MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

INTRODUCTION

THE ARMIES OF THE WESTERN ALLIED POWERS

GREAT BRITAIN

 

EIGHTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, the year which saw the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles, witnessed also the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the British Army. It was then that the first steps were taken to replace the old army of Peninsular model by a force raised and organised on modern lines : the system of purchase, under which officers of the cavalry and infantry bought their commissions in each successive regimental rank, was abolished ; short service was adopted, not so much with the idea of attracting recruits as of building up a reserve; and regiments of infantry, except those which were already composed of more than one battalion, were grouped in pairs. Ten years later, in 1881, this grouping was made permanent, the old numbers were abolished and the infantry was reconstituted into double-battalion regiments with territorial titles on a territorial basis. (An excellent account of the development of the Army will be found in "The Army Book of the British Empire" (H.M. Stationery Office, 5s.). It unfortunately stops at 1893.)

 

The old Militia, Regular and Local, remained, as always, on a territorial basis. It was gradually drifting back to the function, which it had fulfilled during the Napoleonic wars, of a recruiting depot for the army, but without the ballot; for the enforcement of the ballot had for a long time been suspended by an annual Act of Parliament.

 

Side by side with the Militia stood the Yeomanry Cavalry, first called into being by the threat of a French invasion in 179-1-95. It had always attracted an excellent class of recruit, but its training was very limited, both in scope and duration.

 

Behind the Militia and Yeomanry were the Volunteers, chiefly infantry. They also had been first formed in 1794-95 ; but in 1806-7 they had been transformed into Local Militia, recruited by ballot without power of substitution, and subject to the same discipline as the Militia. After 1815 the Local Militia soon died out; but in 1859 the Volunteers were revived on the original basis of 1794-95.

 

The best part of a generation, however, was needed for the new army system initiated in 1871 to settle down and bear fruit. The home battalion of a regiment was for years little more than a group of boys who, as they matured. were drafted out to the battalion on foreign service. Only in India was the real British Army of grown and fully-trained men to be seen.

 

In 1899-1902 the war in South Africa put the British military forces to a rude practical test. Never before had so many troops been sent overseas. The Regular Army was found to be too small for the work even when the Reserves had been called out, so that means to supplement it had to be improvised. The Militia and Yeomanry volunteered for foreign service almost to a man ; the Volunteer battalions sent a succession of companies to the Regular battalions of their regiments in South Africa, and formed special active service units; finally the Overseas Dominions and Colonies enthusiastically raised and despatched contingents. The experience acquired in this war by all arms and by all branches of the Staff was soon to prove of the utmost value.

 

In February 1904 the office of Commander-in-Chief was abolished, and an Army Council was set up. It gave the Secretary of State a board of six advisers : four professional soldiers, each of them at the head of a great department, and two civilians, known as the financial and civil members. The duties of the Commander-in-Chief as regards inspection of troops were transferred to an Inspector- General of the Forces.

 

Next came the constitution of a General Staff, on principles which were established at a meeting of the Army Council on 9th August 1905. The Chief of the General Staff was authorized to proceed with its formation on 11th November 1905. Instructions for its organisation were promulgated by a special Army Order of 12th September 1906. Such a body was a complete innovation in the British Army. The word " Staff " had been known for generations, but signified originally no more than the Department of the Commander-in-Chief as contrasted with that of the Secretary of State for War-of the Horse Guards as distinguished from the War Office. This Staff, however, was an administrative one only ; there was no such thing as a Staff at Headquarters charged with such duties as are now associated with the name. Nor was the Headquarters Staff at the Horse Guards consulted as to military plans and operations. Its business was to provide such trained men as the Cabinet required, not to advise as to their duties or their employment.

 

The General Staff came into being under the guidance of Mr. (later Lord) Haldane, who became Secretary of State for War in December 1905, and was charged with the duty of reorganizing the land forces not only of the country, but of the Empire.

 

The need of reform was urgent, for the Germans made little concealment of their intention to enter the lists for the domination of the world, and were not only perfecting vast military preparations, but quietly insinuating themselves into the control of the most important financial and commercial undertakings of their neighbours. They had already established an elaborate system of espionage, and were abusing the hospitality of friendly States by organizing also a system of sabotage-that is to say, the destruction, by secret agents introduced in time of peace, of such important means of communication as telegraph lines, railway junctions and bridges, and the like. (An assurance has been received from the Reichsarchiv that neither in the Marine Archiv (Navy Historical Section) nor in the Military Section and the Espionage Section has anything of the nature of the sabotage system mentioned in the text been discovered. Doubtless the arrangements detected in the Empire were the work of irresponsible individuals. In any case, no harm was done in the United Kingdom; for on declaration of war all suspected German agents, except one who was absent from England on a holiday, were arrested.) Hitherto our ancient and glorious rival had been France but this new enemy lay to the east and not to the south and the eyes of those charged with the defence of the United Kingdom were now turned towards the North Sea instead of across the Channel.

 

There was now also a prospect that, in order to fulfil our treaty obligations, it might become necessary to land a force on the continent of Europe for the purpose of protecting the integrity of Belgium, and to operate in conjunction with the French and Belgian armies in case of a German attack on France which should involve the violation of Belgian neutrality. Hitherto Britain had always depended upon a nominally voluntary army for service abroad; but the numbers which could thus be raised were unlikely to be sufficient in an European war on a modern scale; and to combine a voluntary with a compulsory system of recruiting at short notice seemed impracticable, even if Parliament could have been brought to assent to it. The problem presented to Mr. Haldane, therefore, was how to reorganize the existing forces so as to raise them to the highest point of efficiency, and to provide for their rapid expansion in time of need.

