great damage was done, and the German guns were soon silenced by two batteries of the XXIX. Brigade R.F.A. But the brushing away of the enemy's advanced troops revealed the German main body holding the north bank of the Marne in strength, with a bridgehead, well provided with machine guns, at La Ferté sous Jouarre. (La Ferté was defended by the 2nd Cavalry Division, the 5th was at Orly and the Guard at Boitron, The 9th was at the battle of the Ourcq but returned in the evening to defend the Marne below la Ferté. With the 5th Cavalry Division were four Jäger battalions, with each of the others, one. Each division had a machine-gun troop (6 guns) and each Jäger battalion a machine-gun company (6 guns). Each cavalry corps had formed a cyclist battalion. G.O.A., iv. p. 178, speaks of there being an " infantry battalion " (now known to have been the II. Battalion of the 27th Regiment) at La Ferté. The retirement north of the Marne of the detachment near Jouarre was ordered by General von der Marwitz at 9 A.M. (Poseck, p. 102).) It was thus evident that the passage of the Marne would not be easily forced ; and there was nothing for the moment to be done but to bring the artillery forward to knock out the machine guns, and to seek a way round. This was exasperating, for heavy columns of the enemy were still crossing the river at La Ferté, and masses of troops were in sight on the slopes of the northern bank ranged like a gigantic amphitheatre around the town, but out of range.

On the right of the Force, shortly before 9 A.M., the advanced guard of the 1st (Guards) Brigade (the 1/Black Watch and the 117th Battery R.F.A.) reached the edge of the plateau above Bellot, and passed down a narrow defile into the valley of the Petit Morin, German shrapnel bursting over their heads as they marched. The 118th and 119th Batteries unlimbered near the crest of the hill, and soon silenced the German guns. By 9.30 A.M. the Black Watch reached Bellot, where they found French cavalry in possession but unable to advance, although the bridge was intact ; pushing through the village, they crossed the river and entered the woods on its north side. They then turned westward upon Sablonnières to facilitate the crossing there , but were stubbornly opposed by dismounted cavalry and the Guard Jäger, until the Cameron Highlanders, with dismounted troopers of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, came to their assistance. The advent of the Camerons was decisive ; for soon after 1 P.M. the British were masters of Sablonnières with over sixty German prisoners. (According to Vogel, the troops which defended Bellot and Sablonnières were the Garde-du-Korps and Garde-Kürassier regiments and part of the Garde-Jäger battalion.)

While this was going forward, the 2nd Division, next on the left, headed by the 4th (Guards) Brigade and the XXXVI. and XLI. Brigades R.F.A., had come up to La Trétoire at the edge of the plateau overlooking the Petit Morin, and had been greeted, like the 1st Brigade, with continuous shrapnel fire from batteries on the heights opposite in the vicinity of Boitron. The British guns soon compelled the Germans to move ; but skilfully placed machine guns made the advance of infantry across the river valley a very difficult matter, and the vanguard (2 companies of the 3rd Coldstream) tried in vain to make its way down to the water. The Irish Guards was sent to its help, but could make no progress ; the forward elements of both battalions were therefore slightly withdrawn whilst the valley was further searched by artillery ; for which purpose, owing to the steepness of the sides of the valley at this point, the XLIV. Brigade R.F.A. came into action, also the 35th Heavy Battery, well away on the flank. (A single gun of the 16th Battery, XLI. Brigade, which had been sent forward in close support of the infantry, got a direct hit on and destroyed a German horse artillery gun and team, which were galloping for the safety of a reverse slope.) About noon the six companies of the Coldstream and Irish Guards, urged on by Generals Haig and Monro, who were present, again advanced, whilst on their left the 2/Worcestershire, at the head of the 5th Brigade, moved down on Bécherelle (1 1/4 miles N.N.W. of La Trétoire), east of which was a bridge ; and on their right the 2/Grenadiers and 2/Coldstream on La Forge, where the 4th Dragoon Guards had secured both bridges. This attack on a front of nearly a mile and a half was pushed successfully as far as the road which runs parallel with the Petit Morin on its southern bank. The Worcestershire then carried the bridge near Bécherelle, capturing a few prisoners in the farm close to it ; and, with the approach of this battalion on his right flank and of the two battalions of Guards on his left, the enemy retired. Thus, before 2 P.M. the passage of the Petit Morin had been forced at the eastern extremity of the line, and the Cavalry Division was able to cross the valley and push northward. (In consequence of the renewal of the attack, the commander of the German I. Cavalry Corps " found himself obliged at 12.45 P.M. to order a retirement. . . . The greater part of the 5th Cavalry Division had already withdrawn." (" Das Marnedrama 1914,"ii).) The 2nd Cavalry Brigade pursued the hostile guns a short distance, taking some prisoners and inflicting appreciable losses ; whilst the 4th Cavalry Brigade, relieving it at 3.30 P.M., struck the flank of a German column seen on its left retiring northward from Orly and did some execution with its guns.

