Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketch 21 ; Maps 2, 3 & 4)

It will be remembered that, shortly after the Aisne was reached, General Joffre had reinforced the Sixth Army with the XIII. Corps, and impressed on General Maunoury the importance of enveloping the German right flank ; in consequence of which, on the 17h September, the latter commander again took the offensive. His left wing, consisting of the XIII. Corps, IV. Corps and Ebener's Group of Reserve divisions (61st and 62nd), was ordered to outflank the German right which was bent back near Noyon, south of the Oise ; whilst his right was to consolidate the ground gained north of the Aisne, keep contact with the enemy, and be ready to resume the offensive.

At the moment the forces at the disposal of the German Supreme Command to meet the enveloping movement were small in number. The IX. Reserve Corps, which had been brought from Antwerp, had arrived on the right of the First Army on the 15th and had been thrust into the fight by Kluck next day. The Sixth Army could not be expected to arrive there on that flank much before the 25th. Bülow, with the approval of O.H.L., after ordering Kluck to stop an offensive which, in order to prevent envelopment, he was wildly taking south-westward with his right, the IV. and IX. Reserve Corps and the 4th and 7th Cavalry Divisions, instructed him to echelon these two corps behind his right flank. On the l6th, the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were sent from the Chemin des Dames to his support.

On the 17th September, before the retrograde movement of Kluck's right could be carried out, the French offensive began. The French IV. and XIII. Corps advancing up both sides of the Oise came into collision with the German right in the area Carlepont-Noyon. On the l8th, however, the French attack came to a standstill on a line south-east and north-west through Carlepont. The first attempt to outflank the Germans had failed and had only resulted in the extension of the battle front north of the Aisne.

General Joffre made his next effort with the reconstructed Second Army under General de Castelnau, and on the 26th September sent General Foch, as his deputy, to take charge of the operations on the western flank. The composition of the Second Army has already been given. As a preliminary measure, its former front in Lorraine having been taken over by the French First Army, since entrenchments allowed the line to be held with fewer men, its four corps were concentrated about Amiens, the four cavalry divisions covering its left flank. On the 22nd September, this Second Army advanced across the Avre against the front Lassigny-Roye-Chaulnes ; but, by this time, new German forces had arrived and were ready to parry the envelopment. The German II. Corps of the First Army had been withdrawn from its position on the Aisne and brought to the right of the IX. Reserve Corps. It came into line between Noyon and Roye on the 18th/19th September. Even with the support of Marwitz's four cavalry divisions, the II. Corps proved insufficient to stop de Castelnau's offensive, and on the afternoon of the 23rd the French Second Army had reached the road Ribecourt-Lassigny-Roye and was threatening the German communications at Ham and St. Quentin. At this critical moment, the German XVIII. Corps, sent off by road on the 21st from the neighbourhood of Reims, over fifty miles away, was approaching Ham. It immediately counterattacked westward towards Roye, and, supported by the II. Corps, it forced back the right wing of the French. De Castelnau's left wing, however, reached Péronne and formed a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Somme.

The offensive force of the French Second Army was for the moment spent ; and it was not fated to make further progress, for another German Army was beginning to appear on the western flank.

At a conference between Falkenhayn and Bülow on the 21st, it had been decided to concentrate the Sixth Army in as great strength as possible, near Amiens ; it was to make a push for the coast and then turn and envelop the French left wing south of the Somme. Before however these troops could arrive de Castelnau's offensive had so materially altered the situation that the plan had to be abandoned ; for the first two corps (the XXI. and I. Bavarian) as they came up found their way to Amiens barred and they were merely used to extend the front.

The XXI. Corps had entrained at Blouay (Lunéville) on the 15th September, and had been railed through Belgium to Cambrai, whence it marched at once towards Chaulnes, arriving, on the right of the XVIII. Corps, on the 24th. The same evening the I. Bavarian Corps came up on the right of the XXI., facing Péronne. Entrained at Glonville (east of Epinal) on the 14th/15th September, it had been railed to Namur, whence it made a forced march. These two newly arrived corps, with Marwitz's cavalry (now reinforced by the Guard Cavalry Division) on the right, drove the French out of Péronne and across the Somme. On the 26th after heavy fighting de Castelnau took up a strong position on the line Lassigny-Roye-Bray. The German cavalry corps moved further north to clear the front for the II. Bavarian Corps, which now came into line on the right of the I. Bavarian Corps, north of the Somme. This corps had entrained at Metz on the 18th/19th September and had travelled as far as Valenciennes by rail.