 

In the reorganisation of 1908 the first step was to build up a General Staff which should be the brains of the army. Special care was taken to separate its work, as a department concerned with strategy and training, from that of the old Headquarters Staff, whose duties were purely administrative. The instruction for officers of all branches of the Staff was provided at the Staff College, Camberley, which was greatly enlarged, and at the Indian Staff College at Quetta, then recently founded by Lord Kitchener. From the graduates of these institutions officers for the General Staff and for the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Departments were chosen. For the technical instruction of the Administrative Staff special arrangements were made at the London School of Economics for selected officers, including Staff College graduates, to be trained in such matters as business management and railway organisation.

 

The initial difficulty of providing a reserve of officers was very great. Mr. Haldane turned to the universities to supplement the military colleges at Sandhurst and Woolwich by converting the Volunteer Corps which had long existed at our older universities into Officers' Training Corps. (The idea of turning the University Volunteers into an Officers' Training Corps was suggested by Lord Lovat and others just after the conclusion of the South African War, but was not then taken up by the authorities.) In these, under the guidance of the General Staff and with the concurrence of the university authorities, practical military instruction was given not only to army candidates but to many students who did not intend entering the military profession as a career. Public schools which possessed Volunteer Corps were invited to convert them into contingents of the Officers' Training Corps ; whilst universities and schools which did not possess such corps were encouraged to form them, and those which did so were given the privilege of nominating a certain number of boys for admission to Sandhurst without further examination.

 

In the Regular Army one great need of the mounted branches was a reserve of horses to make good the deficiencies on mobilisation. This was supplied by taking a census of all horses in the kingdom, and obtaining statutory power to requisition all which were suitable for military purposes.

 

In the Artillery there was an insufficiency of ammunition columns to meet the increased expenditure of ammunition due to the introduction of quick-firing guns. The Garrison Artillery Militia was therefore turned into a Special Reserve, to be used primarily in the formation of these columns; thirty-three Regular batteries, which had their full complement of guns but few men, were employed to train them. The general reserve of artillery was, by careful nursing, increased. By 1912 the number of batteries which could be mobilized for war had been increased from forty-two to eighty-one. The field artillery was gradually organised into brigades, each of three batteries and an ammunition column.

 

In the Infantry steps were taken to restore the observance of the system, generally called after Lord Cardwell, that for every battalion abroad at least one should be at home. The balance had been upset as a consequence of the South African War and our rapid Imperial expansion. By the withdrawal of certain colonial garrisons, the proportion was eventually established at eighty-four battalions at home-including nine of Guards that did not come into the Cardwell system-and seventy-three abroad.

 

The Army Service Corps, reorganised in 1888, had proved itself so efficient in South Africa that it needed little more than such changes in organisation as were entailed by the introduction of motor transport. In 1900 the War Office had appointed a Mechanical Transport Committee, and by 1911 two schemes were in operation, viz. (a) the Provisional Subsidy Scheme, by which civil vehicles could be requisitioned for military purposes, until through (b) the Main Subsidy Scheme the number of vehicles built to the War Office specifications for private' owners should suffice to supply the needs of the Army. Both schemes were employed to furnish the necessary vehicles on mobilisation in 1914. In 1912 the transport of the divisions and the cavalry was reorganised. The horsed baggage and supply wagons were grouped into Train companies, leaving only first line or fighting transport with regimental units. For each division there was formed a divisional supply column of motor lorries, whose business it was to bring up rations to a point where the supply sections of the divisional Train could refill, and, if possible, to take back sick and wounded.

 

In the Medical Services of the Army many important changes were made in organisation, training and administration. (They will be found described in detail in " History of the Great War, Medical Services, General History," and are therefore enumerated here very briefly.) They were due not only to the experience gained in the South African War, but to the lessons learnt from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and to the revision of the Geneva Convention in 1906, which afforded a new basis for the organisation of voluntary aid. In the place of the bearer companies and field hospitals each division and the cavalry division were provided with self-contained field ambulances, and a new echelon-the clearing hospital was introduced to facilitate the rapid evacuation of wounded, which was to be the great feature of the new system. Motor transport, though proposed in 1908, was only introduced on a very meagre scale, sufficient for peace purposes. The Army Nursing Service was put on a firm basis. Under the auspices of an Army Medical Board, of which eminent civilian specialists were members, sanitation, measures for prevention of disease, inoculation, and the provision of pure water, received special attention. To keep the medical service in touch with the General Staff, officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps were appointed to special sections of the Directorates of Military Operations and Military Training. The medical service of the Territorial Force was organised similarly to that of the Regular Army, and large provision made for the formation of hospitals in time of war and the organisation of voluntary aid.

 

The Militia was renamed Special Reserve, to indicate what it had long been in practice a depot for feeding the Regular Army.

