Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches B, 10, 12, 13 &, 14,; Maps 2, 4, 24,, 25 & 26)

In the early morning of the 5th, a little after 3 A.M., a copy of General Joffre's Instruction No. 6 for an offensive n the 6th was brought to British G.H.Q. by Colonel Huguet of the French Mission. It was significant that the orders dealt first with the Armies of the left. Their general purport was that the two Armies of the centre (Fourth and Ninth) should hold on whilst the three Armies of the left (including the British Army), and the Third Army on the right, attacked the flanks of the German forces which were endeavouring to push forward between Verdun and Paris. On the extreme left, the Sixth Army, with the I. Cavalry Corps, was to cross the Ourcq north-east of Meaux, between Lizy sur Ourcq and May en Multien (4 miles north of Lizy), and attack eastwards in the direction of Chateau Thierry. Owing to the progress of the enemy, this latter order was subsequently altered to an advance on Meaux. The British Army, facing east, was to attack from the front Changis (7 miles east of Meaux)-Coulommiers in the general direction of Montmirail, the French II. Cavalry Corps ensuring connection between it and the Fifth Army. The Fifth Army (General Franchet d'Espèrey) was to attack northwards from the front Sézanne-Courtacon (6 miles south of La Ferté Gaucher), and not north-westwards from Sézanne-Provins, as its commander had proposed. In the centre, the Ninth Army (General Foch) was to cover the right of the Fifth Army, by holding the southern exits of the passages over the St. Gond marshes (the gathering ground of the Petit Morin), but with part of its forces on the plateau west of the marshes. On the right, the Fourth (de Langle de Cary) and Third (Sarrail) Armies were to act in conjunction, the former holding the enemy whilst the latter was to attack westwards against the flank of the Germans advancing along the eastern edge of the Argonne.

Fortunately or unfortunately, these orders not having reached Sir John French until the early morning of the 5th, it was too late, without causing confusion, to stop the British columns, which had started early, the II. Corps before midnight and the I. and III. Corps before daybreak. They were therefore allowed to complete their marches southward on this day, and then rest, as already related ; for they were too weary to be called on to retrace their steps. Thus on the night of the 5th/6th, the B.E.F. was, on the right, 10 miles, and on the left, 20 miles in rear of the position, actually in occupation of the Germans, in which the French Commander-in-Chief expected it to be.

General Franchet d'Espèrey, on receipt of Instruction No. 6 at 4 A.M., was also unable to stop the march of his troops ; but at 6 A.M. he issued an order slightly modifying the halt areas of his eastern corps, so that they were given greater depth ; the area of the XVIII. Corps, however, on the left near Provins was not changed, and " in the evening the Fifth Army was established north of the Seine on the general line Sézanne-Provins," facing north-west, and not on the line Sézanne-Courtacon facing north, as ordered by General Joffre. Thus, although the right was in its proper position, the left was 9 miles in rear of where it should have been, and 12 miles in rear of the British right.

At 9 A.M., soon after Sir John French had decided to take part in the French offensive, General Maunoury arrived at his headquarters and explained fully the course which the Sixth Army would take, stating that it would be west of the Ourcq at 9 A.M. on the 6th ready to attack " à fond." The Field-Marshal promised his support. At 2 P.M. General Joffre, who this day shifted G.Q.G. to Chatillon sur Seine (75 miles south-east of Provins), also arrived at British G.H.Q. " to beg in the name of France the intervention of the British Army in a battle into which he had decided to throw his last man." (The scene is described at length in the books of Commandant Muller (" Joffre et la Marne," pp. 105-7) and Br.-General J. L. Spears (" Liaison," pp. 115-18), who were both present.) Visibly moved by the appeal of the French Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French gave his word that his Army would do all that it was possible for men to do.

