Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches A, 4 & 6 ; Maps 3, 9 & 10)

With the close of day in the I. Corps area, stories brought by refugees began to circulate in the villages in which the British were settling down, of the approach of the Germans towards Maroilles and Landrecies, near which places lay the two main passages over the Sambre at the southern end of the Forest of Mormal. Although Sir Douglas Haig had not had the forest searched, he had taken precautions against a hostile attack from it upon his western flank during his retreat : the bridge over the Sambre, which lies to the north-west of Maroilles and carries the road from Le Quesnoy south-eastward through the forest by Locquignol to Maroilles, was guarded by a troop of the 15th Hussars : another troop watched a lock bridge some two miles farther down the river. Infantry was to relieve the cavalry at night : at Maroilles the passages of the Sambre were to be held by the 6th Brigade, and those near Landrecies by the 4th (Guards) Brigade. On the right of the I. Corps were General Valabrègue' s Reserve divisions. From all reports, the enemy was not within striking distance, (According to the statements of German officers, the enemy seems to have been equally unaware of our presence at Landrecies and Maroilles) and so little were the rumours believed that an officer of the 15th Hussars was denied permission by the local civil authorities to destroy some wooden buildings, which obstructed his view near Maroilles bridge, on the ground that no Germans were anywhere near him. Suddenly, about 5.30 P.M., there was a panic amongst the inhabitants of Landrecies, caused by cries that the Germans were upon them.

The troops promptly got under arms, and two companies of the 3/Coldstream took post at the road-junction near the railway about half a mile to the north-west of the town. Mounted patrols were sent out, but without finding any enemy. At Maroilles half an hour later (about 6 P.M.) German parties (The force which came to Maroilles was the 48th Regiment of the 5th Division, III. Corps, the advanced guard of the 5th Division.) engaged the two detachments of the 15th Hussars, but were easily held at bay for an hour, when the assailants of the road bridge brought up a field gun and, creeping forward under cover of the very buildings which the British officer had wished to destroy, compelled the troop to fall back. As it retired towards Maroilles, it was met by a company of the 1/Royal Berkshire which was coming up in relief. The infantry took post by the Rue des Juifs about a mile to the south-east of the bridge. The Germans challenging in French succeeded in enticing a British officer forward and making a prisoner of him ; but they made no further advance and presently retired.

In Maroilles itself there was for a time such a congestion of supply lorries and of refugees with their vehicles, that the three remaining companies of the Royal Berkshire could march off only after considerable delay to the support of the company at the Rue des Juifs. When these companies at last came up, they found that the enemy had retired, and accordingly pushed on to recover the lost bridge. The only access to this, however, was by a causeway over marshy ground, and the enemy having barricaded the bridge and put his field gun into position, the Royal Berkshire failed to drive him from it. After a total loss of over sixty men, it was decided to make no further attempt to recapture the bridge until daylight, and to be content with forbidding advance along the causeway.

Meanwhile at Landrecies also there had been fighting, the seriousness of which was at the time somewhat exaggerated. The cavalry patrols returned with the report that all was clear, and the 4th (Guards) Brigade was confirmed in its belief that the alarm at 5.30 P.M. had been a false one. Subsequent events proved that the rumour of the near presence of Germans was true. (The advanced guard of the German 7th Division (IV. Corps), an infantry brigade (the 14th) with a battery, had marched from Le Quesnoy past the south of the forest towards Landrecies for the purpose of billeting there, entirely ignorant of the presence of the British. On discovering the town was occupied, the vanguard crept along the hedges and corn-stooks and entrenched themselves parallel to the road not five hundred yards from the line of the two advanced companies of the 3/Coldstream. They even loopholed a garden wall still closer to those companies. The original report that the German force was part of the IX. Corps appears to have been due to an identification received by wireless from the Eiffel Tower, Paris.)

At 7.30 P.M. No. 3 Company of the 3/Coldstream was on piquet, on the road, with a machine gun upon each flank, and wire entanglements a short distance ahead. Wheels and horses were heard approaching along the road ; (This, according to the story of a German general who was present, was the regimental transport which had been ordered to trot past the column to get to the billets.) the sentry challenged. The challenge was answered in French ; a body of men loomed through the darkness, and the officer in command advanced to question them. He was answered always in French, but in the course of the parley the supposed Frenchmen edged themselves up closer to the piquet, and then, suddenly and without the slightest warning, lowered their bayonets and charged. In the first moment of surprise, they knocked down the officer, seized the right-hand machine gun and dragged it ten yards, but a few seconds later they were swept away by a volley from the piquet, and the machine gun was recovered.