 

The Regular Army, or First Line, was reorganised into an Expeditionary Force consisting of six divisions of all arms and one cavalry division. Each of the six divisions comprised three infantry brigades, or twelve battalions altogether, with divisional mounted troops, artillery, engineers, signal service, supply and transport train, and field ambulances. The total war establishment of each division was thus raised to some 18,000 of all ranks and descriptions, of whom 12,000 were infantry, with 24 machine guns, and 4,000 artillery, with seventy-six guns (fifty-four 18-pdrs. ; eighteen 4.5-inch howitzers ; and four 60-pdrs.). The Cavalry Division comprised four brigades of three regiments each, and cavalry divisional troops, consisting of artillery, engineers, signal service and medical units.(The 5th Brigade was left independent) The strength was some 9,000 of all ranks and 10,000 horses, with twenty-four guns (13-pdrs.) and twenty-four machine guns. Although the nucleus of one corps staff was maintained in time of peace, at Aldershot, and corps had been formed at manoeuvres, it was not originally intended to have any intermediate echelon between General Headquarters and the six divisions. The decision to form corps was-in order to conform to French organisation - made immediately on the formal appointment on mobilization of Field - Marshal Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief. Thus it happened that two out of the three corps staffs had to be improvised; even for each division four staff officers had to be found, as the Peace Establishment contained only two out of the six of the War Establishment. None the less, the organisation of the Expeditionary Force was a great step forward in the preparation of the army for war.

 

The Yeomanry became the second line of cavalry, and was reorganised into fourteen brigades.

 

The Volunteers were treated according to the precedent of Castlereagh, who had invited them to convert themselves into Local Militia, on pain of disbandment. So, too, Mr. Haldane bade them either become Territorial troops or cease to exist. Mr. Haldane further reverted to the old policy of decentralisation, and entrusted the raising and administration of the Territorial Force to the County Lieutenancies, renamed Territorial Associations, under the Presidency of the Lords Lieutenant. The only difference between the schemes of the two statesmen was that Castlereagh insisted upon compulsory personal service, under the ballot, for the Local Militia, whereas Mr. Haldane did not-or rather, in the prevailing temper of Parliament, could not-do the same for the Territorial Force. This force, whose establishment was something over 300,000 strong, was organised upon exactly the same lines as the Regular Army. Its units were grouped into fourteen divisions, commanded by major-generals of the Regular Army, with small Regular staffs.

 

The old Militia Garrison Artillery was replaced by Territorial Coast Artillery. The field artillery of Territorial divisions was armed with 15-pounder guns converted into quick-firers, and 5-inch howitzers used in the South African War; its heavy artillery consisted of 4.7-inch guns. Thus none of its armament was modern.

 

So much for the reorganisation of the Territorial Forces on paper. Unfortunately, before 1914, both Special Reserve and Territorial troops sank so far below their establishment as to cause some anxiety at headquarters ; but it was not doubted that many old Territorials would rejoin the force at the approach of danger, and this confidence proved to be well justified. It was not anticipated that the Territorials would be ready for the field in less than six months after mobilization; but since they would have at least some training, and as their organisation was identical with that of the First Line, they could be employed to reinforce the Regular Army, either by units or by complete divisions, as they became ready.

 

It had been Mr. Haldane's intention to make the County Associations the medium for indefinite expansion of the forces in case of need. The rough plans for such expansion were actually blocked out, some of the Associations possessing, in whole or in part, the machinery for carrying the plan into effect. But the scheme had not yet received statutory sanction, and had not been worked out in detail. Meanwhile, the County Associations justified Mr. Haldane's faith in them, and their zeal and ability were of the utmost value to the War Office and the country.

 

The first textbook issued after the South African War for the instruction of the army was " Combined Training," dated 1902, written by the late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson. This, in 1905, became Part 1. of "Field Service Regulations." In 1909 the book was superseded by the issue of " Field Service Regulations-Part 1. (Operations)," while " Part II. (Organisation and Administration)" was published for the first time. These manuals dealt with the general principles governing the employment of the army in war.

Individual training-that is, the physical training, including route marching, bayonet fighting, musketry, signalling, scouting, and generally the education of the individual in his duties and the use of his arms-was carried on during the winter; this gave place in the spring to the training by units, first of squadrons, companies and batteries; next of cavalry regiments, infantry battalions and artillery brigades ; then of cavalry and infantry brigades, first alone and secondly in conjunction with other arms; and lastly of divisions ; the whole culminated in inter-divisional exercises and army manoeuvres.

 

The great feature of the training for the attack and counter-attack was combination of fire and movement. Ground was gained as the enemy was approached by rushes of portions of a battalion, company or platoon, under cover of the fire of the remainder and of the artillery. By this procedure, a strong firing line was built up some 200 yards from the enemy ; when fire superiority had been attained an assault was delivered. An attacking force was divided into firing line and supports, with local reserves, and the advance was often made in parallel lines in extended order; but the form was essentially elastic and adapted to the ground, with the definite objects of maintaining control, utilising such cover as was available, and presenting as difficult a target as possible to the enemy. (The soundness of the principle of the combination of fire and movement was abundantly proved during the war; but, as experience was gained, it was found that there was no rôle for " supports " of the kind laid down in the pre-war manuals ; reinforcing a line already stopped by casualties merely meant increasing losses without corresponding gain ; It became apparent that the proper employment of " local reserves " was to ex exploit local successes, and to fill defensively gaps in an attacking line that had been brought to a standstill.)

 

Mobilization was regularly practised. Every winter certain units were brought up to war establishment in the prescribed manner, the reservists and horses required to complete them being represented by men and animals from other units. In 1910 one of the two Aldershot divisions was mobilized at the expense of the other and by volunteers from the 1st Class Army Reserve, and so was able to take part in the manoeuvres at war establishment. Not only fighting units, but also such branches as the Ordnance and the Postal Service were represented at manoeuvres, and their work was carried on under conditions approximating to those of active service.