On the 27th, Marwitz's cavalry corps continued its way northwards, driving away d'Amade's French Territorials, now under General Brugère, and clearing the front this time for the XIV. Reserve Corps, which came up on that day on the right of the II. Bavarian Corps and at once moved on Albert. The two divisions of the XIV. Reserve Corps had detrained at Valenciennes and Cambrai. (An account of the journey from Lorraine and the disorganisation at Cambrai is given in the " Erlebnisse " of General von Stein, who commanded the XIV. Reserve Corps.)

On the 25th September the German Supreme Command had moved from Luxembourg to Mezières-Charleville and, as already recorded, had ordered the Second, Seventh and First Armies to take the offensive again, in order to hold the Allies to their position on the Aisne, and prevent the flow of reinforcements to the Somme district.

Meanwhile, the German offensive in the north was progressing. The II. Bavarian and XIV. Reserve Corps easily drove back the French Territorial division holding the Bapaume district, and were approaching Bray sur Somme and Albert in high hopes of reaching Amiens and Abbeville and the sea. But again reinforcements came to the French northern flank, where General de Castelnau was holding on to cover the detrainment of the Tenth Army (at first called " Subdivision d'Armée ") near Arras. There was little time to lose, and during the 25th, 26th and 27th September the XXI. and X. Corps, which were north of the Somme, covered on the left by Brugère's group of Territorial divisions and Conneau's cavalry corps, were in grave danger ; but by the evening of the 28th they had succeeded in stopping the Germans on the line Maricourt-Fricourt-Thiepval. Marwitz's cavalry extended the German line further northwards to the neighbourhood of Arras, where it was held in check by Conneau's cavalry.

The commander of the new Tenth Army, General Maud'huy (lately commanding the XVIII. Corps), had to deal with a totally different situation from that which had confronted de Castelnau on his arrival in the north. So far from being able to take the offensive in the hopes of turning the enemy's flank, a strong German force was already advancing and threatening Arras before the Tenth Army was even concentrated. For the moment the most that General Maud'huy could hope was to bring the enemy to a standstill. On the 29th September, the X. Corps then at Acheux, between Albert and Doullens (20 miles north of Amiens), Conneau's cavalry corps (1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th Cavalry Divisions) south-east of Arras, and d'Urbal's provisional corps, consisting of Barbot's and Fayolle's Reserve divisions, at Arras and Lens respectively, were placed at his disposal.

On the 1st October, Maud'huy, having but a few hours' breathing space to make preparations, was intending to begin an offensive from Arras-Lens south-east against the German flank, in the expectation of finding nothing in front of him except cavalry. (An account of General Maud'huy's operations will be found in the " Revue des Deux Mondes " for 1st August 1920.) But again the enemy was able to parry the blow, for behind the cavalry three more corps had arrived, and were already deploying preparatory to taking the offensive. The French Tenth Army, scattered over a wide front, was soon in imminent danger of being itself enveloped.

It was to be expected that the Germans would make every effort to prevent the French line from being extended to include Lille, and also, what would have been still more serious for them, from joining hands with the Belgian Army in Antwerp. This fortress, close to the Dutch frontier, offered, apart from its intrinsic importance, an ideal holdfast on which to secure the Allied extreme left flank. The German Supreme Command had already decided on its future plan. It involved three distinct operations, in which all the troops that could be released or collected were to be employed. (Falkenhayn, p. 12. Stegemann, ii. pp. 70-76. Vogel, p. 179. )

First, a strong offensive was to be made on the northern wing near Arras. The three corps selected for the purpose were the IV. from the First Army, the Guard Corps from the Second Army, and the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, the last remaining corps of the original Sixth Army. The attack on Arras was begun on the 2nd October, in combination with an attempt to break through near Roye and capture the French forces between the two places.