The I. Corps was now free to send help further to the west ; and not before it was needed. The 8th Brigade (Only about two thousand strong in spite of " first reinforcements," as a result of the heavy losses of the 2/Royal Irish and 4/Middlesex at Mons, and of the 1/Gordons at Le Cateau.) had come up to the support of the 5th Cavalry Brigade about Gibraltar between 9 and 10 A.M., but could make no progress. The enemy was entrenched on the slopes on the north side of the Petit Morin about half a mile west of Orly, and his machine guns were so cunningly hidden that field guns could not find them. It was noon before howitzers could be brought up, but even then the machine guns could not be located, and they rendered a frontal attack impossible. Further west the l3th Brigade and the 121st Battery had joined the 3rd Cavalry Brigade between 8 and 9 A.M. ; and two battalions were deployed for attack on St. Cyr. But the fire from the enemy's concealed batteries was exceedingly trying, and little or no progress was made. Soon after 9 A.M., therefore, the 14th Brigade, which was halted at Doue, was sent forward to the attack of St. Ouen, a mile east of St. Cyr. The Duke of Cornwall's L.I. and the East Surrey led the way, advancing in open formation for two miles under shrapnel fire till they reached the valley, and plunged into the dense wood which shrouded the descent to the river. So steep was the declivity and so thickly tangled the undergrowth, that the Cornishmen, though little opposed, were obliged to work down to the water man by man and reform by the railway at the foot of the slope. They found before them two seemingly impassable streams, traversed by a single continuous bridge which was swept by two machine guns on the ridge beyond. After a time, however, an undefended footbridge was found over one stream, also a boat, and a ford through the other. Thus two companies of the D.C.L.I. were able gradually to effect a passage. By this time Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Longley of the East Surrey had received a message from the brigade headquarters giving the position of the enemy trenches, and by arrangement his battalion crossed next. Pushing on, the East Surrey attacked the Germans in flank and turned them out, whilst the Duke of Cornwall's cleared St. Ouen and occupied St. Cyr, the 5th Division cyclists going through them, right-handed towards Bussières.

It was now nearly 3 P.M. The river had been crossed on both sides of Orly (2 1/2 miles east of St. Cyr), and the enemy's situation at that place became perilous. (The order to retire had not reached the 11th Cavalry Brigade and Guard Schützen engaged there. (G.O.A., iv. p. 179.)) In the 2nd Division, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire L.I. and the Connaught Rangers of the 5th Brigade turned westward from Bécherelle after they had crossed the Petit Morin, and approached Orly from the east. The 4th (Guards) Brigade had pushed on 3 miles from the river to the cross roads about Belle Idée on the Montmirail-La Ferté sous Jouarre main road, almost behind the German position. The 60th Howitzer Battery now began to search the woods with high-explosive shell, with the result that German cavalry and infantry soon emerged from their cover within close range of the Guards at La Belle Idée and were heavily punished ; the few who remained in the woods were enveloped by the 2/Coldstream and Irish Guards and shot down or captured. (The guns and some men of the Guard Machine-Gun Abteilung (with the Guard Cavalry Division) were captured.) Such fugitives as made their escape were pursued so vigorously by the shells of the British guns that the infantry could not follow up its success. Meanwhile the 8th Brigade began again to press upon Orly itself from the south, and the 9th Brigade did so from the east ; about 4 P.M. the village was captured and one hundred and fifty prisoners (Guard Schützen and men of the 11th Cavalry Brigade.) with it. Simultaneously, the Cyclist Company of the 5th Division reached the main road, La Ferté sous Jouarre-Montmirail, 3 miles west of the point where the 4th (Guards) Brigade had struck it, and came upon the flank of two hundred German Guard Schützen, and after five minutes' fighting compelled them to lay down their arms. Unfortunately, a battery of the 3rd Division which had been pushed forward to north of Orly, peppered both captors and captured so energetically with shrapnel that all but seventy of the prisoners were able to escape. Both divisions however of the II. Corps pressed northward from Orly and St. Ouen as soon as they could, and by dusk the head of the 3rd Division was at Les Feuchéres ( 1 1/2 miles east of Rougeville), and the head of the 5th Division at Rougeville, where they were within less than a mile of the Marne.