The piquet was at once reinforced ; and the rest of the 4th (Guards) Brigade turned out, the 2/Grenadiers coming up to the support of the Coldstream along the road from the railway northwards. Charge after charge was made by the enemy without gaining any advantage, and at 8.30 P.M. German artillery opened fire upon the town and upon the piquet. This fire was accurate, but the German infantrymen shot far too high and accomplished little, until, having by means of incendiary bombs set light to some strawstacks in a farmyard close to the British, they apparently realised for the first time, by the light of the flames, that their way was barred only by a single thin line. (Lance-Corporal G. H. Wyatt, 3rd Coldstream Guards, dashed at and extinguished the burning straw, though the enemy was only 25 yards distant. For this and a further act of bravery at Villers-Cotterêts on 1st September, he received the V.C.) Thereupon they tried, but unsuccessfully, to enfilade the Guards. The engagement went on until past midnight when a howitzer of the 60th Battery was hauled up by hand to within close range and with its third round silenced the German guns. This seems to have decided the issue, and the enemy drew off. The losses of the 3/Coldstream were one hundred and twenty ; those of the Germans, according to their official casualty lists, were 127. (The following information was obtained from Berlin in 1921 : The German forces involved in the fighting at Landrecies consisted of the 14th Infantry Brigade (Major-General von Oven) of the IV. Corps, containing the 27th and 165th Regiments, one squadron 10th Hussars, and the 4th Field Artillery Regiment. Of these the 165th Regiment and three batteries were only employed in the later stages of the fight. Casualties :

27th Regt.-l officer, 32 men killed, 4 officers, 65 men wounded ;

165th Regt.-3 men wounded, 2 men missing ;

10th Hussars-l man wounded ;

4th Field Artillery Regt.-3 officers and 16 men killed ;

total casualties, 127.)

By about 4 A.M. on the 26th, all was again quiet on the line of the I. Corps. But, as it was impossible in the dark to discover the scope of the attack, the information sent back to G.H.Q. from the I. Corps was somewhat alarming. At 10 P.M. there was telephoned " Attack heavy " from north-west can you send help ?" Thereupon G.H.Q. directed General Smith-Dorrien to move to the assistance of the I. Corps, at any rate to send the 19th Brigade. He was forced to reply, " much regret my troops are quite unable to move to-night. The 19th Brigade could not reach Landrecies in a useful state." On this being repeated to General Haig, he decided at 12.30 A.M. on the 26th, after a consultation with General Lomax, to move the 1st Division at 6 A.M. via Marbaix and Grand Fayt to the neighbourhood of Favril to support the left of the 2nd Division. At 1.35 A.M. he reported to G.H.Q., ," situation very critical," and that he was putting in every available man on his left. A little later he suggested that the troops near Le Cateau should assist by advancing straight on Landrecies. There is at this point a gap in the records, but it would appear from what followed that General Haig must have been told by Sir John French that, in view of the direction of the enemy's attack, he must retire southwards, not south-west. At 3.45 A.M., the Commander-in-Chief informed General Smith-Dorrien, " enemy appears to be working round south of Landrecies. G.O.C. 4th Brigade doubts if he can move south. My orders of last night [7.30 P.M.] hold good as far as you and Snow [4th Division] are concerned," and he now gave the II. Corps the Le Cateau-Busigny road, previously allotted to the I. Corps, thus directing the latter more south than south-west. Just before 5 A.M., through the French Mission at G.H.Q., he called on his French neighbours, General Lanrezac and General d'Amade, and General Sordet (cavalry corps) for help, making clear, as will be narrated under the operations of the 26th, that the I. Corps was retiring south, if not south-eastward. (The messages sent off at 5 A.M. are Nos. 630 and 631 in F.O.A. i. (ii.) Annexes i. The one to General Lanrezac runs (those to Generals d'Amade and to General Sordet are similar) :" The I. Corps was sharply attacked this night [night of 25th/26th] in its cantonments between Landrecies and Le Cateau, and is retreating, if it can, on Guise, southwards [Guise is 17 miles due south of Landrecies] , if not south-eastwards in the direction of La Capelle [15 miles south-east , of Landrecies]., the cavalry division, cantonned at Catillon [5 miles south-east of , Le Cateau] is going to retire on Bohain ; the II. Corps and 4th Division, cantonned in the zone Caudry-Le Cateau, are going to retire on the line Le Catelet-Beaurevoir. The next day, the general movement of retreat will be continued on Péronne. In these circumstances, Field-Marshal French asks you to help him by receiving the I. Corps until it can rejoin the main body of the British forces.")