Secondly, eight cavalry divisions (the Bavarian Cavalry Division had arrived and joined the others), in three corps, the I. and II. under General von der Marwitz, and the IV. under Lieut.-General von Hollen, were to cover the right flank of the offensive and sweep across Flanders towards the coast.

(I. Cavalry Corps : Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions.

II. Cavalry Corps : 2nd, 7th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.

IV. Cavalry Corps : 3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions.

(" Schlachten und Gefechte," pp. 46 and 48.) The Kaiser sent General von der Marwitz a message on 3rd October," His Majesty wishes to see the cavalry corps in the rear of the enemy to-morrow.") The two groups started on the 2nd and 4th October, respectively.

Thirdly, the operations at Antwerp were to be accelerated, and the place captured before it could be reinforced. The bombardment with 42-cm. howitzers was commenced on the night of the 27th/28th September.

It may be noticed here that, taking up a proposal made earlier from London, General Joffre, on the l6th September, had asked that all available troops should be sent to Dunkirk and Calais " to act effectively and constantly " against the enemy's communications," so as to interfere with his outflanking movements. In response, the Marine Brigade of the Royal Naval Division was disembarked at Dunkirk on the night of the 19th/20th September and the Oxfordshire Yeomanry on the 22nd. (How they were got across is described in " Naval Operations," vol. i. p. 190.) These troops were under the command of Br.-General G. Aston, who had s instructions to give the impression that they were the advanced guard of a large British force. As in the case of minor landings in the past, the enemy paid no direct attention to so stingless a threat. He took measures, however, to push on with the siege of Antwerp.

The action of Br.-General Aston's force, and of other troops landed on the coast in October 1914, is related in due course in a subsequent volume. It suffices to say now that on the 28th September, the first day of the bombardment of Antwerp, Br.-General Aston sent one battalion to Lille ; the rest of his brigade moved to Cassel on the 30th, and watched the country by means of parties in motors. On the 29th, in consequence of sickness, he had handed the command over to Br. - General A. Paris. At 6 A.M. on the 3rd October the brigade was moved to Antwerp, being followed on the 6th by two new brigades of the Royal Naval Division which had landed at Dunkirk on the night of the 3rd/4th. On the 6th also the 7th Division landed at Zeebrugge, followed on the 7th by the 3rd Cavalry Division. (The organisation of these divisions is given in " 1914," Vol. II.)

To return to the German offensive against the French Tenth Army near Arras, the Guard and IV. Corps left their old positions on the Aisne on the 27th, and the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps entrained at Metz on the same day. The three corps came into action on the 1st October, almost simultaneously, in the above order from south to north, on the front Arras-Douai, where there were General Brugère's (formerly d'Amade's) Territorial troops. They thus encountered the Tenth Army whilst it was preparing for its offensive. Neither side was destined to achieve its ambitious aims. Very heavy fighting took place on 1st-9th October; the French gave ground gradually, but eventually brought the German onslaught to a standstill. By the evening of the 8th the front had become stabilised near the line Thiepval-Gommecourt-Blairville-eastern outskirts of Arras-Bailleul-Vimy-Souchez, on which the belligerents were to face each other for so many months. (It was on the morning of the 6th that General Foch said to the commander of the Tenth Army, " Fight to the last man, but hang on like lice. No retirement. Every man to the attack " (" Revue des Deux Mondes," 15.8.1920, p. 846).) The attempt to break through near Roye was an even greater failure, although continued until the 9th, when Falkenhayn ordered the battle to be broken off, as no impression had been made on the French defence. To the Germans it was " incomprehensible " that they could not get the better of the French, and their ill-success was ascribed to the strength of the French field fortifications and the hitherto unappreciated power of the defence. (G.O.A., v. p. 148. )

The German hopes now rested on the three Cavalry Corps, I., II. and IV. under Marwitz and Hollen, outflanking the French line, and so compelling a withdrawal. They had been working north of the main battle, pushing local Territorial troops before them, to the line Lens-Lille (which towns still remained in French possession).