The ground over which the British Army was about to advance forms part of the great plateau, east and north-east of Paris, whose eastern edge, roughly indicated by Craonne-Reims-Epernay-Nogent sur Seine, is 400 to 500 feet above the plain of Champagne. It is a country of great open spaces, highly cultivated, dotted with woods and villages, but with no great forests except those of Crécy, Armainvilliers and Malvoisine, all south of Coulommiers. It is cut into from east to west by the deep valleys, almost ravines, of the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin, the Marne, the upper course of the Ourcq, the Vesle, the Aisne and the Ailette. These rivers are passable only at the bridges or by bridging, and form ideal lines on which to fight delaying actions. Otherwise, the region on the east of the line Soissons-Meaux presents no definite positions.

Sir John French's operation orders issued at 5.15 P.M. on the 5th September directed the Army to advance eastward with a view to attacking, and, as a preliminary, to wheel to the east pivoting on its right, so that it would come on to the line-facing north-east, with the right thrown back and roughly parallel to the Aubetin and lower course of the Grand Morin, and 5 miles from them, marked by La Chapelle Iger (south-east of Rozoy)-Villeneuve le Comte-Bailly (5 miles south-west of Crécy). (General Franchet d'Espèrey issued his orders at 6.30 P.M. (F.O.A., i. (ii.) pp. 679-80). He informed the Fifth Army that it would attack the German First Army in front, whilst the B.E.F. and Sixth Army attacked it in flank and threatened its retreat. The Fifth Army was to advance in echelon northwards at 6 A.M. on the 6th, the right in front, in the general direction of Montmirail. From right to left the corps were X., I., III., XVIII. and II. Cavalry, with the group of Reserve divisions following in second line between the III. and XVIII. Corps. The cavalry corps was to keep constantly in liaison with the British.) This movement was to be completed by the right wing by 9 A.M. and by the left by 10 A.M. The Cavalry Division (Major-General Allenby) and the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades (acting together under Br.-General Gough) ( Henceforward, until officially designated the 2nd Cavalry Division on the l6th September, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades acted together under the command of Br.-General Hubert Gough, and the Cavalry Division contained the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades. Br.-General J. Vaughan succeeded Br.-General Gough in command of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.) were to cover the front and flanks of the force, and connect with the French Armies between which the British were moving.

Pezarches, 5 miles to the north of Rozoy, was reached about 7 A.M. by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade without opposition, and thence patrols were pushed out northwards towards the Forest of Malvoisine, north-eastwards upon Mauperthuis and eastwards upon Touquin. At all these points and also in the Forest of Crécy touch was gained with the enemy. The advanced parties of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on the right flank, reconnoitring towards Pécy (5 miles east by south of Rozoy), in order to get in touch with the French, found themselves in the presence of formidable forces. Large masses of German cavalry could be seen moving southwards upon Jouy le Chatel (east of Pécy), (The German II. Cavalry Corps had orders to demonstrate towards Lumigny-Rozoy to cover the withdrawal of the left of the German First Army) but heavy hostile columns observed on the road north of Pécy, suddenly and without assignable cause, turned about while still two miles distant, and counter-marched to the north. (The advance of Marwitz's cavalry corps, according to Poseck (p. 92), was not stopped until " about 11 A.M. " ; it would appear that the columns seen to retire were ammunition or baggage columns.)