 

All these reforms were pushed forward under the inevitable disadvantages which have ever hampered the British Army. Recruits were dribbling in at all times of the year. Trained instructors were being withdrawn for attachment to the auxiliary forces, and drafts of trained men were constantly leaving their battalions during the autumn and winter for India. The commanders, again, could never tell whether their next campaign might not be fought in the snows of the Himalayas, the swamps and bush of Africa or the deserts of Egypt a campaign in Europe hardly entered into their calculations. It was practically impossible for the General Staff to keep abreast of the detailed information required as to possible theatres of war. Nevertheless, British regimental officers, to use their own expression, " carried on," although confronted with two changes uncongenial to many of the older men among them : the cavalry was trained to an increasing extent in the work of mounted infantry, and was armed with a rifle instead of a carbine; and the Regular infantry battalions were organised into four companies instead of eight.

 

In every respect the Expeditionary Force of 1914 was incomparably the best trained, best organised, and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war. (For the Order of Battle and organisation of the British Expeditionary Force, see Appendices 1 and 2.) Except in the matter of co-operation between aeroplanes and artillery, and use of machine guns, its training would stand comparison in all respects with that of the Germans. (The German General Staff in 1912 considered it an " ebenbürtiger Gegner "-man for man as good as their own. (Kuhl, " Der deutsche Generalstab,'' p. 87.)) Where it fell short of our enemies was first and foremost in numbers; so that, though not " contemptible," it was almost negligible in comparison with continental armies, even of the smaller States . (The following, which is translated from the German Admiralty Staff's " Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918 : Nordsee," i. p. 82, is of interest in this connection :

"The Supreme Command made no demands whatever on the Navy to stop or delay the British transports. On the contrary, it seemed not to place much value on the action of the efficient (wertvoll) but numerically weak Expeditionary Corps. In any case, when at the beginning of the war Frigate-Captain Heydel of the Operations Section was sent by the Admiralty to inquire if the Army laid stress on the interruption of the transport of troops, the Chief of the General Staff personally replied that the Navy should not allow the operations that it would otherwise carry out to be interfered with on this account ; it would even be of advantage if the Armies in the West could settle with the 160,000 English at the same time as the French and Belgians. His point of view was shared by many during the favourable commencement of the offensive in the West.") In heavy guns and howitzers, high-explosive shell, (No high-explosive shells were provided for the 18-pdr. and 13-pdr. field guns; but for the 60-pdr. and 4.5-inch field howitzer a proportion of the rounds carried in the field was high explosive: for the former 30 per cent and for the latter one-third (2 shrapnel to 1 H.E.).) trench mortars, hand-grenades, (There was a service hand-grenade, but it was a complicated one, with a long shaft, which proved unsuitable in trench warfare, and a single one cost £1 : 1 : 3.) and much of the subsidiary material required for siege and trench warfare, it was almost wholly deficient. Further, no steps had been taken to instruct the army in a knowledge of the probable theatre of war or of the German army, except by the publication of a handbook of the army and of annual reports on manoeuvres and military changes. Exactly the same, however, was done in the case of the armies of all foreign States. The study of German military organisation and methods was specifically forbidden at war games, staff tours, and intelligence classes, which would have provided the best opportunities for such instruction. (Ignorance of the German Army proved a serious handicap in the early part of the campaign. British soldiers imagined that every German wore a spiked helmet, so that Jäger, who wore a kind of shako, and cavalrymen in hussar busbies and lancer caps were mistaken for Frenchmen or Belgians ; machine-gun crews, carrying their weapons into action with the trestle legs turned back, were thought to be medical bearers with stretchers, and were not fired on.)

 

The last of the preparations for defence which requires mention here is the formation of the National Reserve, initiated by private enterprise in August 1910 with the approval of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council. Its object was to register and organise all officers and men who had served in and left any of the military or naval forces of the Crown, with a view to increasing the military strength of the country in the event of imminent national danger. The National Reserve was divided into two classes : (See " National Reserve Regulations," issued with Special Army Order, March 7, 1913.) one to reinforce existing units of the Regular Army, and the other to fill up vacancies in the Territorial Force, to strengthen garrisons, guard vulnerable points, or perform any other necessary military duties either as specialists or fighting men. By 1914, the National Reserve numbered about 350,000. On mobilization many of the members rejoined military and naval service ; the remainder formed eventually the nucleus of the Royal Defence Corps.

 

As regards the other military Forces of the Empire, in 1907 there was a conference of Dominion Premiers in London, and the opportunity was seized to make the General Staff an Imperial one. Britain offered to train officers of the Overseas Dominions at the Staff Colleges, and to send out staff officers of her own as servants of the Dominion Governments. It was urged that there should be in all the forces of the Empire uniformity of armament and organisation. The Dominions cordially welcomed these proposals. The Imperial General Staff was formed and unity of organisation was established. The Dominions reserved to themselves the right of deciding whether to participate with their forces in the event of hostilities outside their own territories.