The reaction of these operations on the right made itself felt about La Ferté sous Jouarre between 3 and 4 P.M. The guns of the 4th Division had come up about noon, and had shelled the bridges at La Ferté and the ground in front of Jouarre very heavily. (La Ferté sous Jouarre lies in the valley, on the Marne ; Jouarre is on the heights above it, on the south side of the valley.) The 108th Heavy Battery of the 5th Division, unlimbering at Doue (4 1/2 miles S.S.E. of Jouarre) and firing by the map, silenced one troublesome battery near Jouarre and another some distance further east. At 1 P.M. the German fire ceased opposite to the 4th Division ; and soon after 2 P.M. orders were issued for the 11th and l9th Brigades to advance on the bridge at La Ferté over the Petit Morin, and for the l2th Brigade to move upon that of Courcelles about a mile and a half to the eastward. Courcelles was quickly evacuated by the enemy at the approach of the 2/Essex and 2/Inniskilling Fusiliers, who thereupon moved on to La Ferté, where both bridges were found to have been blown up. These battalions were joined there by the King's Own, who had already cleared Jouarre, and by some of the Welch Fusiliers. The Germans firing from the houses made some show of resistance, but by dark the portion of the town that lies south of the Marne had been cleared of the enemy and was in full occupation of the British.

The day's operations now practically came to an end. Troops of the I. Corps did indeed advance as far as Bassevelle, midway between the Petit Morin and the Marne ; but at 6 P.M. a very sultry day ended in a violent thunderstorm with such torrents of rain as made it difficult either to see or to move. Nearly the whole of the 8th had been spent in forcing the passage of the Petit Morin. The ground was ideally suited to a rearguard action, and the enemy's positions were well chosen, and most skilfully and gallantly defended. The total loss of the British was under six hundred killed and wounded, against which were to be set some five hundred Germans captured, at least the same number killed and wounded, and about a dozen machine guns taken in the trenches by the river. (Vogel speaks of " the celebrated heavy-in-losses and important fight at Orly. The Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions were engaged ; many of the companies of the Guard Jäger and Schützen came out of action with only 45 men,")

The troops halted for the night in the following positions, all south of the Marne :

The air reports of the day referred, except for the passage of many troops through La Ferté, almost entirely to small enemy columns, and to the positions of the British and of the French Armies on either side of them. The lines of march of the German IX. and III. Corps were beyond the areas reconnoitred except those of the 5th Division through La Ferté, and of a large detachment of the IX. Corps, which, as we shall see, had been diverted to the British front, which were duly reported. The French stated that the III. Corps (or the IX.) was still on the Fifth Army front next to the VII. Corps, where the IX. Corps had been on the night of the 7th/8th. Thus the general situation of the German forces near the British was summed up by the Intelligence Section as follows : the two divisions of the I. Cavalry Corps had fought on the Petit Morin and had retired northwards ; the III. Corps on Fifth Army front ; the IX. Corps north of the Marne, part (actually a quarter) near Montreuil aux Lions (6 miles N.N.E. of La Ferté), part (actually the 5th Division) near Cocherel (5 miles N. by W. of La Ferté) and part (actually the tail of the l8th Division) near Chézy (5 miles south of Chateau Thierry) ; and the IV. Corps was thought to be divided, part being on the Ourcq, and part on the northern bank of the Marne near Nanteuil (what was seen must have been either the tail of the 6th Division or the retiring 5th Cavalry Division). Thus it appeared that the greater part of the IV. and IX. Corps (actually only one division and one mixed brigade, and that division under orders to continue its movement to the Ourcq) was opposite the British on the north bank of the Marne, quite enough to make Sir John French feel cautious when forcing the passage of a wide river.