The labours of the II. Corps lasted to as late an hour on the night of the 25th/26th as those of the I. Corps. All through the evening the stream of transport flowed slowly and uneasily through Solesmes, and shortly before dark the Germans closed more resolutely on the South Lancashire and Wiltshire (7th Brigade), the rear guard of the 3rd Division before that town; they brought their artillery up to close range, though pushing forward only small bodies of infantry. When darkness fell, however, they went into bivouac. (The action at Solesmes looms somewhat large, as so often in an unsuccessful fight, in the German records, the title of "" The Battle of Solesmes-Le Cateau being given officially to the fighting on the 25th and 26th. The history of the 153rd Regiment (pp. 51-2) states that the regiment, with a battery, formed the advanced guard of the 8th Division marching south on Solesmes. It ran unexpectedly into the British on the heights north of the town about dusk, the divisional cavalry not having reported the presence of any enemy After a rapid deployment, all three battalions (only two companies following in second line) attacked about 7 P.M. ; but in the dusk, in enclosed country, confusion resulted and, two battalions of the 93rd Regiment coming up on the right, the Germans fired on each other. To stop this the manoeuvre bugle call of ," The whole will halt ", was sounded, followed by the " Commanding Officers call ". It was proposed to make a bayonet attack at 9 P.M., but this was abandoned on account of the existence of wire fences, and the two regiments lay down where they were. This was perhaps fortunate for them, for they would have found in Solesmes only a portion of the 72nd Regiment, of the 8th Division, which had entered and settled down in the north-west corner of the town, without having seen any British. Soon after this General von Kluck himself had arrived in the town having selected it as his night quarters, only to retire to Haussy, a couple of miles back. (Kluck, p. 55.))

This enabled the two battalions to be withdrawn, much scattered, indeed, and with the loss of several small detachments cut off by the enemy, but without further mishap. (Both infantry brigades of the German 8th Division (IV. Corps) and the 4th Cavalry Division had casualties at Solesmes on 25th August (see ," Schlachten und Gefechte ).) The infantry of the 4th Division meanwhile stood fast on the heights immediately south of Solesmes, while the mass of transport and troops disentangled itself on the roads leading south and south-east upon Caudry and Le Cateau. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade (less the 4th Hussars), with the headquarters and portions of the 2nd, pushed on through the congested streets of Le Cateau to Catillon, where it halted for the night between 10 and 11 P.M. The 1st Cavalry Brigade bivouacked in the fields south of Le Cateau, with the exception of the 5th Dragoon Guards, which retired after dark to Inchy and thence shortly before midnight to Troisvilles, west of Le Cateau, their horses utterly exhausted. The 19th Brigade, together with two companies of the Scots Fusiliers which had lost connection with the rear guard of the 9th Brigade, marched into Le Cateau at 10 P.M. and bivouacked in the central square and at the goods station. The bulk of the 7th Brigade retired to Caudry, but the Irish Rifles and the 41st Battery, the last party of the rear guard, only reached Le Cateau about 10 P.M., when, finding they could not rejoin their brigades direct, owing to the rapid advance of the enemy, they passed southward to Maurois. There they bivouacked in the grey dawn of the 26th. At least one detachment of the Wiltshire, having with some difficulty avoided capture, also found its way into Le Cateau in the early hours of the 26th. The masses of troops, guns and transport at dusk and for many hours afterwards pressing through the northern entrance to the town created most alarming congestion. The British alone would have sufficed to crowd it, but besides the British a considerable body of French chasseurs marched in from Valenciennes. .

The mile of road from Montay to Le Cateau falls very steeply and becomes a defile, and here infantry, cavalry, guns and wagons, in places all three abreast, were jammed together in what seemed irremediable confusion. Had the Germans pushed on, even with a small force supported by guns, they might have done terrible damage ; for one or two shells would have sufficed to produce a complete block on the road. The rear parties of the Suffolk and Manchester (14th Brigade), rear guard of the 5th Division, had been withdrawn at dusk, and there would have been nothing to stop an enterprising enemy. The Germans, however, were no less weary than the British, and they had also gained sufficient experience of British rapid fire to make them cautious. They had gone into bivouac here as at Solesmes ; and though at dusk they were in force only five miles away, (The 7th Division spent the night in Bousies, Fontaine, and adjoining villages.) they left the British free to disentangle themselves at their leisure. The process was long and tedious, and until a late hour Viesly was as hopelessly blocked as Solesmes had been.