On the 2nd October, Marwitz had issued orders for a general offensive, the objectives of which were " finally to break down the weakening resistance of the enemy by operating against his flank and rear, to block all the railways leading from Paris and the Lower Seine, and to destroy completely the railways from the lower Somme and the coastal railways near Abbeville." A number of additional artillery, engineer and infantry units were allotted to the cavalry divisions. (See Reinhardt's " Sechs Monate Westfront," p. 19 ; Rutz's Bayern-kämpfe," p. 12 ; Hocker's " An der Spitze meiner Kompagnie," p. 124.)

The progress of this great cavalry raid must have been extremely disappointing to those who had organised it. The operation was in fact a complete failure. The I. and II. Cavalry Corps advancing between Lens and Lille met with some opposition and by evening retired behind the Lorette heights. It was only with difficulty that they held their ground on the 7th, for the heads of the divisions of the French XXI. Corps, detrained near Béthune, were moving against them.

On the morning of the 8th, however, hopes of French success were again blighted by the arrival of the German XIV. Corps to extricate the cavalry. Entraining at Metz on the 4th October, this corps had marched to the field from Mons. On its arrival the I. and II. Cavalry Corps were sent north to penetrate between La Bassée and Armentières and reach Abbeville.

Meantime the IV. Cavalry Corps moving north of Lille had, on the 8th, passed through Ypres expecting to reach the sea that evening. (Rutz s " Bayernkämpfe," pp. 16-25 ; he was with the 2nd Cavalry Division.) General von Hollen's orders were " to ride round the flank and rear of the enemy opposite the right wing, thoroughly destroy the communications, particularly the railways which lead from the coast and the south to the area west of Amiens-Lille-Alost, and at the cost of the last horse and man ensure that the enemy's operations against our right flank are hindered in every way." The columns turned south-west from Ypres and were soon streaming on all the roads towards Hazebrouck. They turned back, however, on meeting resistance from units of de Mitry's newly formed cavalry corps, (4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, from the Fifth Army and I. Cavalry Corps, respectively.) and reassembled next day in and near Bailleul.

Thus by the 9th October, on both sides, the battle line had been extended from the Aisne westwards and northwards to within 30 miles of Dunkirk and the coast.

Towards the close of September, Sir John French had suggested to General Joffre the transfer of the British Army to its former place on the left of the line. Other British troops, as already mentioned, were about to be landed in the north of France ; and it was obviously desirable that all the forces of the nation available should act in one body. The lines of communication also of the B.E.F. would be greatly shortened by its being near the coast. The British were specially concerned in preventing the fall of Antwerp, and were vitally interested in barring the way to the Channel ports from which the Germans could threaten the transport of troops from England to France and block the avenues of water-borne traffic converging on London. That the Germans had not seized Ostend, Calais and Boulogne during their first triumphant advance, when they might easily have done so, had been due to lack of troops ; but that omission they were now desperately striving to make good.

Apart from all question of those ports, it was obvious that if the British were restored to their old place on the left of the new line, they could be reinforced with a swiftness and secrecy elsewhere impossible.

Against this movement there were the obvious objections that it must be carried out gradually, so that for a time the British Expeditionary Force would be divided, and that the British in their journey northward must move right across the line of the French communications, thus necessarily preventing the despatch of French troops to the north for several, it was even said ten, days. General Joffre, however, agreed to Sir John French's proposal ; and on the night of the 1st/2nd October was begun the withdrawal of the British troops from the valley of the Aisne. Their movements were carefully concealed ; all marches were made by night and the men confined to their billets by day, so that no sign of their departure from the Aisne should be visible to enemy aircraft. These precautions were so far successful that on the 3rd October an intercepted German wireless message mentioned that all six British divisions were still on the Aisne. (It was not until 8th October that German air reconnaissances revealed lively traffic on the railway south of the Aisne, and the movement of lorries and marching columns westwards : a transfer of troops from the Aisne to the lower Somme was deduced. (G.O.A., v. p. 197.))