The news that came in at nightfall from the French Armies on the right and left was less satisfactory than on the 7th. To the eastward the French Fifth Army was said to have made good progress, encountering no very serious opposition ; on its extreme left Conneau's cavalry corps, however, was five miles behind Haig's corps. Next to it the XVIII. Corps had crossed the Petit Morin to L'Epine aux Bois (4 miles west of Montmirail), and the rest of the Army was extended from Montmirail eastward to Champaubert, beyond which General Foch's Ninth Army stretched from St. Prix (3 miles south of Champaubert) to La Fère Champenoise. To the westward, the Germans, having been strongly reinforced by the troops withdrawn by Kluck from the south, were offering a determined resistance to the French on the Ourcq, and General Maunoury, in spite of all efforts, had failed to gain ground. Indeed, his centre had actually been forced back, and he had been obliged to recall the French 8th Division, which should have linked his right to the British Army, from the east to the west bank of the Ourcq. From this information it became evident that the quicker the advance of the British upon the left flank and rear of Kluck, the speedier would be General Maunoury's deliverance, and the more telling the damage inflicted upon the Germans.

Instruction No. 19, issued by General Joffre at 8.7 P.M. on the 8th September, drew attention to the fact that the right wing of the German Army was now divided into two groups, connected only by some cavalry divisions, supported, in front of the British troops, by detachments of all arms. It was therefore important to defeat the German extreme right before it could be reinforced by other formations released by the fall of Maubeuge. This task was confided to the Sixth Army and the British. The Sixth Army was to hold the troops opposing it on the right bank of the Ourcq, whilst the British forces crossing the Marne between Nogent l'Artaud and La Ferté sous Jouarre were to advance against the left and rear of the enemy on the Ourcq ; the Fifth Army was to cover the right flank of the British Army by sending a strong detachment against Chateau Thierry-Azy, which, as will be seen, it failed to do.

(Summarised from the French Official Account.)

The Sixth Army on the Ourcq remained stationary on the 8th September. Its left was prolonged by the arrival of the IV. Corps (7th Division and 6lst Reserve Division) ; General Bridoux, who had superseded General Sordet in command of the cavalry corps, despatched a (5th) provisional division, under General Cornulier-Lucinière, on a raid round the rear of the German First Army. " As each of the other formations of the Army waited before moving for the advance of the formation on its left, the Army as a whole maintained the positions it occupied and entrenched them."

The Fifth Army closed up to, and on the left, crossed the Petit Morin. The orders for the 8th deflected its advance from north-south to " slightly north-north-east " so as to give support to the Ninth Army. They said that, in view of the large enemy forces reported north of Montmirail, resistance was to be expected on the Petit Morin, and measures were to be taken accordingly : the X. Corps was not to cross the Montmirail-Champaubert road without further orders, its business being to outflank, in co-operation with the 42nd Division (Ninth Army), the Germans attacking the left of the Ninth Army. The XVIII. Corps was to start at 6 A.M., other formations at 7 A.M.

The two left divisions the 4th and 8th, of Conneau's cavalry corps, found the Germans holding the Petit Morin, and halted, " but the entry into action of a British infantry brigade about 11 A.M., at Bellot, where it crossed, drove the enemy detachment away, and brought about the abandonment of the heights." The 10th Cavalry Division met with no opposition on the Petit Morin. The three divisions, after watering horses, advanced a short distance. General Conneau heard from air reports that many German columns were retreating across the Marne ; but as soon as his three divisions got abreast of Vieils Maisons about 5 P.M., they were ordered, as at manoeuvres, to return to the Petit Morin to bivouac. It so happened that they slept under the protection of the British 1st Cavalry Division, which that night pushed the 11th Hussars across the Marne.