Though the infantry of the 4th Division had been unmolested since dusk, except by one or two cavalry patrols which were quickly driven off, it was not free to begin to move off until 9 P.M. During its detention near Solesmes the remainder of its divisional artillery, except the heavy battery, had been detraining, and the 2/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, which had not come up with the 12th Brigade, arrived at Ligny, where it took over guard of the divisional transport. In view of the flank march that the division would later have to make to its new position on the left of the Le Cateau line, two companies of this battalion were in the afternoon sent as a western flank guard to occupy. Bévillers and Beauvois. A hasty reconnaissance of the new ground had been made on the 24th, at the suggestion of G.H.Q., by Br. General J. A. L. Haldane (10th Brigade) and Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Montgomery (G.S.O. 2) ; and they selected a good reverse-slope position, or, as it was then called, " back position," covering Haucourt.

At 5 P.M. the 4th Division issued warning orders for the march to and occupation of the position. A G.H.Q. alteration, sent out at 6.40 P.M., reduced the length of front to be held, and made it from Fontaine au Pire to Wambaix, that is to say about three miles. General Snow's orders directed that the 11th and 12th Brigades should hold the front line, with the 10th in reserve at Haucourt, whilst the artillery should assemble at Ligny.

The artillery (with the exception of the XXXII. Brigade, which was with the rear guard) arrived fairly early in the evening; the 12th Brigade moved off from the heights above Solesmes soon after 9 P.M. ; the 11th, an hour later, before which time the German guns shelled and set on fire the eastern portion of Briastre (2 miles south of Solesmes), at the west corner of which the brigade was assembled. The 10th Brigade, which could not move until the 3rd Division had got clear of Briastre, started at midnight. As the three brigades marched off south-west rain was falling heavily and the darkness was only relieved on the northern horizon by the red glow of villages fired by the enemy.

Instructions from G.H.Q., received in the afternoon, intimated that the retirement would probably be continued at 7 A.M. next morning, but it was on the position defined in General Snow's orders that the troops of the 4th Division stood when the first shots were fired in the early morning of the 26th.

The head of General Sordet's cavalry corps had passed through Ligny, behind the Le Cateau position, in the course of the day, and the corps bivouacked for the night near Walincourt. Its arrival on the western flank of the British was, perhaps, the one cheerful feature in a gloomy situation.

To summarise the situation : at 7.30 P.M. the British Commander-in-Chief, after having established his head-quarters at St.Quentin at 6 P.M., had issued definite orders for the retreat to be continued ten to fifteen miles to the south-west on the morrow, to a line Busigny-Le Catelet, facing a little west of north. Communications from General Joffre, admitted that his attempt at the offensive had failed, and that his intention was to retire to the line Laon-La Fère-St. Quentin, and from this position to take the offensive again. Later information which arrived during the evening. was not reassuring. There seemed little time to lose. The Germans were in touch with the British at several places, and had considerable forces within a few miles of them. They were known to be pushing troops with all speed towards the western flank of the British, where General d'Amade's six Reserve and Territorial divisions guarded the long line to the sea. The I. Corps had already been struck at Maroilles and at Landrecies, the II. had been engaged in a definite rear-guard action at Solesmes ; and it was not difficult to guess what these blows might portend. Sir Douglas Haig's troops stood to arms all night, losing the rest of which they were so much in need; and it was feared that the attack at Landrecies might mean that the Germans w ere already in force across the southern end of the Forest of Mormal, between Landrecies and the Roman road. (The German 7th Division was there, with the 5th Division in rear of it.) It will be remembered that on the afternoon of the 25th General Haig had issued instructions for the I. Corps to march at 2 A.M. south-westwards to the right of the Le Cateau position. These orders he had changed on receiving those of the Field-Marshal to continue on to Busigny ; but the events of the night had caused him to decide, with at least Sir John French's knowledge, to retreat southwards on Guise. For the G.O.C. 11. Corps a decision was more difficult.

Only a sketch would give an idea how the various units of the II. Corps had been jostled between the barrier of the Forest of Mormal, which edged them away to the west, and the pressure of the enemy on the western flank, which bore them back towards the east. To General Smith-Dorrien the true situation did not reveal itself until late at night.

At 10.15 P.M. he too had issued orders for the renewal of the retreat towards the line La Sablière-Beaurevoir prescribed by Sir John French's 7.30 P.M. order which he had received at 9 P.M. : the transport was to start at 4 A.M. and the main bodies at 7 A.M. Meantime the divisions of his corps, acting on his previous order, were in readiness on or near the Le Cateau position : the 3rd Division, under orders issued at 9.42 P.M., was to stand to arms at 4 A.M. and be prepared to occupy the sections of the position allotted in case of attack ; two and a half infantry brigades of the 5th Division w ere bivouacking on a line across the Troisvilles-Le Cateau roads, with the remaining two battalions posted on the high ground north-east of Le Cateau to connect with the I. Corps as originally arranged. This division had orders to stand to arms at 3.30 A.M.