The II. Corps was the first to move, the I. Corps extending its left to Vailly and the III. Corps its right to Missy to cover the vacated ground. A day s rest on the south bank enabled the II. Corps to make good its deficiencies in blankets and greatcoats which had been keenly felt throughout the miserable weather on the Aisne. By the night of the 3rd/4th the entire corps had started on its march westward to the railway at Compiegne and three neighbouring stations. The 2nd Cavalry Division marched by road on the night of the 2nd ; the 1st Cavalry Division on the night of the 3rd. The III. Corps, giving over its trenches to the French on the night of the 6th, moved off twenty-four hours later, also to entrain at and near Compiègne, leaving the 16th Brigade with the I. Corps. (The l9th Brigade took its place for a time in the III. Corps.) This corps remained in its trenches until the night of the 12th/13th, but the evacuation was not finally completed until forty-eight hours later.

The advance of the B.E.F. into Flanders will be dealt with in the succeeding volume of this history, but the following outline of it is given to complete the narrative of the move from the Aisne. During the 8th and 9th October the II. Corps detrained at Abbeville and concentrated on both banks of the lower Authie, about twelve miles north-east of Abbeville, in the area Genne Iverny-Gueschart-La Boisle-Raye. It then received orders to advance towards Béthune. On the 9th also, the 2nd Cavalry Division arrived between St. Pol and Hesdin, with the 1st a day's march in rear of it. On the 8th, G.H.Q. moved from Fère en Tardenois to Abbeville and five days later to St. Omer.

On the 11th October, the III. Corps began detraining and concentrating at St. Omer and Hazebrouck, and subsequently moved on the left rear of the II. towards Bailleul and Armentières.

On the l9th, a week later than the III. Corps, the I. Corps detrained and concentrated at Hazebrouck, and moved on Ypres. The 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division landed at Ostend and Zeebrugge, and the Belgian Army retiring from Antwerp had meantime filled the gap between Ypres and the sea.

Thus ended for the British the fighting on the Aisne in 1914 ; and the narrative may be closed with a very brief review of the battle.

The disappointing results of the operations on the 12th-14th September, after which a deadlock ensued, seem to have been due to a failure of the High Command to appreciate the situation, and exploit the still existing gap in the enemy's line. It was at any rate partly due to the neglect to exercise control and issue orders which would have made the essential requirements of the situation clear to subordinate commanders.

The forcing of the Aisne was likely to involve a race with hostile reinforcements, in which the Germans had the advantage, as they were falling back. This race was lost mainly owing to the failure to make a resolute effort even to reconnoitre the enemy's dispositions on the river, and, except in the 4th Division, to push forward parties to seize the bridges on the night of the 12th/13th. On the 13th, when the divisions made a rather cautious and leisurely advance, they should have been reminded, in spite of their fatigue after over three weeks' continuous operations, that " sweat saves blood." In the G.H.Q. orders there was no hint whatever of the importance of time.

By the evening of the 13th September the situation had completely changed. German reinforcements were known to have arrived, and serious resistance was to be expected on the 14th ; yet the G.H.Q. orders merely repeated the formula that " the Army will continue the pursuit . . . and act vigorously against the retreating enemy " ; they gave no more tactical direction than to allot roads. There was no plan, no objective, no arrangements for co-operation, and the divisions blundered into battle.

The actual passage of the Aisne is likely to be remembered in the annals of the Army as a very remarkable feat ; for it involved forcing a passage frontally without possibility of manoeuvre. The Germans excuse their failure to stop the British at the river line by the explanation that their peace-time teaching required one single strong line and a long field of fire, and that to secure these they went back to the top of the plateau. The advance of the 11th Brigade alone across the damaged bridge at Venizel was a most audacious move ; yet at no point did the crossing of any one body of troops facilitate the passage of others, owing to the topography of the valley and the small depth of the positions gained on the north side of the river. But for the German failure to destroy the aqueduct at Bourg completely, it is possible that the British might have been unable to maintain their firm hold on the north bank. By way of that aqueduct, however, the guns of the 1st Division managed to cross the river and find effective positions at once. Thus Sir Douglas Haig, taking instant advantage of his opportunity, was able to make his bold thrust forward on the 14th and to establish his right on the Chemin des Dames, where his troops clung to the shallow holes which did duty for trenches, with a tenacity beyond all praise. For want of another division in reserve, he was unable to push his advance further ; to the west of Troyon the 2nd Division, the II. Corps and the III. Corps were pinned to their ground and could give him no help.