 

In India, the reorganisation of the army on modern lines into nine divisions, six cavalry brigades and a certain number of independent brigades by Lord Kitchener in 1903, was designed to meet the Russian menace and make India independent of assistance from overseas for twelve months. As a consequence of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907, and the state of Indian finances, this reorganisation was never completed. The " Army in India Committee " of 1912-13 recommended that the field army should consist of seven divisions, five cavalry brigades and certain army troops, a force sufficient to deal with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes combined, till reinforcements could arrive. This was the authorised Field Army when war broke out in 1914, but even this had not been provided with all its mobilization equipment. No troops were maintained for the specific purpose of war outside the Indian sphere. Not till August 1913 was the Government of India invited to consider the extent to which India would be prepared to co-operate with the Imperial Forces in the event of a serious war between Britain and an European enemy. It was agreed that the Army Council might count upon two-possibly three divisions and one cavalry brigade. Actually in 1914, as will be seen, two infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions were sent to France, a division to the Persian Gulf, the equivalent of the infantry of two divisions to Egypt, besides minor detachments, and all but eight battalions of British infantry were withdrawn from India, their places being filled by British Territorial troops. But no measures were taken to make India the Eastern military base of the British Empire by the provision of arsenals and the development of the industrial resources of the country for war purposes, except in certain minor items. (Field artillery ammunition and rifles in small quantities, small-arm ammunition, certain vehicles, boots, saddles, harness.)

 

The supreme direction of war in England, which originally lay in the sovereign, and was actually exercised by William III., passed after that monarch's death to the principal Ministers, and has remained with the Cabinet, or a group within the Cabinet, ever since. Up to 1904 no precedent had ever been set for the formation of a Council of War or of any standing advisory body for the Cabinet in naval and military matters in view of an outbreak of war.

 

In 1895, however, a Defence Committee of the Cabinet was formed which, after some changes in 1902, was finally turned by Mr. (later Lord) Balfour in 1904 into the Committee of Imperial Defence. It was then placed under the direct control of the Prime Minister, and a Secretariat was provided to record its deliberations and decisions, to collect information, to outline plans necessary to meet certain contingencies, and to ensure continuity of policy.

 

Much good work was done by the Committee in various directions. Full measures were thought out in 1909 for counteracting any hostile system of espionage and sabotage, the Official Secrets Act being amended in 1911 to give the Government greater powers. An amendment of the Army Act in 1909 also gave authority to billet troops in time of emergency. Lastly, the essential steps to be taken immediately upon the outbreak of war were all studied exhaustively, and a distribution of the consequent duties among the various departments, even among individual officials, was arranged in the minutest detail, so that there should be no delay and no confusion. The results of these preparations, and the regulations finally laid down, were embodied in a " War-book," and all essential documents were prepared beforehand, so that they might be signed instantly, the very room in which the signature should take place being fixed and a plan showing its exact position attached to the documents.

 

Altogether, Britain had never entered upon any war with anything approaching such forwardness and forethought in the preparation of the scanty military resources at the disposal of the War Office. The Committee of Imperial Defence was still, however, only an advisory body possessing no administrative or executive functions.

 

From 1.911 onward the French and British Staffs had worked out in detail a scheme for the landing of the Expeditionary Force in France, and for its concentration in the area Maubeuge-Le Cateau-Hirson, but, though there was an " obligation of honour," there was no definite undertaking to send the whole or any part of this force to any particular point, or, in fact, anywhere at all. (The first steps in the elaboration of the British scheme were taken in 1906, as a result of a conversation between Major-Gen. (afterwards Lieut.-Gen. Sir James) Grierson, then Director of Military Operations at the War Office, and Colonel Huguet, then military attaché at the French Embassy in London. The studies were pursued by General Grierson and his successors, Major-Gen. (later Lieut-Gen. Sir) J. Spencer Ewart and Br.-Gen. (later Field-Marshal Sir Henry) Wilson, with the authority of the Prime Ministers, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr Asquith, under the reserve that in no case should they constitute an engagement for the British Government.

Similar arrangements of a non-binding nature had been made between the Italian and German General Staffs for Italy to assist Germany in certain circumstances, by " strengthening the German Western Armies by the despatch of an Army, and the holding of French forces, if only small ones, to the Alpine frontier. The Italian fleet should, together with the Austro-Hungarian, form a counter-weight to the French Mediterranean fleet." (G.O.A. i. p. 20.)

An account of the steps which led to the British General Staff being given permission by the Government to enter into relations with the French General Staff will be found in " The Quarterly Review " of April 1932, in an article, entitled " The Entente-Cordiale and the Military Conversations," by Major-Gen. Sir George Aston.

There was no arrangement with Belgium of any kind, her Government having made it clear that they would maintain strict neutrality, opposing with all the Belgian forces France or Germany, if either violated the frontier, or any third Power interested who might land troops in Belgium, or try to use Belgian territory as a base of operations. See the article ---The Belgian Conversations of 1912 " by Professor Emile Cammaerts in " The Contemporary Review " of July 1933.)

 

FRANCE

 

(Sketches 1 & 2; Maps 1 & 2)

For France the problem of defence against her eastern neighbour was a very difficult one. The frontier had no natural protection, both banks of the Rhine and the crest of the Vosges being in German hands, and the population of France was not only smaller than Germany's, but steadily sinking in comparison. She first sought to assist the solution of the problem by creating great fortified regions along her borders, alternating with selected gaps. Thus, from the Swiss frontier to Epinal there were roughly forty miles of fortification; from Epinal to Toul a space of forty miles-the well-known Trouée de Charmes was left undefended; from Toul to Verdun was another forty miles of fortification; and from Verdun to the Belgian frontier another gap of thirty miles. In second line were the second class fortresses of Besançon, Dijon, Langres, Rheims, and Laon ; and in rear of them again the entrenched camps of Lyons and Paris. There were no modern fortifications on the Franco-Belgian frontier, but La Fère, Maubeuge, and Lille were defended by old-fashioned detached forts.