G.H.Q. orders for the continuance of the retreat, and for the Cavalry Division to cover it on the north and west, did not reach General Allenby at his headquarters at Beaumont (on the west side of Inchy) until after 11 P.M. Shortly after their receipt, Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell of the 5th Dragoon Guards came in to report that his regiment and the 4th Division had safely withdrawn from the high ground north of Viesly, which overlooks Solesmes, and that the enemy was in possession of it. Now it was this high ground and the ridges abreast of it that the cavalry must occupy to cover the initial stages of the retirement from the Le Cateau position, and as General Allenby had not sufficient force, in fact, only the 4th Cavalry Brigade, under his hand to recapture it, he proceeded at once to General Smith-Dorrien's headquarters at Bertry. There he explained the situation, and expressed the opinion that, the Germans being so close, unless the troops of the II. Corps and 4th Division could march " before daylight," the enemy would be upon them before they could start, and it would be necessary to fight. General Smith-Dorrien thereupon at 2 A.M. sent for General H. I. W Hamilton, commanding the 3rd Division, whose headquarters were close at hand, and asked him if it was possible to get on the move during the hours of darkness. His reply was that many units of the division were only just coming in, and he did not think that he could get them formed up for retreat before 9 A.M. General Allenby further said that his division was too much scattered and exhausted to be able to give useful assistance in covering the retreat next day. General Smith-Dorrien, after a full discussion of the situation with Generals Allenby and Hamilton, reluctantly came to the decision that he must stand his ground. To do this he must ask the commanders of the Cavalry Division and of the 4th Division to place themselves under his orders ; with them and with the II. Corps, that is to say, with the whole of the British troops in the line from Catillon westwards, he would strike the enemy hard, and, after he had done so, continue the retreat. Whether he could withdraw his troops after such a stand would depend on the pressure and weight of the German attack. Several German cavalry divisions, and the head of a division of the German IV. Corps were already before him, the British I. Corps had been attacked by another corps, and further forces were known to be hurrying up. Much would obviously depend on breaking off the action before the overwhelming numbers of the enemy became effective. To guard his flanks he had to depend upon the weary and sorely tried Cavalry Division, with some possibility of assistance on the western flank from General Sordet's equally weary cavalry corps, and on the eastern flank from the I. Corps, should it not be held fast itself. Help from this quarter, however, appeared unlikely, and indeed Sir Douglas Haig had asked for assistance from the II. Corps.

The situation, in short, seemed to him one that could be saved only by desperate measures. General Allenby promptly accepted the invitation to act under his command; there was no doubt that General Snow of the 4th Division would do likewise when the request reached him.

A lengthy message was despatched by 11. Corps at 3.30 A.M. to G.H.Q. St. Quentin, by motor car, where it was received about 5 A.M., informing Sir John French in detail of the decision taken. At 5 A.M. another message was sent asking that General Sordet might be told that the II. Corps w as not retiring.

A written reply to the first message was prepared at once, between 5 and 6 A.M., but it was not sent until 11.5 A.M. as it was found that G.H.Q. could communicate with the II. Corps by a railway telephone line. General Smith-Dorrien was accordingly summoned from his quarters in Bertry to the railway station, where, shortly after 6 A.M., Major-General H. H. Wilson, the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, spoke to him and gave him the gist of the G.H.Q. reply (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien spoke, "" putting the matter squarely," to General Wilson, who said to him that his voice was the first cheerful, one he had heard for days, and if you stand to fight there will be, another Sedan." To this the commander of the II. Corps replied that " it was impossible to break away now, as the action had already begun, and that he could hear the guns firing as he spoke." (See "" Recollections " of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien " in the Army Quarterly, October 1930, by his signal officer, Br.-General A. Hildebrand, who accompanied him to the telephone, and the " Foreword" to ", The Advance from Mons 1914 (translation of Bloem's "" Vormarsch "), written by Br.-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, to whom General Smith-Dorrien spoke on the matter at 2 P.M. during the battle.) ) Subsequent to this conversation the 4th Division was warned at 6.55 A.M. by G.H.Q. that the II. Corps might not be able to continue the retirement at the time arranged, and that it was to cover Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's left flank. The written reply sent by G.H.Q. to General Smith-Dorrien, despatched after a further message had come in from the II. Corps, timed 9.10 A.M., reporting that Caudry was being heavily attacked, but that the 7th Brigade was still holding its own, was signed " C. in C," and ran as follows :" Your G971 received. News from I. Corps reassuring also 4 divisions of French Territorials in area Cambrai Villers-Campeau-Douai-Croisilles. Thus left seems fairly secure. An intercepted German message says German Guard Cavalry Division (The 9th Cavalry Division was near Solesmes ; the Guard Cavalry Division was thirty miles further to the east.) about Solesmes were asking for reinforcements at 8.25 A.M.. If you can hold your ground the situation appears "likely to improve. 4th Division must co-operate.