This was noticed between 8 and 9 A.M. ; but immediately afterwards the German cavalry and artillery became aggressive against the right flank. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was shelled out of Pécy and compelled to retire for a short distance until the rest of the division could come up. The leading regiment of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, somewhat later, was forced back from Touquin, then shelled out of Pezarches and finally, having no guns in support, was driven back to Rigny (1 mile south-west of Pezarches). As it retired German battalions (If Kluck's map is correct, these must have been Jäger. There were four battalions Nos. 3, 4, 9, 10, with the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions. According to Kluck, pp. 152-3, the 3rd and 4th Jäger were carried in motor lorries.) were seen moving westward from Vaudoy towards Rozoy ; this column, which had been sighted by the Flying Corps earlier in the morning, was described by the observers as being of the strength of a brigade, with a brigade of artillery attached to it. The I. Corps, which was to face practically east with its centre about Rozoy, was moving into position, when, about 9 A.M., its leading troops, the advanced guard of the 1st (Guards) Brigade, found themselves checked when no more than two miles east of Rozoy by this party of the enemy ; the II. Corps being, as ordered, near La Houssaye (6 miles north-west of Rozoy), 5 miles from the left of the I., General Haig felt uneasy about his left, overshadowed as it was by the great forests of Crécy and Malvoisine, which could easily conceal large numbers of the enemy. He therefore directed the I. Corps to halt, and its advanced guards to take up a covering position. On receiving Haig's report of this action , the Commander-in-Chief sent orders to the II. Corps to close in on the I. to Lumigny (4 miles north of Rozoy). West of the I. Corps, the II. and III. Corps had marched north-eastward at 5 A.M. and 3 A.M., respectively, to a line running from La Houssaye, through Villeneuve le Comte to Bailly, as ordered. Both corps reached this destination in the forenoon, without molestation ; for, though hostile patrols were encountered as the columns moved through the Forest of Crécy, the main body of the Germans, estimated at a cavalry division, retired at once. Shortly after 11 A.M., however, the II. Corps as already mentioned, and also the III. Corps, received the Commander-in-Chief's orders to close in to the left of the I. Corps ; and between 1 and 1.30 P.M. they resumed their march in the new direction. By 3 P.M. their approach had cleared the enemy from the left flank of the I. Corps ; and shortly afterwards the 1st Division, again advancing eastward upon Vaudoy, found that the Germans had evacuated their positions and retreated northward. (The Germans in question, who had advanced to Vaudoy and Pécy, were the 2nd and 9th Cavalry divisions and a cyclist battalion ; the Jäger of the 11. Cavalry Corps were holding the passages of the Grand Morin near Coulommiers. Towards 11 A.M., in consequence of the increasing British artillery fire and the obvious advance of infantry, General von der Marwitz ordered that the advance should be stopped, and at 1 P.M. that the fight should be broken off and a retirement made to a position just south of Coulommiers.)

On this day the Commander-in-Chief allotted three aeroplanes each to the I. and II. Corps for tactical reconnaissance ; many flights were made by the R.F.C., but the information obtained, except of small bodies moving in various directions, was chiefly negative, although it revealed the retirement of the German II. Cavalry Corps on Coulommiers, and established that the French Fifth and Sixth Armies were engaged in battle. The area in front of the British, except on the right flank, where the German IV. and 11. Corps had been on the previous day, was reported clear of troops. (The 11. Corps had marched northwards at 3 A.M., and the IV. Corps at 4.30 A.M., leaving weak rear guards on the Grand Morin, and the reconnaissances were not sent far enough afield to discover these movements until the afternoon. It was not until 1.45 P.M. that G.H.Q. asked that an area bounded on the north by Rebais should be reconnoitred.) It was not until 5.15 P.M. that bivouacs and large assemblies of troops were reported at Rebais, mostly north of the town, and at Doue, and correctly identified by the Intelligence Section as the IV. Corps ; a little later General Galliéni reported that German troops from the south were recrossing the Marne above Meaux and reaching the Ourcq battlefield. As it had been established that the units of the II. Corps which had been engaged with the British left earlier in the day had withdrawn across the Grand Morin, it was assumed that the greater part of the II. Corps was already north of the Marne, and that there were no important bodies of the enemy immediately opposite to the British except parts of the II. and IV. Corps and several cavalry divisions.

At 3.30 P.M. Sir John French issued orders by telegraph for the I. Corps to advance to a line just short of the Grand Morin, from Marolles (4 miles E.S.E. of Coulommiers) to Les Parichets (1 mile south-west of Coulommiers) ; for the II. Corps to come up to west of it from Les Parichets to Mortcerf (5 miles south of Crécy) ; and for the III. Corps to move up into the loop of the Grand Morin south-westward of Crécy, between Tigeaux (2 1/2 miles south of Crécy) and Villiers sur Morin (2 1/2 miles north-west of Tigeaux). The Cavalry Division was to advance north-east to, the line Choisy-Chevru (4 miles and 6 miles south-west of La Ferté Gaucher), and cover the right flank ; and Gough's cavalry brigades were sent in rear of the left of the I. Corps. But by the time that these orders reached the I. Corps, it was too late for it to make more than a short move to the line Vaudoy-Touquin-Pezarches, 8 miles short of its intended destination, where it halted at 6.30 P.M. In the II. Corps, however, the head of the 3rd Division reached Faremoutiers: whence, after a few skirmishes with the German piquets, the 1/Wiltshire of the 7th Brigade, at 11 P.M., forced the passage of the Grand Morin and seized the heights of Le Charnois, about a mile north of the river. The other divisions of the II. and III. Corps also got to their places. The final positions taken up for the night were as follows, the heads of the II. and III. Corps being up to the Grand Morin and the I. Corps and cavalry echeloned to the right rear :