 

The steadily aggressive attitude of Germany justified the uneasiness of France. In 1887 Germany formed a Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy. In 1890 France responded by an Alliance with Russia. In 1891 Germany emphasised her hostile bearing by renewing the Triple Alliance; while in 1899 she rejected the Tsar's proposal for a limitation of armaments. In 1905, 1911, and 1912 she made important additions to her army, raising its strength to twenty-five active corps, as against the fifteen with which she had taken the field in 1870 ; and behind these twenty-five she had nearly an equal number of Reserve corps.' On 30th June 1913 the total number of men with the colours in peace was raised from 711,000 to 856,000 ; this not only made the army the readier for an attaque brusquée, so much dreaded by the French, but assured a substantial corresponding increase in the effectives of reserve formations.

 

France could only reply by reimposing the term of three years with the colours, which in 1905 she had reduced to two years. This signified an augmentation of 220,000 men to her peace strength. But, even so, France had at the outbreak of war, roughly speaking, only three millions and a half of trained men, whereas Germany had over five Millions; (G.O.A., K.u.K., i. p. 219, puts the French trained strength at 5,067,000, and total available at 5,940,000!

F.O.A., i. (i.) p. 52, gives the theoretical mobilizable strength (with 680,000 reinforcements in the depots) for service in France at 3,580,000. This total does not take into account all of the coloured troops : including these the mobilizable strength realised was 3,683,000 (" Commission de l'Armée," p. 203, by General Pédoya, President of the Senate Commission of the Army during the war).) and, moreover, Germany's reserve formations were more completely organised than those of the French.

 

The French Army in peace was composed of ten cavalry divisions ; twenty-one army corps, each corps area also furnishing in war a Reserve division The Reserve divisions were numbered by adding 50 to the army corps number up to the 71st thus the 1. Corps area provided the 51st Reserve Division. The word Reserve " was dropped in June 1915, after which date the divisions were known by their numbers only. The XIX. Corps was in Algeria.) and certain Territorial brigades ; and a Colonial Corps.

 

On mobilization, according to the plan in force in 1914, (Known as Plan XVII ; the text is given in Appendix 9. The earlier plans and the origin of Plan XVII. will be found in F.O.A., i., chapters i. and ii.) these forces formed five Armies, with seven divisions of cavalry, and a cavalry corps of three divisions. The Reserve divisions were grouped into pairs, threes, or fours, and allotted either to Armies or defences, or kept at the disposal of General Headquarters. (For the Order of Battle and organisation of the French Armies see Appendices 3 and 4.) Whilst the British and Germans had a clip-loading (5 cartridges) rifle, the French infantry had a magazine rifle with 8 cartridges in the butt ; these fired it became a single-loader. On the other hand the French field gun was a true " Q.F.,'' with a rate of fire almost double that of the British or German ; but, again, the French corps and divisions had no howitzers or heavy guns, and only a few groups of heavy guns of small range under Army control. In all a French Active corps had 28 battalions and 120 field guns; a German, 24 battalions, 108 field guns, and 52 howitzers (4.2 or 5.9 inch).

Map 2. Sketch 2.

The zones of concentration selected in peace for the five Armies were, commencing as usual on the right :

 

First Army (General Dubail)-Region of Epinal.

Second Army (General de Castelnau)-Region of Nancy.

Third Army (General Ruffey)-Region of Verdun.

Fifth Army (General Lanrezac)-Between Verdun (exclusive) and Mézières, with a detachment east of the Meuse.

Fourth Army (General de Langle de Cary)-In general reserve in region Sainte Menehould-Commercy.

On either flank was a group of Reserve divisions :

On the right-a group of four Reserve divisions-Region of Belfort.

On the left-a group of three Reserve divisions (General Valabrègue)-Vervins.

 

The French Staff in choosing the areas of concentration were in face of the following facts. At Metz there was an immense German entrenched camp touching the frontier, and connected by four main lines of railway with the heart of Germany. From this a sudden blow-the attaque brusquée-could be easily struck with all the force of perfect organisation ; it was imperative to take measures to parry it. On the other hand, the German school of strategy favoured envelopment from one or both flanks. This in a war with France signified, indeed, violation either of Belgian or of Swiss neutrality, or of both; but Germany was not likely to be squeamish about such matters. Such violation might not go beyond a peaceable passage of troops across a corner of the neutral territory, yet still might suffice for the aggressor's purpose of turning a flank.

 

To meet menaces so different in kind as direct attack in the centre and envelopment on the flanks, the French General Staff decided to take the offensive and to concentrate facing the Eastern frontier, trusting to fortifications and to covering troops to gain sufficient time to move the mass of the army elsewhere if required. It was intended to attack as soon as possible with all forces united: the First and Second Armies south of Metz, and the Fifth north of it ; the Third Army was to connect these two main attacks and arrange for the investment of Metz as they progressed. The employment of the Fourth Army depended on the action of the enemy; if the Germans moved into Luxembourg and Belgium, it was to co-operate with the Fifth Army ; if the enemy merely covered the common frontier, it was to go to the support of the right attack. A detachment of the First Army (one corps and one cavalry division) was detailed in the plan to carry out a special operation on the extreme right in Alsace, with the object of holding any enemy forces which might attempt to advance on the western slopes of the Vosges, and of assisting in the removal of that part of the population which had remained faithful to France. It was hoped by the general offensive movement at any rate to dislocate the plans of the enemy, wrest the initiative from him, and, if he were moving through Belgium, strike a mortal blow at his communications.