French troops are taking offensive on right of I. Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement and you must make every endeavour to do so." The die having been cast, it remained only for General Smith-Dorrien to inform his subordinates. As General H. I. W. Hamilton had been present at the conference, this was easy as regards the 3rd Division; to Sir Charles Fergusson he went himself about 4 A.M. and whilst he was discussing the situation the commander of the 5th Division drew his attention to the fact that formed bodies, the rear guard (2/R. Irish Rifles) of the 3rd Division, were still coming in, dead beat. The actual orders to stand fast, which were conveyed by two staff officers in a motor car, reached 5th Division headquarters shortly afterwards. A staff officer was sent to the 4th Division, but did not arrive at Haucourt until 5 A.M., only a short time before the division became engaged. The news that meanwhile had come in to II. Corps headquarters was not reassuring. At 2.30 A.M. General Smith-Dorrien heard that the Germans had occupied Cambrai; and at 3.45 A.M. that they were working round to the south of Landrecies. These details were neither of them true ; but, true or false, they could not affect his resolution. (Actually, the French 84th Territorial Division was in occupation of Cambrai and its northern approaches.)

Seeing that many of the brigades had only lately come in, it was inevitable that the divisional commanders should have considerable difficulty in communicating the order to stand fast to the brigadiers, owing to the uncertainty of their whereabouts : General Shaw of the 9th Brigade, being in Beaumont, received the order through General Allenby at 3.30 A.M. ; the 7th and 8th Brigades, having stood to arms at 4 A.M., were actually on the position and improving trenches when fired on at 6 A.M. There is no record either of the order to continue the retirement at 7 A.M., issued by the II. Corps at 10.15 P.M., or of the later order not to retire, reaching them. Of the 5th Division, Count Gleichen of the 15th Brigade, being nearest to divisional headquarters, heard at 5 A.M., and the other two infantry brigadiers about 6 A.M.

We left the 4th Division hungry, wet and weary after its hurried journey by night to Le Cateau, its equally hurried march to Solesmes, and a long wait in position without supplies, (" Cookers " had not been issued to the 4th Division as they had to the other divisions.) marching through the darkness to take its place on the extreme left of General Smith-Dorrien's line between Fontaine au Pire and Wambaix, with its reserve at Haucourt. The first of the troops to reach their destination, about 1 A.M., were the headquarters and two companies of the 2/Inniskilling which had left Ligny shortly before midnight to secure Esnes (5 miles south-east of Cambrai). There they found a small party of General Sordet's cavalry which had barricaded the western approaches to the village. The two remaining companies of the battalion, it will be recalled, had been detached as a flank guard to Beauvois and Bévillers (both about four miles north-east of Esnes) on the afternoon of the 25th. Just after darkness fell, the outposts before Bévillers were suddenly aware of a troop of German horse, which came within thirty yards of them before it was recognised to be hostile, and was followed by six motor lorries full of Jager.

The Inniskillings opened rapid fire, with what effect could not be seen, but the enemy retired in haste. The two companies remained in their positions until 3 A.M. when, by order of their brigadier, they marched for Longsart (just north-west of Haucourt). Meanwhile, the advanced guard of the 12th Brigade-two companies of the Essex, which had moved from Béthencourt at 10 P.M., reached Longsart about 3.30 A.M., and the 2/Lancashire Fusiliers came in a little later. Both parties entrenched themselves on the plateau just to the north-west of the hamlet. The l/King's Own reached the eastern end of Haucourt shortly after 4 A.M. and halted there, General Sordet's rear guard riding through the village during the halt. The two remaining companies of the Essex, which had been left at Béthencourt as rear guard under Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Anley remained there until recalled at 3 A.M., and then marched via Ligny and Haucourt to Esnes, where they arrived two hours later. Towards 5 A.M. the flank-guard companies of the Inniskillings came in to Longsart. Thus by 5 A.M. the whole of the 12th Brigade had reached its allotted ground.