The intelligence gathered during the day by the French and British was thus summed up at night, correctly except as regards the II. and IV. Corps : the III. and IX. German Corps, with the Guard Cavalry Division on their western flank, were opposing the French Fifth Army south of the Grand Morin on the line Esternay-Montceaux-Couperdrix (5 miles W.S.W. of Montceaux) : echeloned to the west in second line between the Grand and Petit Morin were part of the German IV. Corps at Rebais, with the 5th Cavalry Division in front of it north of Marolles, the greater part of the II. Corps near Meaux, and the X. Reserve Corps (as was conjectured) west of Montmirail: the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were opposite the British, and the remainder of the IV. Corps, the IV. Reserve Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division opposite the French Sixth Army. Both the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were reported to have pressed the enemy back ; but of their position G.H.Q. had no more information than was derived from British air reports. One of these stated that at 4 P.M. the Fifth Army was fighting south of Esternay and north of Villers St. Georges, and another that at 5 P.M. the Sixth Army was still west of the Ourcq, where on the northern flank, May-Marcilly, a good deal of movement was going on and many shells were bursting. Sir John French therefore issued no orders on the night of the 6th September except a Special Order of the Day and a warning that all the troops should be ready to move at short notice any time after 8 A.M. By evening practically all the " first reinforcements " for the British Army had arrived from the Base.

(Summarised from the French Official Account.)

There had been a collision, the beginning of " the Battle of the Ourcq," as we have seen, on the afternoon of the 5th, between the leading troops of General Maunoury's Sixth Army and the flank guard of the German First Army, under General von Gronau, consisting of his IV. Reserve Corps and the remains of the 4th Cavalry Division (cut up at Néry). The German force, " driven into a semi-circle of 2 1/2 miles radius, and under fire of superior artillery," had, during the night, fallen back and broken contact. During the 6th, a day of taking contact all along the front, the Moroccan Brigade, 45th, 55th Reserve, 56th Reserve, 63rd Reserve and l4th Divisions had moved forward, getting touch with the German infantry from 10.30 A.M. onwards, and driving it in, so that at night, after Gronau had been reinforced, the two opponents were facing each other west of the Ourcq on a nearly north and south line, Varreddes (north-east of Meaux)-Etrepilly-Acy. There, with little change except extension northwards, they were to remain until the last day of the battle. Between the right of Maunoury's Army and the left of the B.E.F. there was a gap of eight miles, in which, tending to increase the separation, lay both the Marne and its tributary the Grand Morin. At 4.30 P.M., however, G.Q.G. telephoned to G.H.Q. stating that a division and a cavalry brigade would arrive early on the 7th on the left of the B.E.F. to fill the gap and furnish support to the British left flank.

The French Fifth Army also made little progress on the 6th. Having on the previous day, like the B.E.F., continued the retreat, it had not, on the night of the 6th/7th, except on the right and a single point in the centre (Montceaux at 10 P.M.), reached the line, the great highway Sézanne-Esternay-Sancy-Courtacon, fixed by General Joffre as its starting line at the opening of the battle in the morning. It did not move on the 6th until 6 A.M. and its average advance was only four or five miles, as it proceeded with the utmost caution.

In his orders issued at 6.30 P.M. on the 5th, General Franchet d'Espèrey ordered his corps to march northwards to the attack, in echelon, the right leading, adding, " the corps commanders will take great care not to engage all their infantry at once, as the operation will probably last several days."