Regarding the Aisne in the light of the ditch of a fortress, only the I. Corps had really passed over it and could see any prospect of carrying forward its attack. The II. and III. Corps had practically made no more than a lodgement on the escarp, (The defender's side of the ditch of a fortress.) above which they dared not show their heads. They could find no effective positions for their artillery ; and for a time could make little reply to the German bombardment except with rifle fire. Indeed, had not the enemy frequently assaulted the British lines in force and in close formation, the British would have had little to show in return for the casualties which they suffered from the German artillery. As matters fell out, the Germans gave on many occasions the very opportunity of which the British soldier could take advantage, and he did so to the full.

It is somewhat difficult to arrive at the total number of German formations which fought the British five, eventually six, divisions on the Aisne ; for single brigades from many corps were put into the line. Thus we know (From General von Zwehl, commander of the VII. Reserve Corps.) that apart from the cavalry and two heavy howitzer batteries, the British I. Corps was opposed not only by the VII. Reserve Corps, but by a mixed detachment of the XII. Corps consisting of the 63rd Brigade, three batteries and a heavy howitzer battery ; the 50th Brigade of the XVIII. Corps ; five battalions of the XV. Corps, the 25th Landwehr Brigade, and 1,200 men of the X. Corps : a total of over 20 extra battalions. The British II. Corps had opposite it the German III. Corps with the 34th Brigade of the IX. Corps interposed between its divisions, (Zwehl's map No. 4. ) and two heavy howitzer batteries, as well as, on at least one day, a regiment of the VII. Corps. The four infantry brigades of the III. Corps had in front of them the German II. Corps, whose front was from Chivres sector (exclusive) to Cuffies. (Kluck, p. 187.) Thus, recalling that German brigades contained six battalions to the British four, there were at least 100 German battalions to 78 British (including the 6th Division).

It is remarkable to note the contrast from the 16th September onward between the activity of the Germans in the new Seventh Army east of Celles and the apathy of the wearied soldiers of Kluck's First Army west of the spur of Condé. Hardly a day passed without an onslaught of some kind on some point of the line between Paissy and Vailly ; but, except on the 26th September, there was little sign of an offensive movement west of Condé. There was, of course, constant shelling of the 5th and 4th Divisions, but little more ; yet the position of the 5th Division was so precarious as positively to invite attack. Moreover, the Germans can hardly have been unaware that the battalions of the 5th Division had suffered more, perhaps, in the previous operations than any others in the Army. The 4th Division, as its trenches improved and as its ranks were refilled, showed much enterprise on the Aisne. It could do nothing on a great scale ; but by pushing trenches forward and by worrying the Germans perpetually with patrols and snipers, it established over them a well-marked ascendancy.

The British Army gained much useful experience on the Aisne, and absolute confidence in its shooting. The men learned how to entrench quickly and to appreciate the value of digging. The drafts were able to settle down, and the young soldiers of the Special Reserve had time to gather instruction from the trained officers and N.C.O.'s who though sadly reduced in numbers, were still fairly abundant. For the rest, the soldiers astonished even those who had trained them by their staunchness, their patience, their indomitable cheerfulness under incessant hardship, and, in spite of a fire such as no human being had ever before experienced, by their calm, cool courage at all times. Whether it was the gunner unloading ammunition almost too hot to handle, in the midst of blazing wagons ; the engineer repairing his bridge under continuous fire ; the infantryman patiently enduring heavy shell fire, patrolling No-Man's-Land in the hours of darkness, or, as sniper, lying all night on soaking clay in dripping beet-fields ; the cavalry trooper fighting on foot to hold gaps in the line ; the transport driver guiding his wagons through bursting shells ; or the stretcher-bearer toiling through the dark hours to rescue the wounded, all alike proved themselves worthy soldiers of the King. Though their dearest friends, comrades of many years, fell beside them, they fought with the majesty of their ancestors, without anger or malice, trusting always in the good cause of their country. Their good health in quagmires of trenches under constant rain of itself testified to their discipline. Sober, temperate and self-respecting, they were not to be discouraged by wounds or sickness. There could be no fear as to the final victory, if only more armies of such soldiers could be brought into being in sufficient numbers and without delay, and conveyed in security across the Channel to France.