The 11th Brigade was not so fortunate in reaching without mishap the position assigned to it. It was about 2.15 A.M. before the head of its column arrived at Fontaine au Pire, the march having been delayed by a serious block of 3rd Division transport at Viesly, which brought the brigade to a standstill for some time. The 1/Hampshire was leading, followed by the l/East Lancashire, two companies of the l/Somerset L.I., the l/Rifle Brigade (one company and a platoon being with the brigade transport to give assistance), the transport, and the rest of the Somerset L.I. as rear guard. Fontaine au Pire and Beauvois north of it, form one long straggling village a mile and a half in length, and it was intended, on reaching the road fork near the far end of the houses, to take the right to Cattenières, which passes north of the " Quarry ", called " Carrière " on the French 1: 80,000 map then in use, which marked the top of the ridge on which position was to be taken. Not an inhabitant could be found of whom to make enquiries, and a mistake was made. A street to the right in Fontaine au Pire, immediately before the turning to Cattenières, was followed, and it led out to a mud track between pasture fields, with barbed wire on either side of it. The brigadier, who was near the head of the column, decided therefore to halt and rest the brigade where it stood and wait for daylight, the two leading battalions being already well down the track, and the rest of the column in the streets of the long village, the rear still in Beauvois. The Rifle Brigade was ordered to furnish outposts, and moved to the open fields in front, pushing out one company down the slope to cover the ground between Beauvois and Cattenières. The leading portion of the Somerset L.I. covered the transport near the southern end of Beauvois. The other units sought what resting places they could, some in houses, some in fields recently tenanted by cattle, whilst others were lucky enough to find corn in stooks on which to bed down. The portion of the transport which had entered the lane was in the course of time turned round so that the whole of it could be got clear by taking the road from the centre of Fontaine au Pire southwards to Ligny, two and a half miles away across the Warnelle ravine. The rear guard of the Somerset went on towards Ligny to occupy a covering position there, and the detachment of the Rifle Brigade with the transport, which had become rear guard and had remained some time at the northern end of Beauvois, rejoined its battalion.

Towards daylight, in accordance with custom at training and manoeuvres, the brigade stood to arms preparatory to moving back to its assigned sector just behind the ridge. In the faint light of early morning parties of the Rifle Brigade on outpost saw hostile cavalry and artillery advancing from the north on Cattenières, and almost immediately the enemy opened an indiscriminate and ineffective rifle fire from the north and north-west backed by a few shell. The transport was at once got on the move, the German skirmishers who were pushing in towards Fontaine au Pire being held off by the cooks and brakesmen, and by the Somerset. The whole of it reached Ligny safely, and during the day retired by stages to Serain (6 miles south of Ligny), where it arrived late in the afternoon.

As it had grown light, about 4 A.M., the senior officer with the East Lancashire (the lieutenant-colonel and second-in-command having gone to a brigade conference); seeing the exposed position of the battalion, drew it back, first a couple of hundred yards clear of the wire to the open fields, and then to the ridge. When the Germans opened fire on the transport, he formed his men up in battle position, with two companies in reserve. The Hampshire were also moved back about 4.30 A.M., and then, by Br.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston's order, took position on the left of the East Lancashire, astride the railway leading to Cambrai. The Somerset L.I. (half-battalion) and the Rifle Brigade, helped by fire from the East Lancashire, gradually fell back fighting, somewhat intermixed in consequence, but with the Rifle Brigade mostly on the right of the line, the front of the two battalions being astride and to the west of the Ligny-Fontaine au Pire road. The half battalion of the Somerset L.I. was ordered back from Ligny to support its forward companies ; but on the left there were too many troops in the front line, and the East Lancashire, except one company, were withdrawn into reserve in the hollow behind the right centre.

The 10th Brigade, the last of the troops of the 4th Division to leave the Solesmes position, also had some difficulty in finding its way in the dark night. It moved, with its transport leading, via Viesly, Béthencourt and Beauvois, where the head of the column turned southwards, as the 11th Brigade had done, to Fontaine au Pire. Here the divisional commander, who was at the moment with the 11th Brigade, told Br.-General Haldane to pass through that brigade and to continue on to Haucourt. The 11th Brigade, having already taken a turn to the right, the wrong one as it happened, the 10th Brigade transport took the next turning, and at 3.40 A.M. arrived at a village whose name it could not discover until daylight, when a board inside the railway station revealed it as Cattenières, in front of the outpost position of the 4th Division, as was at once realised. Firing was already heard, and the transport was hastily got on the march for Haucourt, its tail being fired into shortly after it had cleared Cattenières. The infantry of the brigade, there was a considerable gap between it and the transport owing to the latter moving faster, had not followed the vehicles. With the Seaforth as rear guard and the R. Irish Fusiliers as west flank guard, marching by country tracks until Beauvois was reached, the column, after one mistake at a turning near Beauvois, corrected by receiving fire, marched straight through Fontaine au Pire at the first streak of dawn without turning off, and by 4.30 A.M. had arrived at Haucourt, where the men threw themselves down and slept, hoping that, being in reserve to the division, they might have a little rest. A French cavalry patrol returning shortly before 5 A.M. reported that the front was clear, but there was no means of verifying this except by using the horses of field officers and the Staff, for reasons which will appear.