Conneau's cavalry corps at noon found that there was no enemy within nine miles ; but it did not push on to the great highway. Towards evening, going forward again at 4.30 P.M., it had an exchange of artillery fire with Germans established in Courtacon, and then, as the day had been hot and water was scarce the whole corps except one division was sent back to Provins, the starting place of the morning.

Until midday the XVIII. Corps, the left corps of the Fifth Army, did nothing but reconnoitre and push forward advanced guards, which were " not to engage any important element of the enemy beyond the Aubetin," which runs 2 1/2 miles south of the great highway. The III. Corps, its 5th and 6th Divisions commanded by Generals Mangin and Pétain, advanced at first without difficulty, then received artillery fire from heavy guns, and, about noon, being two miles south of the great highway, was getting ready to attack the Germans reported on it. The I. and X. Corps drifted north- eastwards, for, as early as 9 A.M., the left of Foch's Army was calling for help ; at noon, the 1st Division, the left of the I. Corps, was held up two miles south of Esternay by machine-gun fire ; the 2nd Division and X. Corps had seen nothing of the enemy.

At 1.30 P.M. General Franchet d'Espèrey issued the following order :

" In order that the co-operation of the neighbouring Armies may make itself effectively felt, the Fifth Army will not this evening cross the line [left to right] Couperdrix [2 miles south of the great " highway]-Montceaux [on the highway]-Courgivaux-Esternay [both on the highway]-Clos le Roi-Charleville [5 miles north of the highway].

On this front, all the corps and the Group of Reserve divisions will very solidly entrench, so that they can resist coûte que coûte "any enemy counter-attack."

Except in the centre, the line defined, facing north-west, was reached after some fighting with German rear guards, the III. Corps losing Courgivaux after it had reached the village, and the X. Corps being driven back a little.

At night the Fifth Army ordered for the 7th : " continuation of the offensive manoeuvre under the same conditions of economy of force." The X. Corps, then ahead, was to start at 7.30 A.M., the other corps at 6 A.M.

The operations of the French Ninth Army, on the right of the Fifth, must receive some notice, as they had a most important influence on the battle.

The Ninth Army had been ordered " to cover the right of the Fifth Army," by " holding the southern exits of the Marshes of St. Gond," and " sending part of its forces to the plateau north of Sézanne." It would seem that General Foch determined to take a share in the offensive with his left and centre, leaving the protection of the flank of the Allied attack to his right wing alone. He put his XI. Corps (2 divisions) behind the upper course of the Somme (which, running north-west, almost touches the Marshes of St. Gond before turning north-east), and the IX. Corps (3 divisions) behind the marshes, but directed it on the 5th to push strong advanced guards over them and be prepared to advance on the 6th. The left, the 42nd Division (not attached to a corps), was sent to the plateau north of Sézanne, but definitely ordered to attack with the Fifth Army on its left.

On the 6th, the advanced guards of the IX. Corps were driven back across the marshes, which could only be crossed on a few causeways ; the XI. Corps lost the line of the Somme, its left falling back about one and a half miles, and Foch reinforced it with the one division in his reserve. The 42nd Division left the plateau and attempted to advance northwards, but, meeting the German l9th Division (X. Corps), was driven back and appealed to the X. Corps (Fifth Army) on its left for help.

Of the rest of the French forces on the eastern wing, it need only be said that the First Army (General Dubail) and Second Army (General de Castelnau) successfully resisted the attacks of the German Seventh and Sixth Armies under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, although the XV. Corps had been taken from de Castelnau and the XXI. Corps from Dubail and sent to fill the gaps on either flank of the Fourth Army, near Revigny and Mailly. So stout was the French defence that on the 8th September Moltke decided to " abandon the Lorraine enterprise completely, as it had no hope of success." The Third Army (General Sarrail) and Fourth Army (Gen. de Langle de Cary) also practically held their ground, with some vicissitudes, against the German Fifth and Fourth Armies and the left half of the Third Army ; their success was mainly due to the field artillery, which pinned the Germans to the ground by day, and induced the German Crown Prince to attempt, without much success, a night attack.