 

No provision, it will be noticed, was made to meet an envelopment carried out through Belgium west of the Meuse, or to cover the gap between the western flank of the Fifth Army and the sea, in which there were only local Territorial troops and a few old fortresses incapable of offering serious resistance to any invader. The information at the disposal of the French General Staff appeared to indicate that the Germans would attack from Metz, and had not sufficient troops to extend their front west of the Meuse. Beyond arranging for an alternative concentration of the Fourth and Fifth Armies should the enemy enter Luxembourg and Belgium, there was no preparation against a wide enveloping movement.

 

On mobilisation, General Joffre, vice-président du Conseil supérieur de la guerre et chef de l'Etat-Major General, was appointed Commandant en Chef of the French Armies, with General Belin as Chief of the Staff.

 

The approximate strength of the Armies (with the Reserve divisions on the flanks included in the totals of the nearest Army) was, in round numbers, after certain exchanges had taken place (viz. the transfer of two corps and two Reserve divisions from Fifth Army to Fourth, of one corps from Second to Fifth, etc.) :

First Army

256,000 men

Second Army

200,000 "

Third Army

168,000 "

Fourth Army

193,000 "

Fifth Army

254,000 "

 

1,071,000 men

 

BELGIUM

 

(The details of the operations of the Belgian Army are taken from the official account : " L'Action de l'Armée Belge. Periode du 31 juillet au 31 décembre 1914," which has since been translated as " Military " Operations of Belgium. Report compiled by the Belgian General Staff " for the period July 31st to December 31st, 1914 " (London, Collingridge, 1s. net). For the Order of Battle see Appendix 5.)

 

In 1914 the Belgian Army consisted of a Field Army organised in six divisions and a cavalry division, and fortress troops which formed the garrisons of Antwerp, Liège and Namur. Antwerp was the great fortress of Belgium, the final refuge and rallying point of her forces and population in case of invasion by a powerful enemy. Its defences originally consisted of a strong enceinte, i.e. a continuous inner ring of fortification, and a girdle of forts, some two miles from the town, finished in 1868. Though a second girdle of forts and redoubts outside the first had been gradually added from 1882 onwards, the line was incomplete, there were several gaps and intervals in it, and it was on the average only some eight miles from the town, an altogether insufficient distance under modern conditions. Nor was the construction of the forts, although improvements were in progress, capable of resisting modern heavy artillery; notwithstanding that the guns were protected by armour (cupolas and tourelles), the fact that they were inside the forts, which were conspicuously upstanding, and not in well concealed batteries outside, made them easy targets. The same remarks as regards construction apply to the defences of Liège and Namur; these fortresses were " barrier forts and bridgeheads " on the Meuse ; they constituted the first line of Belgium's resistance, and were designed to guard the approaches into Belgium from the east and south-east, and hinder any force from crossing the Meuse either from France into Germany or Germany into France. They were never intended to be defended à outrance and depended on field troops for the defence of the intervals between the forts. At Huy on the Meuse between Namur and Liège there was an ancient fort, which at best might secure sufficient time for the destruction of the railway bridges and tunnel situated there.

 

The reorganisation of the Belgian Army authorised by the Government in 1912, had barely begun to take effect. In accordance with this a force of 350,000 men was to be formed: 150,000 for the Field Army, 130,000 for the fortress garrisons, and 70,000 for reserve and auxiliary troops. But these numbers would not in the ordinary course have been available until 1926. Actually in August 1914 only 117,000 could be mobilised for the Field Army, and a smaller proportion for the other categories.

 

The six divisions were stationed in peace so that at short notice they could quickly confront any enemy, were he Germany, France, Great Britain or Holland: 1st Division around Ghent ; 2nd Division, Antwerp ; 3rd Division around Liège ; 4th Division, Namur and Charleroi ; 5th Division around Mons ; 6th Division, Brussels ; and Cavalry Division, Brussels. Thus the 1st Division faced England ; the 3rd, Germany ; the 4th and 5th, France ; and they were intended to act as general advanced guards as occasion arose and gain time for the movements of the other divisions to the threatened area.

 

On the ordinary peace footing only part of the recruit contingent was with the colours, so that in case of danger of war, the Belgian Army had first to recall men on unlimited leave, in order to raise its forces to " reinforced peace establishment," the ordinary strength of the units of the Continental Powers, and then to complete the numbers by mobilising reservists. Thus not only was Belgium normally less ready than most nations, but she was in the throes of reorganisation, and could not put into the field even as many men as the British Regular Army.

 

GERMANY

 

(For the Order of Battle and organisation of the German Forces see Appendices 6 and 7.)

 

From 1815 to 1860, the Prussian Army had practically remained stationary in numbers, with a peace strength of 150,000 men formed in eight Army Corps, maintained by a yearly contingent of 40,000 recruits, who served three years with the colours. One of the first acts of Wilhelm I. on coming to the throne in January 1860 was, in opposition to the wishes of his Legislature, to raise the annual contingent to 63,000, and the peace strength to 215,000. From thence onwards there was a steady increase of the Prussian military forces.