The XVIII. Corps advanced in four columns at 8 A.M., two hours late and then the right column was delayed by the left column of the III. Corps being on the same road. The movement was covered by advanced guards, " forming detachments of pursuit." By 10.30 A.M., after the Grand Morin had been passed without opposition, General Maud'huy came to the conclusion that there were no Germans between the two Morins, and, north of the Petit Morin, none in front of his left, the 36th Division ; but, from information given by the III. Corps, there were some batteries on the west of Montmirail ahead of the 35th Division. He therefore ordered that " the positions which might be occupied north of the Petit Morin should be approached with precaution, and that they should not be attacked without reconnaissance and until after a vigorous artillery preparation ; above all, he recommended waiting the effect of flank attacks executed by any troops which might have already crossed the stream."

The advanced guard of the 35th Division, " very late in consequence of the block on the road," on approaching the Petit Morin about 3 P.M., came under gun fire for a short time, although the divisional squadron and infantry detachments had reached the bridges and sent reconnoitring parties on to the heights on the north bank. The main body of the leading brigade crossed the river a little before 5 P.M. and bivouacked on the heights about half a mile from the river at 8 P.M. The 36th Division crossed the Petit Morin without any opposition ; there appeared to be nothing in front of it, " but before pushing ahead General Jouannic waited [apparently from 12 noon to 2.15 P.M.] to make sure there was nothing on his left." Germans were then discovered in the woods ahead, who stopped further progress until night, when both regiments of the leading brigade made a night advance and reached the Montmirail-Vieils Maisons road and bivouacked north of and in front of the 35th Division. The 38th Division halted for the night in rear of the 35th.

The III. Corps did very little ; the two leading divisions advanced about six miles to within two miles of Montmirail, where the aviators reported " a lot of artillery, but little infantry, with the main bodies in retreat on Chateau Thierry." The divisions dug in there about 3 P.M., it being General Hache's intention " to form a barrier south of Montmirail to attract the enemy's artillery and thus permit the XVIII. Corps to cross the Petit Morin." In this position the corps remained until 7 P.M., when the bivouac orders necessitated a slight forward movement. The 6th Division billeted in rear of the 5th and 37th, with the Group of Reserve Divisions behind it again.

The I. Corps also did little during the day, the 1st Division advancing two miles eastward, and the 2nd, three miles north-eastward. It waited until noon for the III. Corps to come abreast of it and attack Montmirail, and at that hour was ordered by the Army to cross the Petit Morin. It moved about an hour later, and was almost at once held up by fire from the villages on the stream.

Finding his corps stationary, General Deligny called for help from his neighbours, which they apparently did not give. No further progress was made except to get a footing in two of the villages. The corps therefore bivouacked south of the Petit Morin, and its commander in his evening report blamed the corps on his right and left for not giving assistance, and stated that his troops were very tired and would probably be more tired after another night in bivouac.

In the X. Corps, at Foch's repeated requests for help by a flanking attack, the 5lst Division was used in defence to assist the left of the Ninth Army, and the l9th and 20th Divisions, after swinging to the north-east a short distance, dug in.

The Ninth Army had a disastrous day. Foch overnight had issued only a preparatory order for the troops " to be under arms at 5 A.M. ready to resume the offensive," but not until 3 A.M. on the 8th did he send out an instruction directing reconnaissances to be made " to determine the points still occupied by the enemy." Before this could have reached the troops the Germans, by a dawn attack (4.15 A.M.), drove back Foch's right wing. Its retreat, besides increasing the gap between the Fourth and Ninth Armies which the XXI. Corps was moving up to fill, involved the retirement of the centre from the southern exits of the Marshes of St. Gond, which it had been ordered to guard.

Foch's opinion in the evening was that " the vigorous offensive which my Army has had to withstand for two days had the purpose of concealing the true design of the enemy, and had no other object except to cover the retreat of the German right wing (First Army and part of the Second), which since the 7th September has been retiring in the direction of the Marne." He therefore at 9 P.M. ordered the IX. and XI. Corps to attack towards Champaubert, secure the higher ground beyond it and dig in. At the same time he begged the Fifth Army to take over the ground held by his 42nd Division so as to free it as a reserve. General Franchet d'Espèrey not only agreed to do this, but for the purpose placed the X. Corps (2 divisions) at his disposal. Steady progress north-west by the whole Fifth Army would probably have given the Ninth Army more effective assistance. And the loan of the X. Corps was to be followed by the diversion of the I. and III. Corps eastwards to help Foch.