Thus, by 5 A.M. on the 26th, the infantry of the 4th Division had to all intents occupied the position assigned to it for the night of the 25th/26th, with its firing line near the crest of the ridge, in order to obtain a field of fire, and the rest under cover on the short, sharpish reverse slope which falls to the Warnelle stream behind it. It was a good position for action, though hardly for a rear-guard action, in view of the long, gradual and exposed slope from the stream up to Ligny which must be crossed in retirement. On the right there was a gap of nearly two thousand yards between the Rifle Brigade and the 3/Worcestershire of the 3rd Division about Caudry. There was also a gap of nearly three-quarters of a mile between the11th and the l2th Brigades, but the 10th Brigade, in reserve south of the Warnelle, near Haucourt, covered this, the R. Dublin Fusiliers and R. Warwickshire being east of the village and the Seaforth and R. Irish Fusiliers behind it. The artillery was not in battle position, as its commander, Br.-General G. F. Milne, was with divisional headquarters and therefore expected to resume the retirement at 7 A.M.

Though complete in field artillery and infantry, the 4th Division was as yet without its divisional cavalry Divisions were left without trained " eyes," except in so far as mounted officers, the cyclist companies, and Yeomanry detachments eventually sent to replace the cavalry, could furnish them. The absence of the divisional cavalry squadron was a cause of heavy loss to the 4th Division on the morning of Le Cateau, as will be seen, and hampered both divisions gravely in the retreat to the Seine and the advance to the Aisne. The other divisional troops (less the 60-pdr. battery) mentioned in the text as being absent reached St. Quentin early on the 26th, and the O.C. Signal Company sent a message to the 4th Division, timed 8.10 A.M. which reached General Snow during the morning, saying " detained here by order of G.H.Q: " Formed in a column, under Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Jones, the C.R.E;. of the 4th Division, these divisional troops were soon after ordered by G.H.Q. to retire. They waited south of the Somme until the main body of the division reached them on the 28th. Half a squadron North Irish Horse reported to 4th Division headquarters on the evening of the 25th, and was sent to assist the flank detachment of the R. Inniskilling Fusiliers at Bévillers. During the night, however it lost touch of the 4th Division and fought at Caudry on the 26th with the 3rd Division, not returning to the 4th until late on the 28th.) and cyclists, heavy battery, engineers, the greater part of its signal company, (No. 1 Section (for divisional headquarters) was absent. It contained three cable detachments with telephone equipment, motor cyclists, push cyclists, mounted men, heliographs and other means of communication. It formed the exchange centre of the division for the despatch and receipt of messages.) train, ammunition column and field ambulances. Hence there were no mounted troops to furnish patrols or covering parties, no 60-pdrs. to mow down the enemy before deployment as was to be done with such striking effect by the heavy battery of the 5th Division on the right, no engineers to superintend working parties, very limited means of attending to wounded, no means of removing them, and, above all, no means of controlling from divisional headquarters the general movements of some fifteen thousand men extended along a front of five miles, except by the use of mounted officers and orderlies. The ground on which the 4th Division lay, on the left of the British line, was open fields under cultivation, with some of the crops, notably beetroot and clover, still ungathered, soaked by the rain of the previous night, and in many places churned into deep mud by the passage of men, horses, guns and vehicles ; over such a surface horses, already none too fresh, were soon exhausted by a few hard gallops.

The 4th Division did not receive the 7.30 P.M. order to continue the retreat on Le Catelet until midnight, when a copy was brought by Colonel W. H. Bowes from G.H.Q. Divisional orders were prepared but were not issued to the brigades, for they were all on the move. At 5 A.M. officers were sent out to ascertain the positions of the troops, and it was intended to issue the orders as soon as the officers reported, should the situation permit retirement. It was almost immediately after this that Captain B. Walcot arrived from General Smith-Dorrien to announce his decision to stand and to request that the 4th Division would cover his flank. General Snow agreed to do so, and at 5.30 A.M. sent messages to his brigades to take up the positions already ordered, and to the 11th Brigade to get in touch with the 3rd Division. Shortly after this the officers who had carried the order returned reporting, to use the words of one of them, Captain H. J. Elles, that the infantry was already " at it hammer and tongs."