 

The war of 1866 made Prussia head of the North German Confederation, whilst Hesse-Darmstadt, Württemberg, Bavaria and Baden were bound to place their armies at the disposal of Prussia in time of war. In 1870, in addition to her original eight corps, she was able after arrangements with the other States to put into the field the Guard, IX., X. (Hanoverian), XI., and XII. (Saxon), and I. and II. Bavarian Corps, and eventually the XIII. (Württemberg) and XIV. (Baden), with a war-strength of roughly 950,000.

 

The formation of the German Empire in 1871 made expansion still easier, for by the Constitution one per cent of the population could be in training under arms. The subsequent peace strengths were(G.O.A., K.u.K., i. and tables in the Appendix volume.

The largest increase , it will be noticed, came after 1912. A project was put forward at the end of that year by the Chief of the General Staff who stated, in view of the Balkan War, which had just broken out, that " the Army was not strong enough for the duties required of it "-which were to carry out the Schlieffen plan of campaign. The increase was sanctioned by the Reichstag in June 1913. in the spring of 1914 a decision

was made to introduce complete universal service, no one escaping it, in

1916. This would probably have doubled the strength of the German Army.) :

 

Divisions.

Cavalry Brigades

Officers.

N.C.O's.

Other Ranks.

One Year Volunteers.

1875

37

38

17,213

53,956

347,703

7,000

1882

37

38

18,134

57,694

369,580

9,000

1888

39

39

19,294

61,867

406,542

10,000

1890

43

45

20,285

65,001

421,982

8,000

1893

43

46

22,458

77,864

479,229

9,000

1898

43

46

23,176

78,237

479,229

9,000

1902

48

46

24,292

80,985

495,500

11,000

1910

48

46

25,722

87,071

504446

13,145

1911

48

46

25,880

88,292

507:253

14,000

1912

50

51

27,267

92,347

531,004

14,350

1914, Aug.

50

55

30,459

107,794

647,793

16,000

(Sanctioned)

50

55

32,000

110,000

661,500

-

 

The approximate mobilisable strength was (The figures in brackets are from G.O.A., K.u.K., i. p. 219; the original ones were calculated before the war by the British Intelligence Branch.) :

Trained officers and men

4,300,000

(5,020,700)

Partially trained

100,000

-

Untrained

5,500,000

(5,474,000)

 

9,900,000

(10,494,700)

 

The Army was organised into 25 Active army corps (50 divisions)-the Guard, I. to XXI., and I, II., III. Bavarian; and in each army corps district cadres were provided to form certain Reserve divisions (32), Ersatz divisions (7), Landwehr brigades and regiments (equivalent to 16 divisions), from the supernumeraries in the depots. There were also 11 cavalry divisions.

 

The plan on which this great force would be used oil the Eastern and Western fronts could only be surmised. It will, so far as it is known, be given later 2 after the opening moves of the campaign have been developed and described.

 

Service in the German Army was divided into service in the Active (or Standing) Army (two years, but three in the cavalry and horse artillery) ; service in the Reserve (five years, but four in the cavalry and horse artillery) ; service in the Landwehr (eleven years). The Landsturm included youths between 17 and 20, too young for service in the Army, and trained and untrained men between 39 and 45, who were thus over the ordinary military age.

 

The original Reserve corps which took part in the August offensive were formed mainly of Reserve men supernumerary to the requirements of the Active Army, with some Landwehr but the Guard Reserve Corps contained an Active division, and others, e.g. the V., VI., VI., VII. and IX., each contained an Active brigade, as the Active corps of these numbers had each in peace time an extra brigade ; others had similarly an Active regiment. Soon after declaration of war, additional Reserve divisions and corps were built up of volunteers (mainly youths under full military age and men not yet called up, etc.), with a substantial nucleus of about 25 per cent of trained men of the older classes. (" Ypres 1914," p. 5.)

 

The Ersatz brigades and divisions of 1914 were not formed from untrained men of the Ersatz Reserve, (This consisted of men temporarily unfit, or fit and liable for military service but not called up for training either because they were supernumerary to the annual contingent, or for family reasons, or on account of minor physical defects.) but from trained men supernumerary to the numbers required for the Active and Reserve formations. They were organised like the Reserve formations but had not the full establishment of machine guns, cavalry, or artillery, and were entirely without field kitchens, medical units, train and ammunition columns. They were therefore not equivalent to other brigades and divisions in open warfare.

 

The Landwehr units were formed of men who had completed seven years with the Active Army and Reserve, and were under 39 years of age.

 

As the war went on, the significance of the various classifications largely disappeared, and Active, Reserve, Ersatz and Landwehr divisions contained men of all categories.

 

The French were at the outbreak of war dressed in their peace-time old-fashioned uniforms -the infantry in blue, with red trousers, and képi the officers conspicuous by reason of their shorter coats; horizon-blue " was not introduced until 1915. The Belgian infantry wore dark blue, with blue-grey trousers, adopting khaki in 1915. The Germans wore " field-grey," with a cover of that colour on the spiked helmet or other cavalry or Jäger head-dress. The British were of course in khaki, and wore the flat peaked cap.

MENU OF MILITARY OPERATIONS - FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914 - Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

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